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Abstract 
The frequency of currency crises has increased drastically in the last 30 years, and 
the scale and impact of these episodes has greatly renewed interest in the existing 
literature and stimulated a growing volume of new literature on both theoretical and 
empirical sides. These offer quite different explanations for currency crises which 
the thesis attempts to assess. 
Firstly, this project looks at the experiences of countries in Latin America, Eu-
rope and East Asia during 1970-2001. The aim is to examine how good the so-called 
'three generation' crisis theoretical models are in explaining the origins of different 
currency crises where they were originally inspired. Instead of imposing an arbi-
trary threshold a priori, we employ the non-linear SETAR (Self Exciting Threshold 
Autoregression) model and Markov-switching model to identify the crisis incidents. 
The Limited Dependent Variable Model-Logit Model is adopted to link the defined 
crisis variable to a wide range of selected variables based on crisis theories and em-
pirical works. The estimated results show limited evidence that the three generation 
n1odels efficiently address the different features of currency crises in three regions. 
The overall imperfect picture lays down the task for our further research. 
In the following chapter, we focus on the issue of credibility within the approach 
of the second-generation models. In an extended model, we show that whether a 
Vl 
strenuous defence of a parity would boost its credibility is ambiguous and depends on 
the importance of the 'debt-burden' effect relative to the 'signalling' effect. In other 
words, resisting a crisis could show the authority's resolution not to devalue, and 
thus enhance the expectation that the regime will be maintained in the future. But 
at the same time, refraining from inflationary financing increases the debt burden 
and hence the likelihood of a forced future devaluation. Two testable predictions 
are derived regarding the impact of the debt maturity on the interest rates in two 
different types of countries-the debt-burden countries and signalling countries. We 
distinguish between them in our sample by observing different patterns in the in-
terest rates when countries experience actual crises and/ or successful defences. The 
actual devaluations are identified by the regime changes in the Reinhart-Rogoff in-
dex, while the successful defences are periods that are under severe attack (defined 
by· both the SETAR and MRS model) but do not le.ad to actual crises. By using 
the GMM (General Method of Moments) for the dynamic panel data model, the 
estimated results show supportive evidence for the predictions. 
Finally, we re-examine the crisis transmission mechanism during the 1997/98 
East Asia Crises. It is argued that the tests for contagion based on the conditional 
cross-market correlation coefficient are inaccurate and biased due to heteroscedas-
ticity. We adopt the proposed formula to adjust for the bias and conduct our tests, 
for the first time, in the framework of a Markov-switching Vector Autoregressive 
(MS-VAR) model. It is shown that the adjustment has a significant impact on the 
tests, and the evidence of contagion that is found in the initial tests based on the 
conditional correlation coefficients soon disappears, after we adjust for heteroscedas-
ticity. Instead, the highly correlated comovements amongst the East Asian markets 
during the 1997/98 crises is only a continuation of the strong econmnic linkages-
interdependence between them-which exist in all states of the world. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
In the last 30 years many countries in the world, developed and developing alike, have 
experienced fierce speculative attacks on their currencies. The European Monetary 
System (EMS) was severely undermined by such attacks in 1992/93- ｴｾ･＠ cause 
of Great Britain's and Italy's exit from the EMS in 1992, and the widening of the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) bands for most of its member nations in 1993. 
In December 1994, following a speculative attack on the Mexican peso, the Mex-
ican government abandoned the crawling peg, leaving the currency to devalue. The 
newly industrializing countries in East Asia, once regarded as the most economically 
successful in the world, abruptly fell into financial/currency turmoil in 1997. A new 
phenomenon, which became the most striking aspect of the East Asia crises, was the 
resultant rapid crash that spreads from the Thai exchange market to other countries 
in the region, and to Russia and Brazil later in 1998. 
More recently, turbulence in Argentina's financial market has pushed its govern-
ment to default on foreign debts at the beginning of 2002, and also slow its recovering 
economy. The scale and impact of these events have to a large extent renewed inter-
ests in the existing literature on the subject, and stimulated an growing volume of 
Introduction 2 
new literature on both theoretical and empirical work to offer different explanations 
for these apparently ever-changing phenomena. 
Two questions are raised in 1ny research: 
1. "How good are the existing crisis theories (the so-called 'three generation' 
models) at explaining the currency crises?'' 
2. If they are not good enough, then "is there any area where we can make 
improvement in either/both theories and empirical works?" 
The latter question covers two different points: 
• Revisit the issue of credibility of an exchange rate regime in second-generation 
crisis theories, in order to see how current actions affect future policy through 
the channel of Public Debt. 
• Re-examine the crisis transmission mechanism in the 1997 East Asia Cur-
rency /Financial Crises, after adjusting for the bias due to heteroscedasticity, 
as proposed by Forbes and Rigobon {2002). 
However, before proceeding to a detailed discussion of currency crises, it is nec-
essary to clarify the concept of 'currency crisis' used in this thesis. Popular wisdom 
refers to currency crises as the episodes when domestic currencies come under se-
vere pressure to be devalued. These episodes may or may not result in actual 
devaluations; for example, governments facing fierce speculative attacks can avoid 
devaluation by selling foreign reserves and/ or raising interest rates. 
Therefore, many papers develop a two-step classification to identify currency 
crises (see Eichengreen et al. (1996a), Eichengreen et al. (1996b), Frankel and Rose 
(1996), and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) amongst others). Firstly, the vulnera-
bility of a country's exchange rate regime is gauged by an exchange market pressure 
index, which comprises changes in the exchange rate, interest rate, and reserves. 
At the second stage, a crisis is identified if the index exceeds a certain threshold 
level. The problem is that the choice of the threshold is arbitrary, i.e. 10%, or one 
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standard deviation. Throughout this thesis, however, the bias will be avoided by 
adopting non-linear state models that allow the data to reveal whether a given move 
represents abnormal behaviour and thus signal a crisis. 
As will be shown in the Chapter 2 Literature Review, the existing crisis litera-
ture has been extensive and offered various ･ｸｰｬ｡ｮ｡ｴｩｯｾｳ＠ for currency crises occurring 
around the world in the last three decades. The initial approach of 'bad' fundamen-
tals (put forward by Krugman (1979) and modified by Flood and Garber (1984)) 
indicates that currency crises result from expansionary fiscal and/ or monetary poli-
cies. These classic speculative attack models have been tested, and are considered 
good fits to the ･ｸｰ･ｾｩ･ｮ｣･ｳ＠ of many Latin American countries during 1970s and 
1980s. 
But in the early 1990s, the fact that some speculative attacks took place in Eu-
ropean economies without large apparent monetary and fiscal imbalances prompted 
the emergence of so-called 'second-generation' crisis models (i.e. Obstfeld {1994), 
Obstfeld (1996)). These models suggest that conflicting goals of governmental poli-
cies, when combined with investors' 'rational' perceptions, can create multiple equi-
libria. A crisis is created when the economy switches from a 'good' equilibrium to 
a 'bad' one and the process can be self-fulfilling, even when the fundamentals are 
sound. 
Most of the classic models failed to predict the East Asia Currency /Financial 
Crises which suddenly broke out in 1997/98. As a result, the 'third-generation' 
models were developed. Krugman (1998) suggests that the problem of 'moral hazard' 
and the resultant international over-borrowing play an important role, acting as 
a main force in creating bubbles in asset markets. Change and Velasco (1998) 's 
illiquidity model shows that a financial (currency) crisis can occur if a large number 
of agents lose their confidence in the banks and withdraw their money at the same 
time, because these actions can force the liquidation of more profitable long-term 
investments to compensate for the temporary shortfall. 
But the question is: how good are the three generation crisis models when ad-
--- --- --------------------------- ------- - - ------
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dressing the origins of currency crises globally? Chapter 3 will examine the crisis 
episodes in three different country groups - Latin America, Europe and East Asia 
- looking at the distinctive features of crises in each region, as defined by the three 
generation models. 
As mentioned above, the Market Pressure Index (MPI) is established to gauge 
the vulnerability of a country's exchange rate to speculative attacks. As opposed to 
imposing an arbitrary threshold, i.e. 10% or a one standard deviation move in the 
MPI, the SETAR (Self Exciting Threshold Auto-regression) model and the Markov-
switching model are employed to allow data itself to signal crises. The SETAR 
model allows the MPI to switch from a state of 'tranquil' to a state of 'turmoil', 
once it exceeds the threshold level that is chosen to deliver the lowest standard error 
in the maximum likelihood estimation. The Markov-switching model assumes that 
the evolution of the state follows a first order Markov process. 
Based on the definition of currency crises above, we examine a wide range of 
economic factors as potential causes for the crashes in the three regions, looking in 
particular at the variables recommended by the three generation crisis models. 
The work adopts the 'Limited Dependent Variable' model, more specifically the 
'Logit' model, to link the probability of a crisis to the relevant economic variables. 
As the data used is annual, a one-period lag of the explanatory variables is also 
included in the model. Finally, by dropping all explanatory variables that are not 
statistically significant at 10% level from our primary regression, we arrive at a set of 
final results (discussed in Chapter 3). The study is an attempt to adopt an objective 
approach by using both the SETAR and Markov-switching model to examine the 
crisis episodes in Latin America, Europe and East Asia. 
The estimated results show limited evidence that the three generation models 
efficiently address the different features of currency crises in three regions respec-
tively. In other words, there is the possibility for improvement; we start by looking 
at the issue of credibility of the exchange rate regime within the second-generation 
framework. 
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From the traditional view of a monetary authority's reputation, resisting a cur-
rency crisis sends a strong signal of resolve and thus enhances the credibility of a 
fixed exchange rate. But Benigno and Missale (2001) point out that current ac-
tions affect future policy. Therefore, defending the currency and refraining from 
inflationary financing increases the debt burden, impairing the authority's ability to 
withstand future crises. Therefore, whether an exchange rate regime gains or loses 
credibility after a successful defence depends on whether the monetary authority's 
reputation or fundamentals dominates, i.e. the level and maturity of public debt. 
Drazen and Masson (1994) suggested in an earlier paper that the persistent effect 
of unemployment could be another factor, showing that ·Inaintaining a fixed parity 
leads to higher future unemployment thus constraining the scope to maneuvre in 
the future. 
Following Benigno and Missale (2001)'s approach, we adopt a three-period stochas-
tic version of the Barro and Gordon (1983) model, where the probability of deval-
uation in each period is derived from the optimal problem facing the monetary 
authority. Three cases are studied: 
Firstly, the case is considered where the central bank can commit itself to a 
2-period rule, which is set up in period 0 and publicly known. We obtain the 
socially optimal solution as a benchmark for following studies. Secondly, we study 
the case where the monetary authority cannot make a commitment and its type is 
known to the public ('complete information'). Finally, we examine the case where 
the monetary authority cannot commit itself but its preferences are not known to 
private sectors ('asymmetric information'). 
We also extend the original model to distinguish between defiatable and non-
defiatable debt. We show that when the type of monetary authority is not .publicly 
known, the relative importance of the 'debt-burden' effect and 'signaling' effect are 
crucial in determining the probability of a future crisis after a current crisis, and the 
term structure of interest rates. 
In a pioneering methodology, we combine the Reinhart-Rogoff index (which gives 
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actual changes in exchange rate regimes) with the SETAR and Markov-switching 
model (which could identify the periods of high pressure in exchange rate markets). 
The periods of severe attacks defined by both the SETAR and Markov-switching 
model but not accommodated in the Reinhart-Rogoff index are differentiated as 
successful defences against the actual crises. Based on the different patterns shown 
by the domestic interest rate differential (relative to the USA, a proxy for the likeli-
hood of a devaluation) after a devaluation and/or a successful defence, 11 emerging 
countries are split into two groups: one where the 'debt-burden' effect dominates, 
and the other where the 'signaling' effect prevails. Finally, two predictions of our 
theoretical models are tested on the two groups by adopting the GMM (Generalized 
Method of Moments) model for dynamic panel data; the results are quite promising. 
The 1997/98 East Asia Crises showed that a sharp devaluation of one country's 
currency could have a profound impact on the vulnerability of currencies in other 
economies in the region. In an attempt to mal<e a contribution to the crisis con-
tagion literature, we re-examine whether these highly correlated co-movements in 
the exchange markets give evidence of contagion. This depends on how we define 
the term 'contagion'. In the thesis, we follow the conventional approach to give a 
narrow definition of contagion: a significant increase in cross-market linkages after 
a shock to one country (or countries). Therefore, if the cross-market correlation 
does not increase significantly during periods of turmoil compared with the rela-
tively stable periods, then any continued level of correlation suggests that there is 
an interdependence that exists in all states of the world. 
Many economists, basing their tests on estimated conditional correlation coef-
ficients, find there are evidences suggesting that contagions occur in several crisis 
episodes (including the 1997/98 East Asia Crisis). But as Forbes and lligobon (2002) 
argue, the cross-1narket correlation coefficient is conditional on ｭｾｲｫ･ｴ＠ volatility. 
Therefore, during crises when markets are more volatile, the estimators of the cor-
relation coefficient tends to increase and be biased upward. This is the reason that 
so many tests traditionally find evidence of contagion. 
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Chapter 5 of this thesis, following Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 's approach, cor-
rects the bias due to heteroscedasticity before testing for contagion. Our analysis 
focuses on the period from 1991 to 1998 for five East Asian countries, where Thai-
land is chosen as the country that spawned the original crisis. As mentioned above, 
the Market Pressure Index (MPI) is adopted to represent not only the successful 
attacks (actual crises) but also the unsuccessful attacks on local currencies defended 
by loss in foreign reserves and increased interest rates. 
The main contribution of chapter 5 lies in the adoption of the non-linear Markov-
switching VAR framework to deliver a better representation of the crisis transmission 
mechanism. The rationale behind this is that during a long period, the macroe-
conomic or financial variables, such as Market Pressure Index (MPI), sometimes 
undergo episodes in which the series behaviour seems to change quite dramatically, 
e.g. currency crises. Unlike the linear models, the Markov-switching model assumes 
that observed data is drawn from different distributions conditional on the state-
contingent parameter sets. The model switches amongst different states, following 
the Markov chain, which means that the current state only depends on the state 
in the last period- 'let the history tell the future'. The results show that the hy-
potheses of linear specification are rejected at even 1% significant level in all cases, 
favouring the Markov-switching VAR models. Several exogenous variables are also 
included in our models to capture the fundamental changes and/ or external shocks. 
We find that the adjustment has a significant impact on the estimated cross-
market correlation coefficients, and hence on the test results. The evidence of conta-
gion that is found in the initial tests based on the conditional correlation coefficients, 
soon disappears after we adjust for heteroscedasticity. 
The material in the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the available 
literature on currency crises. We begin our literature review with a presentation of 
the so-called three generation crisis theoretical models, followed by four different 
empirical approaches. We also include some contemporary issues, e.g. crisis conta-
gion. As the volume of work on currency crises has grown so significantly in the last 
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two decades, presenting the main contributions in a systematic way is a challenging 
task. However, it is also rewarding, as the progress made in the understanding of 
currency crises in recent years is particularly encouraging. 
Chapter 3 is an empirical section. Firstly, we establish a Market Pressure Index 
(MPI) to represent both successful and unsuccessful attacks, and define currency 
crises by using the SETAR model and Markov-switching model. The potential 
factors for currency crises are chosen according to economic theories ·and empirical 
works. The Logit model is employed to identify the distinctive features of currency 
crises in three regions: Europe, Latin America and Asia. 
In Chapter 4, we firstly set up a theoretical framework for a revised Barra-
Gordan model. Three cases are then studied respectively: the Commitment case, 
which gives the benchmark, Discretion under Complete Information, and Discretion 
under Asymmetric Information. The results are demonstrated by numerical simu-
lation using Matlab. The sample of 11 emerging countries is split into two groups 
according to their different behaviours-debt-burden countries and signalling coun-
tries. Finally, the two predictions drawn up from our theory are tested on the two 
country groups. 
Chapter 5 firstly gives the definition of crisis contagion and review the relevant 
literature. The bias in the conventional approach using the conditional correla-
tion coefficient to test for contagion is identified and quantified, and an adjustment 
method is presented. The Markov-switching VAR model is adopted to examine 
the East Asian countries' experiences during the 1997/98 crises, after adjusting for 
heteroscedasticity. 
The implementation of the econometric analysis in chapters 3, 4 and 5 has in-
volved the collection of a variety of data. Every effort has been made to ensure 
that we collect the information in a consistent way and from reliable sources. The 
sources of data extraction are cited in each chapter. Detailed information on the 
construction of variables is also provided in the relevant chapters. Moreover, at 
various stages throughout the report the adopted econometric methodologies are 
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discussed, and their use justified. 
Finally, the main findings of this research project are discussed and summarized 
in Chapter 6. We also acknowledge the limitations of our analysis and outline 
directions for future research. 
· CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
During the last three decades, the frequency of currency crises has increased dra-
matically (see Bordo et al. (1998)). Events such as the Latin America Crises in 
the late 1970's and 1980's, the collapse of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) in 1992/93, the 1994 Mexica;n peso crisis, the East Asia Financial/Currency 
Crises in 1997/98, and the more recent turmoil in Argentina are all good examples. 
The scale and impact of these incidents has inspired interest in the existing crisis 
literature, and stimulated a large volume of new literature (including both theo-
ries and empirical works) to provide different explanations for currency crises-the 
apparently ever-changing phenomena. 
The initial speculative attack models were inspired by the crisis episodes expe-
rienced by the Latin American countries during the late 1970's and 1980's. This 
approach of 'bad' fundamentals (put forward by Krugman (1979) and modified by 
Flood and Garber (1984)) indicates that crises could be caused by expansionary fis-
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cal and/ or monetary policies, resulting in unsustainable credit expansion that was 
common amongst many Latin American economies at that time. However, the fact 
that some crises took place in Europe without either weak economic fundamentals 
or irresponsible credit expansion in the early 1990's, prompted the emergence of the 
so-called 'second generation' crisis models (Obstfeld (1994), Obstfeld (1996)). They 
emphasize that the conflicting goals of government policies when combined with 
investors' rational expectations can create multiple equilibria, where a crisis can be 
self-fulfilled even when the fundamentals are sound-move from a 'good' equilibrium 
where the fixed exchange rate regime is feasible to a 'bad' equilibrium where it is 
not. 
The debate on the causes of crises continued until1997 when the third generation 
models emerged to explain the factors that pushed the East Asian economies, once 
regarded as the world's most dramatic economic successes, into deep turmoil. The 
problems of moral hazard (international over-borrowing) and the liquidity crunch 
experienced once the currency regime collapsed are believed to have played a major 
part in the crises. The speed that crisis spread from one country to another has also 
raised interest in studies of contagion. 
On the empirical side, there are in general four different approaches analyzing 
currency crises. The first is the 'signalling' method, where the behaviours of a 
number of individual variables are evaluated against certain threshold levels. Once 
any of these indicators moves beyond its respective threshold, it signals a potential 
crisis in waiting. The 'optimal' threshold is selected to balance out the risks of 
failing to predict the crisis and giving a false signal of an impending crisis. 
The second methodology is the discrete-choice technique that analyzes the prob-
ability of having a currency crisis. This has been the most widely-used method until 
recent years when the non-linear changing regiine (state) models are introduced into 
crisis literature. Different countries and time periods are firstly sorted into two dis-
crete states: a crisis and a stable period. Then, a Legit or Probit model is employed 
to link the binary crisis variable to a range of potential factors chosen on the basis 
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of a priori economic theories. The likelihood of having a crash can therefore be 
evaluated, given a set of economic variables. The third method is largely descriptive 
and often based on specific case studies, where authors try to establish structural 
relationships between the selected variables and crisis incidents. 
The last approach that is increasingly popular in the crisis empirical literature 
is the changing regime models. In models like the Markov-switching model, we 
are allowed to assume that the time series variable could be drawn from differ-
ent distributions, conditional on state-contingent parameter sets. By adopting the 
Markov-switching ｾｰＮｯ､･ｬＬ＠ we could have a continuous dependent variable, and also 
avoid the arbitrary choice of a threshold level for currency crises. 
The literature grows at such a speed that it is very difficult to keep track of all 
theoretical and empirical developments. So while this chapter gives an overview of 
the theoretical approaches and empirical methodologies that appear to be relevant, 
it concentrates on key articles in each area. The rest of the chapter is organized 
as follows. In Section 2, we review the three generation theoretical models, noting 
their implications in the using of certain variables as potential factors in crises. 
Section 3 presents the four different approaches adopted by economists in building 
up empirical models. Finally, we summarize and give direction to our research in 
the following chapters. 
2.2 The Three Generation Crisis Models 
There are three generations of theoretical models in the currency crisis literature: 
the initial approach indicates that irresponsible government policies and unsound 
economic fundamentals are potential causes for crises; the second generation models 
emphasize the contingent nature of the government that may give rise to multiple 
equilibria, when combined with private sector's perfect foresight; and the latest 
method blames the problems of moral hazard (international over-borrowing) and 
the liquidity crunch for the currency reghne collapses. 
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2.2.1 The First-generation Crisis Models 
The first-generation crisis model is inspired by the literature on government price-
fixing schemes in exhaustible resource markets (Salant and Henderson (1978), Salant 
( 1983)). In the so-called 'New International Economic Order', Salant argues that 
any policy made by an official price stabilization board aiming to buy or sell the 
ex;haustible resource (e.g. gold) at a fixed price would be subject to devastating 
speculative attacks. It is assumed in his paper that because gold in the ground 
yields no service flow and costs nothing to extract, its price must rise in line with 
the real rate of interest. 
Suppose the government pegs the price of gold at some level between the initial 
price and the zero-demand choke price. At the beginning, gold owners will sell their 
entire stock to the government because they can earn a rate of return-the real 
interest rate-by placing their wealth in bonds instead of gold. For a time, industrial 
.and personal demands therefore will be supplied entirely by the govern1nent, who 
must sell any amount of its reserve at the fixed price. It is clear, however, that this 
situation is unsustainable: eventually the stock will be depleted and the equilibrium 
price will have to be at its choke level. 
In the model, the shadow free-market price of gold is introduced to show the 
competitive market price that would prevail in the absence of price fixing, whose 
path is derived by the well-known Laissez-faire perfect-foresight solution. The date 
at which the two prices become equal is the date at which the price-fixing scheme 
collapses: it does so after a speculative attack in which private market participants 
acquire all of the remaining official gold stock at the fixed price. The increase in 
private stock is justified, ex post facto, by the increased yield on holding stocks; 
for when the price stabilization policy breaks down, the price of gold begins rising, 
providing a capital gain that makes the holding of stocks more attractive. 
The initial approach of the speculative attack model in crisis literature was first 
put forward by Krugman (1979) and modified by Flood and Garber (1984). Krug-
man (1979) applies similar logic to speculative attacks not on a government using 
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a stockpile of an exhaustible· resource to stabilize its price, but on a central bank 
....... 
using foreign reserves to peg an exchange rate. In his model, the central bank has 
to intervene to support the fixed rate under the regime, and a speculative attack 
on a government's reserves can be viewed as a process by which investors change 
the composition of their portfolios. In other words, investors would reduce the pro-
portion of domestic currency which they hold and buy the foreign currency from 
the authority, once they expect a potential possibility of a depreciation of domestic 
currency. 
If the government runs excessively expansionary fiscal policies and large budget 
deficits are financed by monetary expansion, the economy will face a problem: the 
resulting increase in domestic credit will lead to a gradual growth in money supply 
and a decrease in foreign exchange reserves. Ultimately, pegging the exchange rate 
becomes impossible when the reserves are depleted. 
We can formalize these arguments in the follqwing model. The money demand 
function is as usual: 
(2.1) 
where M is the nominal money demand, P is the price level and i is the interest 
rate. The money supply function is: 
!v!(t) = R(t) + D(t) (2.2) 
where M, R and D are the nominal money supply, book value of foreign reserves and 
domestic credit respectively. Suppose that because of the excessively expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies, the domestic credit expands at a positive fixed rate f-L 
to meet the government deficits: 
ｾｄＨｴＩ＠ = f-L (2.3) 
Moreover, we assume PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) and UIP (Uncovered In-
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terest Parity) hold, 
P(t) - P*(t) * S(t) 
.;(t) '*(t) b..S(t) 
" ｾ＠ + S(t) 
15 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
where S is the spot exchange rate and an asterisk(*) denotes the foreign variables, 
which are assumed exogenous for the small open country case. 
In order to get the money market equilibrium, we substitute (2.4) and (2.5) into 
(2.1), and obtain 
M(t) [aoP*(t) - a1i*(t)P*(t)]S(t) - ｡ＱｐＪＨｴＩｾｓＨｴＩ＠
{3S(t) - ｡ｾｓＨｴＩ＠ (2.6) 
where f3 = (aoP*(t) - _a1i*(t)P*(t)] and a= a1P*(t). Thus, the equilibrium in the 
money market is given by 
M(t) = R(t) + D(t) = {3S(t) - aD.S(t) (2.7) 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, S(t) = S, b..S(t) = 0. Therefore, the foreign 
reserves are equal to 
R(t) = {38- D(t) (2.8) 
It follows that if the central bank tries to peg its exchange rate, continuous 
domestic credit expansion will eventually dry up the reserves in finite time as 
b..R(t) = ＭｾｄＨｴＩ＠ = -J-t (2.9) 
In this case, the price level will ilnmediately begin to rise when reserves are 
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exhausted. There are two reasons behind that: domestic residents may still be 
dissaving, and try to reduce their holdings of domestic as well as foreign money; 
and, if the government continues running a deficit as before, the nominal money 
supply must begin rising. 
In Krugman (1979)'s original model, this rise is reflected in the private sector's 
rational expectation. If an investor conectly anticipates that the price of foreign 
exchange will jump instantly by a discrete amount when the central bank sells out 
all its reserves, he can earn an infinite rate of return by exchanging his domestic 
currency for foreign currency just a little bit earlier than that point. If everyone 
tries to do this, of course, the government's reserves will be eliminated so that all 
investors can only avoid windfall capital losses, and the speculative attacks will not 
lead to a discrete change in the exchange rate. 
Krugman (1979) then suggests that if the foreign reserves the central bank holds 
initially are larger, then the time before the crisis is due is longer. 
However, Flood and Garber (1984) take another approach to find the collapse 
time for the fixed-rate regime. In their model, the 'shadow floating exchange rate' is 
introduced as the floating rate that would prevail if the exchange rate was not fixed 
(see Figure 2.1). The upward trend in the 'shadow rate' is defined by the assumption 
that the central bank is engaged in a steady, but uncontrollable issuing of money to 
finance the budget deficits. As before, the limited stock of foreign reserves will be 
exhausted since the central bank is assumed to use it to hold the exchange rate peg. 
Suppose the post-attack exchange rate is free floating. Let T be the time at 
which the fixed exchange rate regime collapses, T+ and T_ be the instant right after 
and before the attacks. Take for instance, at t = T +, we have 
(2.10) 
At the instant right after the attacks reserves will be depleted con1pletely, R(T+) = 
0, so M (T+) = D (T+), and fj.M (T+) = /j.D (T+) = J..l· If we conjecture that a solu-
tion to equation (2.10) as a first order differential equation is S (t) = Ao + A1M (t), 
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then b,.S (t) = A1 JL. Combining this with (2.10), we have 
S(t) = a)\lJL + M(t) 
{3 {3 (2.11) 
By comparing 2.11 with our conjectured solution, we find .\1 = ｾ＠ and Ao = lfi· 
Therefore, the 'shadow exchange rate' equals 
t '?:. T (2.12) 
If the fixed-rate regime is to last without a speculative attack until the last 
penny of reserves leaks away, there will be a discrete rise in the exchange rate at the 
point of abandonment, implying an instantaneously infinite return on speculation. 
Such a path, as in Krugman's original model, can not be an equilibrium. Instead, 
foresighted speculators, realizing that such a jump is in prospect, will sell domestic 
currency just before the collapse-and in doing so advance the date of the aban-
donment, leading speculators to sell even earlier, and so on ... the result is that when 
the shadow exchange rate equals the fixed rate (S(T) = 8), there will be an abrupt 
speculative attack that quickly drives all the central bank's remaining reserves to 
zero and forces it to an abandon the fixed exchange rate regime (Figure 2.1). 
The remarkable finding of the classical crisis model is its surprising prediction 
that the exchange rate will have to be abandoned, before the central bank's foreign 
reserves gradually decrease to zero on their own for monetizing the deficits. 
Substitute this condition and the fact that M(t) = D(O) + p,t into (2.11), we 
have 
T = {38- D(O) _ ｾ＠ = R(O) _ ｾ＠
JL {3 JL {3 (2.13) 
From (2_.13) we see that the larger the initial foreign reserve holdings are, the 
longer the fixed regime will last, same as in Krugman (1979) 's original1nodel. Also, a 
decrease in credit expansion (smaller JL) will put off the speculative attacks. Overall, 
the Krug1nan-Flood-Garber model suggests that fiscal variables such as the budget 
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Figure 2.1: Anatomy of a Speculative attack 
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deficits to GDP ratio, and financial variables such as the domestic credit to GDP 
ratio and international reserves are all crucial factors explaining currency crises. 
In an extended model (Agenor et al. (1992)), expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies lead to higher domestic demand for both tradable and non-tradable goods. 
The former causes a deterioration in the trade balance, while the latter causes a 
real appreciation of the currency. Thus, external variables such as trade and current 
account balances should also be considered as potential causes of currency crises. 
We will examine the effects of all these variables suggested by the first generation 
models on currency crises in Chapter 3. 
The Krugman-Flood-Garber model was originally inspired by the experience of 
many. Latin American countries in the late 1970's and 1980's. During that period, 
countries like Argentina, Chile and Brazil embarked on stabilization programmes, 
including pegging their currencies, in order to curb high inflation rates. But their 
. failure to tackle large fiscal deficits at the same time -resulted in the same scenario: 
the collapse of the fixed rate regimes and a massive depletion of the central banks' 
foreign exchange reserves. For this reason, the first generation crisis models are also 
described as the 'seignorage-driven' models by Krugman (1996). 
2.2.2 The Second-generation Crisis Models 
Under intense speculative attacks, member countries of the European Monetary Sys-
tem (EMS) agreed in August 1993 to widen the fluctuation bands for most ERM 
rates from ±2.25 percent around par to ±15 percent. This shows that factors other 
than weak economic fundamentals and/ or irresponsible credit expansions could lead 
to currency crises, prompting the emergence of the so-called 'second-generation' cri-
sis models that emphasize the contingent nature of government's economic policies. 
Obstfeld (1986), adopting the Flood and Garber (1984) framework, den1onstrates 
the existence of circumstances in which balance-of-payments crises might indeed 
be purely self-fulfilling events rather than the inevitable results of unsustainable 
macroeconon1ic policies. In the paper, he suggests that there are an infinite number 
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of alternative equilibria, each representing a set of public beliefs about the probabil-
ity of a run on the central bank's reserves. They are all self-fulfilling equilibria in the 
sense that if private agents expect a speculative attack on the fixed exchange rate, 
then the central bank will validate the expectation by shifting to an inflationary 
policy. Moreover, it is shown that the nominal interest rate can at times exceed 
the world rate even when the exchange rate remains fixed, in order to compen-
sate domestic bond holders for the possible capital losses in the case of a currency 
devaluation. 
Based on that, Obstfeld (1994) and Obstfeld (1996) develop the theory in two 
different ways, showing how crises (realignments) can result from the interactjon 
between the rational private agents and the government that pursues 'well-defined' 
policy goals. Note that in his models, foreign reserves can be freely borrowed in 
the world capital market, so that there is no special role assigned to reserve level in 
generating currency crises. 
In one model that is later widely cited by most economists, it is shown that 
devaluation could be triggered by the government's desire to offset negative out-
put shocks by loosening monetary policies-the perfect foresight formed by private 
sectors could feed into wages, lower competitiveness and raise unemployment, then 
therefore sap the government's resolve to resist the realignment, which in return val-
idates the expectation. Obstfeld (1996) draws the basic framework from the Barra 
and Gordon (1983) model, but assumes an open economy. The government's loss 
function is given by: 
£ = (y- y*)2 + (3E2 + C(c) (2.14) 
where y is output, y* is the government's output target, and E = e- e_1 the change 
in the exchange rate (the price of foreign currency). C (E) is the political cost born 
by the government in the case of a collapses of the fixed exchange rate: any upward 
changes in the rate (devaluation) produce C(c) = c, whereas downward (revaluation) 
changes cost the govern1nent C(c) =f. Output is determined by the expectations-
--------------------- - - --- ------- ----- -
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augmented Phillips curve 
(2.15) 
where y is the 'natural' output level, ce is the market's expectation of c based on 
lagged information, and u is an i.i.d. mean-zero shock. Firstly, ignore the term C(c) 
in (2.14). The government chooses the currency's exchange rate e in each period 
to minimize its loss function after observing u (unlike private sectors), taking the 
expectation of exchange rate as predetermined (e.g., through nominal wages agreed 
in the last period). The assumption of y* > y implies that the government always 
tries to boost the output above the natural level, which results in a systematic 
·inflation bias under the rational expectations. 
Because of its sticky nature, we assume that the nominal wage is time-invariant 
ce. If we substitute (2.15) into (2.14), then the optimal problem for the government 
can be solved by differentiating (2.14) by c: 
a(y*- y + u) + a 2ce f..= __...;:. ____ ;.__ _ 
a2 + (3 (2.16) 
The output is then given by substituting (2.16) back into (2.15): 
(2.17) 
The government's loss in a flexible exchange rate regime is 
(2.18) 
But if the government has no option whatsoever to change the exchange rate 
(e.g. the fixed rate regime), its loss is instead 
(2.19) 
by setting c = 0. 
---------------------------- ---- ------
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Then, let us reintroduce the assumption that the government faces a fixed cost 
of realignment (devaluation or revaluation) into the model. Clearly, a realignment 
will occur whenever the government's loss under a fixed exchange rate exceeds its 
loss if it realigns its exchange rate, e.g., when u is so high that £FLEX+ c < f.FIX or 
so low that ﾣｆｌｅｘＫｾ＼＠ f.Frx. Devaluation thus occurs for u > u, and revaluation 
for u < ｾＧ＠ where 
1 
u - - /c( a 2 + [3) - y* + y - af.e 
a 
ｾ＠ = ＭｾＩｾＨ｡ＲＫｦＳＩ＠ -y*+y-af.e 
a 
(2.20) 
(2.21) 
Suppose u is uniformly distributed on [-J.L, J-t]. Given market's expectation f.e, 
the rational expectation of f. in the next period is 
E£ (2.22) 
(2.23) 
Figure 2.2 graphs Equation (2.23) together with a 45° line, which shows the 
equilibrium E£ = f.e. 
This 'escape-clause' arrangement allows the government to escape (change to the 
floating exchange rate) in some extreme situations (large negative shocks), while re-
straining the inflationary proclivity by imposing a realignment cost. But the trigger 
point at which the escape option is exercised depends on prior expectation of de-
preciation, which in turn depends on market perception of where the realignment 
trigger point lies. The element of circularity creates the potential for multiple equi-
libria, which is shown in Figure 2.2. A relatively low credibility of the exchange rate 
regime could be self-fulfilling: a high expectation of depreciation feeds into wage 
inflation, which creates a shortfall in competitiveness, then the resulting ｨｩｧｾ＠ un-
employment is so painful that the government will be forced to devalue its currency, 
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Figure 2.2: Three Possible equilibria in the expected depreciation rates 
which in return justifies the expectation. The process is always accompanied by a 
sharp rise in domestic interest rates and a loss in foreign reserves. This approach 
will be employed to set up a theoretical model in Chapter 4 to examine the impact 
of the public debt, especially its debt Inaturity, on the credibility of the exchange 
rate regime. 
In an earlier paper, Obstfeld (1994) suggests that the high nominal interest rates 
associated with the high expectation of devaluation can force the government to 
devalue its currency, although the peg would be viable under another set of private 
expectations. 
The world is again assumed to last for two periods, and the government can only 
levy taxes on output to balance its budgets in the second period. Subject to the 
inter-temporal budget constraint, the government's objective function is minimized 
to yield the optimal solutions as in the former model. According to the concept of 
perfect foresight, the depreciation rate that the market expects must equal the rate 
the government finds optimal given the 111arket's expectation. Therefore, the inter-
sections of the government reaction function and the interest parity curve determine 
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the possible equilibria. 
Once again, the government faces a dynamic inconsistency problem (multiple 
equilibria): much as it would like to, it cannot credibly promise not to validate 
expectations if the bond market settles on the high-inflation equilibrium interest 
rate. In the model, the high interest rate induces the government to realign through 
its impact on the goyernment's fiscal position. 
In summary, these more sophisticated second generation models require three 
ingredients. First, there must be a reason why the government would like to abandon 
its fixed exchange rate. Second, there must be a reason why the government would 
like to defend the exchange rate-so that there is a tension between the two motives. 
Finally, in order to create the circular logic that drives a crisis, the cost of defending 
a fixed rate must itself increase when people expect (or at least suspect) that the 
rate might be abandoned. All the three elements combine to give rise to multiple 
equilibria-under one equilibrium, the fixed exchange rate regime is feasible, but 
not under another equilibrium. 
It is recommended by the second generation models that the real business cy-
cle variables, such as unemployment and real GDP growth rate, and the market's 
expectation variables (e.g. interest rate spreads) are important factors in trigger-
ing currency crises. A large reserve loss certainly accompanies a crisis, but is not 
considered as a factor that ultimately leads the government to devalue. 
In another paper by Benigno and Missale (2001), a three-period stochastic ver-
sion of the Barro and Gordon (1983) model is adopted to show that defence of the 
exchange rate in the CUlTent period would worsen the fundamentals by increasing 
public debt, and thus impair the ability of the authority to withstand crises in the 
future. 
It is shown that whether the exchange rate regime gains or loses credibility after 
a successful defence is uncertain. On one hand, resisting a crisis sends a signal that 
the government is tough on inflation (devaluation) and thus enhances the expecta-
tion that the parity will be maintained in the following period-the 'signal' effect. 
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On the other hand, defending the parity and refraining from inflationary financing 
increases the debt burden, hence the likelihood of a forced future devaluation-the 
'debt-burden' effect. Which effect dominates depends on the importance of the 
government's credibility relative to the public debt level. 
In an earlier paper, Drazen and Masson (1994) suggest that the persistence of 
unemployment could provide another channel whereby current actions affect future 
policy. An extended theoretical model based on Benigno and Missale (2001) will be 
presented in Chapter 4 with its results demonstrated by numerical simulation using 
Matlab, and the two derived predictions will be tested empirically. 
2.2.3 The Third-generation Crisis Models 
In the most part of the 1980's and the first half of the 1990's, the newly industri-
alizing countries in East Asia were held up as the world's most dramatic economic 
success story. They were characterized by exceptionally rapid rates of economic 
growth and human development, by relatively low inflation and by an absence of 
balance of payment difficulties. Then, suddenly in 1997/1998, it seemed that the 
success turned sour and the economies of East Asia experienced an economic rever-
sal of such proportions that it would generally be regarded as a· currency /financial 
crisis. The crisis saw a sharp depreciation in exchange rates, a large turnaround 
in capital flows frmn inflows to outflows, high interest rates, rising unemployment, 
reduced confidence in policies, and a big reduction in the rate of economic growth. 
But the essential features that characterize the earlier crisis models-weak fun-
damentals, excessive monetary expansion, and conflicting government policy goals-
did not appear to exist in these East Asian countries before the crises occurred. Also 
surprising is the vulnerability of some (but not all) of the East Asian economies to 
crisis contagion. As a result, the so-called 'Third-generation Models' were devel-
oped. Amongst them, the problems of moral hazard (international over-borrowing) 
and the liquidity crunch experienced by the private sector once a currency regime 
collapses are in particular believed to be the main causes of these currency crises. 
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Moral Hazard Models 
The Moral Hazard Models, laid out by Krugman (1998) and McKinnon and Pill 
(1998), suggest that factors like moral hazard and international over-borrowing 
played a key role in the 1997/98 East Asia Crises, acting as main forces for bubbles 
in asset markets. According to Krugman (1998), renewed emphasis needs to be put 
on two important issues: the role of financial intermediaries (and of the moral haz-
ard associated with such intermediaries when they are poorly regulated), and the 
prices of real assets such as capital and land. 
In the East Asian countries, the foreign creditors always believe that their in-
vestment to local financial institute are guaranteed implicitly by the governments, 
as there exist strong connections between the owners of these local institutions and 
the East Asian governments. These local financial intermediaries that are able to 
raise money at safe interest rates from international financial markets, intend to lend 
that money at premium rates to finance speculative investments. In other words, 
since the local intermediaries are essentially unregulated, they have an incentive to 
undertake excessively risky investments. As a result, there appears to be a serious 
problem of moral hazard. If the supply of assets is completely inelastic-the inter-
mediaries have their impact not on quantities but on prices, then the excessive risky 
lending from these intermediaries creates inflation-not of goods but of asset prices. 
Krugman (1998) emphasizes that with moral hazard, crises could be self-fulfilling: 
if the pre-crisis asset values are in a 'meta-stable' state (such as the boom in property 
and equity markets in Malaysia and Thailand in the early 1990s), a small shock could 
cause a slump in asset values that will make the insolvency of intermediaries visible 
and force them to cease operations, which in turn would justify the drop in asset 
prices by leading to further deflation. 
Corsetti et al. (1998) then go further to argue that because of the special re-
lationship between the governments and the local financial institutions, the former 
might at last have to step in and guarantee the outstanding stock of external lia-
bilities of the latter. To satisfy demand for solvency requirement, the governments 
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may possibly resort to seigniorage revenues through money creation, which therefore 
causes a first-generation crisis. 
It is also worth noting that access to the world capital markets might actually 
have made the East Asian economies worse off, by allowing moral hazard in financial 
sectors to be translated into excess capital accumulation instead of driving up the 
interest rates which is what happens when the local financial institutions have to 
rely on fixed supplies of domestic savings. 
In short, the moral hazard models consider the East Asia story as a bubble in 
and subsequent collapse of values in asset markets, with the crisis rather a symptom 
than a cause of the underlying real (in both senses of the word) malady. Therefore, 
the domestic credit provided by the banking sector would be an important factor in 
triggering currency crises in East Asia. 
Illiquidity 
In contemporary banking theory, one of main reasons of the existence of financial 
intermediaries is to provide liquidity for private agents by issuing demand deposit 
contracts. As Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue, there is a co-ordination problem 
between the bank and depositors. If a large number of depositors attempt to exit 
since they individually believe that there will be a bank run, they will then impose 
huge pressure on the bank. As a result, the behaviours of the depositors who first 
require withdrawals are validated as the bank hardly has enough liquidity to pay 
back the requested large deposits and is finally forced to default. This vicious circle 
is enforced by the fact that the depositors who are most reluctant to withdraw their 
deposits will expect there will be no money left in the bank in the event of bank 
run, and thus join other depositors to hurry out. By contrast, all the depositors will 
be better off collectively if they stay put. Hence, banks are subject to the risk of 
illiquidity and a bank run can be self-fulfilling. 
Change and Velasco (1998) extend the Diamond-Dybvig framework into a small 
open economy context, and emphasize the significant role that international illiquid-
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ity played in the recent East Asia financial crises. In a 3-period Diamond-Dybvig 
setup, the domestic agents discover their 'type' at t = 1. Each can be either an 
'impatient' type who only derives utility from early consumption (at t = 1) or a 
'patient' type who only derives utility from late consumption (at t = 2). It is also 
assumed that the agents, who also happen to be the investors, are faced with two 
investment choices at t = 0: a short-term investment in the world capital market 
with a low rate of return at t = 1, or a long-term domestic investment with a higher 
rate of return at t = 2. The long-term investment, however, is illiquid in the sense 
that early liquidation (at t = 1) will yield relatively little. Each agent is born with 
an endowment but can also borrow a limited amount from abroad. 
If we suppose that there.is no co-ordination problem in the model, then investors 
will act collectively as 'a commercial bank' that pools its resources (including each 
investor's maximum foreign borrowing and the endowment that he/she inherits at 
the period 0) in order to maximize the welfare of all agents by providing them with 
optimal liquidity solutions. 
However, a financial (currency) crisis will materialize precisely if all agents lose 
confidence in the bank and demand immediate withdrawals. This would force the 
liquidation of the more profitable long-term investments. Such collective behaviour 
turns out to be individually optiinal-it forces the bank to run out of resources and 
fail to meet all the claims on it. It is also shown that the collapse of the financial 
intermediaries can lead to a full-blown financial (currency) crisis, when combined 
with other problems such as weak fundamentals, moral hazard and excess foreign 
borrowing. Thus, factors that would affect the liquidity of banking sector (e.g. ratio 
of bank liquid reserves to bank assets) are regarded significant in indicating the 
financial fragility. 
Chui et al. (2001) set up a model to explore the policy ramifications of sovereign 
liquidity crises. One central feature of their analysis is that they focus on the col-
lective action problem amongst creditors, and the interaction between fundamentals 
and strategic behaviours. They identify the unique liquidity crisis equilibrium of 
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the liquidity game and are, thus able to characterize and calibrate the welfare costs 
of sovereign liquid crises. Some specific policy proposals are evaluated-namely, 
prudent debt management, information disclosure, and ｣｡ｰｩｴｾｬ＠ controls. 
Contagion 
Besides the severity of the East Asia crisis, the speed with which it spread from 
the Thai crash to other countries in the region also gave most commentators a big 
surprise, as it did in the case of Russia and Brazil in the following year. The literature 
has striven to explain these episodes in both theoretical and empirical works. The 
term 'contagion' is first defined systematically by Masson (1998) as having three 
distinctive effects: 'monsoonal', 'spillovers' and 'jumps'. The monsoonal effect refers 
to a cluster of crises due to a common external cause, while spillovers relate to the 
interdependence amongst countries that are linked by trade and/or finance. The last 
category of jump or pure contagion refers to a shift in private agents' expectations, 
but not to changes in the country's macroeconomic fundamentals. 
But Forbes and Rigobon (1999) suggest a slightly different taxonomy of the crisis 
transmission mechanism: crisis-contingent (shift-contagion) and non-crisis contin-
gent (real linkages) contagion. For the former, a structural shift in the economy is 
caused by a crisis via a channel that does not exist pre-crisis. An obvious example 
is the so-called 'common lender' effect-during a crisis, if the common lenders fail 
to cash their claims for liquidity in one country, they will seek for it in a another 
country, and.. . then in other countries. Shortly after Finland devalued the markka 
in the early 1990's, the German banks that had relatively heavy exposures to Fin-
land (as well as other European countries) were forced to re-evaluate their portfolios, 
creating a Euro-wide liquidity crisis. For the latter type of contagion, it is assumed 
that the transmission channels shown after an ·initial shock are just a continuation 
of the 'real linkages', which has already existed before the crisis. Scenario include 
Masson's monsoonal effect, and the situation when a currency crisis in one country 
can trigger a beggar-thy-neighbor type of devaluation in its neighboring countries 
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with close trade links. It is argued that only those countries that are affected by 
shift-contagion can qualify for multilateral bailouts. 
One of the well-defined contagion models is that of information 'cascades', which 
is based on the herding model developed by Banerjee (1992). Chari and Kehoe 
(2000) point out in their model that asymmetrically informed investors acquire in-
formation sequentially by observing the actions of others who precede them. So 
if the first n investors receive bad signals about the state of the economy and sell 
the currency, the n + 1 investor will infer that all those investors have information 
favouring that action and sell the currency as well, although his private information 
alone would imply another action. Then such behaviours, whatever their initial 
causes, could be magnified through sheer imitation and turn, quite literally, into 
a stampede out of the currency. Calvo and Mendoza (1998) get the same results 
even after relaxing the assumption of sequential decision-making. They assume that 
investors form their decisions simultaneously instead. The idea of information ex-
ternality is still applied to the uncertainty about policymaker's commitment to a 
fixed exchange rate. It is shown that small rumors can trigger herding behaviours 
amongst investors who have few incentives to collect country-specific information. 
This collective action can shift the country and its neighbors from an equilibrium 
where the fixed exchange rate regime is feasible, to another where it is not. 
The models of 'trade spillovers' put forward by Gerlach and Smets (1995) and 
Eichengreen et al. (1996a), show that an attack-induced devaluation in one coun-
try enhances its export price competitiveness, leading to increases in trade deficits 
(and a drastic decline in foreign reserves) in countries which it competes with in a 
third country. As a result, its trading partners find that their currencies become 
more vulnerable. Valdes (1997) develops a simple model of capital flows to show 
that some country-specific fundamentals (i.e. the liquidity of one country) could 
affect the abilities of other countries to repay their debts during a crisis. Financial 
spillovers can also be applied to individual agents, as the third-country investors try 
to liquidate their positions in other countries when facing a crisis-induced loss in one 
-------------------------------- ------ - --
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country. Drazen (1998) studies the political pressure on one country to commit to 
the fixed exchange rate arrangement, if other potential members of the union place 
less weight on meeting the required conditions. It is shown that in that case, the 
country is less likely to maintain the fixed exchange rate either. 
2.3 The Relevant Empirical Literature 
In this section, we focus on the leading indicator literature where statistical models 
are set up to help rank the vulnerability of countries given a set of potential factors. 
There are in general four different approaches to set up leading indicator frame-
works examining currency crises: the signalling approach, the discrete-choice ap-
proach, the structural approach, and the Markov Regime Switching approach. 
2.3.1 Signalling Approach 
Kaminsky_ et al. (1998) are amongst the first to adopt this approach to analyze 
currency crises. A broader definition of crises is adopted in their framework-in 
addition to devaluations, they include episodes of unsuccessful speculative attacks, 
i.e., attacks that are averted without a devaluation but at the cost of a large increase 
in domestic interest rates and/ or a sizable loss of international reserves. Therefore, 
a Market Pressure Index (MPI) for the exchange rate regime is created, which is 
a weighted average of monthly percentage changes in the exchange rate and the 
negative monthly percentage changes in gross international reserves, measured in 
US Dollars. 
Based on theoretical considerations and the availability of monthly data, 15 
variables are chosen as potential factors for crises. Their warning system essentially 
involves monitoring the evolution of the economic variables that tend to systemati-
cally behave differently prior to a crisis. Every time that a variable exceeds a certain 
threshold value, it is interpreted as 'signalling' a warning that a currency crisis may 
take place within the following 24 months. The 'optiinal' set of threshold values are 
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chosen to minimize the noise-to-signal ratio, so as to strike a balance between the 
risk of having too many false signals (if a signal is issued at the slightest possibility of 
a crisis) and the risk of missing too many crises (if the signal is issued only when the 
evidence is overwhelming). Furthermore, one can identify the source(s) of the crisis 
from the information provided by the group of variables that are issuing signals. 
Finally, they conclude that the variables that have the best track record in 
anticipating crises within their framework include exports, deviation of the real 
exchange rate from its long-term trend, ratio of broad money to gross international 
reserves, output, and equity prices. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) also suggest that problems in the banking sector 
normally precede a currency crisis, and that a currency crisis in return could increase 
the risk of a bank run. 
2.3.2 Discrete-Choice Approach 
Discrete-Choice Approach is the most common method that economists adopt to 
establish the potential factors relating to currency crises. It allows a quantification 
of the probability of having a crisis, given a set of economic variables. (see Frankel 
and Rose (1996) and Kumar et al. (1998)) 
Based on pooled panel data across countries and time periods, the discrete-choice 
technique-Logit/Probit model is employed to analyze crisis incidents. Let y denote 
the crisis variable that takes a value of either 1 (if a crisis occurs) or 0 (otherwise), 
X be a vector of explanatory variables and {3 be a vector of parameters. Then we 
can obtain the probability of having a crisis as: 
Pr(y = 1) = f({3'X) (2.24) 
where f(.) is a Logistic/Probability distribution function. If we assume a Probability 
distribution and a standard nonnal distribution with unit variance, then 
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X'{3 
Pr(y = 1) = L, f(u)du (2.25) 
This is known as the Probit model. 
Alternatively, if we assume a logistic distribution, then 
1 
Pr(y = 1) = _l_+_e-xp_( ___ X_' {3....,...) (2.26) 
This model is known as the Logit model. The only difference between the Probit 
and Logit model is that the underlying latent variable that is assumed to generate 
the discrete events in two models has slightly different distributions-being a little 
more fat-tailed in the Logit case than in the Probit case. The parameter vector f3 
can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood in either way. 
Within this approach, the crisis definition normally differs amongst studies and 
are subject to arbitrary choices. The crisis variable ranges from the simple large nom-
inal depreciation to a significant increase in the crisis index (e.g. MPI in Kaminsky 
et al. (1998)), while the latter incorporates the changes in exchange rate, foreign 
reserves and interest rates. The threshold level chosen to qualify for a crisis is 
arbitrary and varies from study to study, but is typically 10% or a one standard 
deviation movement. Furthermore, in the case of countries with high inflation rates 
and consequently high expectation of depreciation, as Frankel and Rose (1996) sug-
gest, a substantial increase in the nominal depreciation or in upward move1nent in 
the index compared with the prior period is also required for a currency crisis to be 
identified. 
The choices of sample frequency and size also vary amongst projects. Frankel 
and Rose (1996) choose a panel of annual data for over 100 countries from 1971 
through 1992 to characterize currency crashes. Kumar et al. (1998) choose monthly 
data because they focus on how to 'forecast' ｣ｵｮｾ･ｮ｣ｹ＠ crashes, and covering emerging 
markets only. 
Despite all these differences, empirical works following the discrete-choice ap-
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proach produce the most fruitful results in identifying the potential factors for cur-
rency crises. Frankel and Rose (1996) examine the variables that are most suggested 
by the first generation models, especially fiscal and debt variables. They find that 
currency crashes tend to occur when domestic credit growth is high, the real ex-
change rate appears to be over-valued and reserves are low. A low ratio of FDI 
to debt is also consistently associated with a high likelihood of a crisis. They also 
attempt to associate crashes with sharp recessions, but fail in at the end as the 
causal linkage is not clear. Moreover, surprisingly neither current account balance 
nor government budget deficits appear to play an important role in a typical crisis. 
Jeanne (1998) studies the respective role of the fundamentals and self-fulfilling 
speculation in currency crises. She first presents a model of a fixed exchange rate 
system in which self-fulfilling speculation can arise following a bifurcation in the 
fundamentals. She then estimates the model in the case of French Franc. in the 
period 1991-93. She shows that the model-in which the relationship between the 
fundamentals and devaluation expectation is non-linear and may give rise to multiple 
equilibria-gives a better account of the data than the usual linear models. In other 
words, she finds evidence that self-fulfilling speculation is at work. 
Kumar et al. (1998) select their explanatory variables based on an a priori judge-
ment drawing on the three generation crisis theories. Their findings confirm that the 
most important explanatory variables for crashes are declining reserves and exports 
according to the first generation Inodels, and weakening economic activities for the 
second generation models. Contagion also plays an important role in triggering the 
occurrence of a crash, both as a regional factor and through export growth correla-
tion. Surprisingly, they find that the capital flows variables suggested by the third 
generation 1nodels mainly have counter-intuitive signs, although not statistically 
significant. 
The journey will go on in Chapter 3, but in a slightly different fashion. Variables 
recommended by all three generation crisis models will be selected as potential 
factors explaining currency crises in Latin America, Europe and East Asia. Our 
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aim is to see how good the three generation crisis models are in addressing the 
different features of currency crises in different regions respectively, by which they 
were originally inspired. 
2.3.3 Structural Approach 
While the above two approaches aim to establish the likelihood of impending cur-
rency crises, the structural approach is developed to explain the causes of currency 
crises in terms of what characteristics of a country make it more vulnerable to specu-
lative attacks. Based on crisis theories, structural models are applied to case studies 
of the specific devaluation episodes. 
Sachs et al. (1996a) (STV) analyze the financial incidents following the devalua-
tion of Mexican peso in 1994 by adopting a simple structural ｾｯ､･ｬＮ＠ They identify 
three factors that could determine whether a country is vulnerable to a financial 
(currency) crisis: a large appreciation of the real exchange rate, a weak banking 
system, and a low level of foreign exchange reserves. 
The cross-sectional data of 20 emerging markets in 1994 is examined in STV. 
In order to measure the pressure in foreign exchange markets, an index (IN P) is 
created as a weighted average of the depreciation rate with respect to US Dollar 
and the negative percentage change in foreign exchange reserves. The extent of real 
exchange rate misalignment (RER) is represented by the percentage changes in the 
average of the real exchange rate index in 1990-94 compared with the period 1986-
1989. The banking sector vulnerability (LB) is measured in terms of whether or 
not the economy experiences a lending boom immediately before the crisis. Finally, 
the yardstick with which to evaluate the abundance of reserves is a broad measure 
of money (M2) compared with the stock of foreign exchange reserves (M2/ R). 
The basic framework is a statistic model regressing the (continuous) crisis index 
(IND) on the levels of RER and LB, taking into account the strength or weakness 
of these fundamentals and the adequacy of foreign exchange reserves. Sachs et al. 
(1996a) find that countries with strong fundamentals but low reserves are not likely 
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to be attacked. But for countries who have weak fundamentals and low reserves, a 
more overvalued real exchange rate or a larger lending boom will lead to a higher 
crisis pressure. 
Corsetti et al. (1998) adopt a similar framework to examine the East Asia crises 
and find that variables, such as the non-performing loans in the banking system, 
the current account balance, and M1 (as a proxy for the strength of fundamentals 
and the position of reserves), are also significant explanatory variables for currency 
crises. 
2.3.4 Markov Regime Switching Approach 
Recently, it has become increasingly popular to analyze currency crises as regime 
changes in a non-linear model, and in particular the evolution of a regime is assumed 
to follow a first-order Markov chain1 . The literature is currently not extensive, but 
it is clear that interest in this approach is increasing rapidly. 
Engel and Hakkio (1996) use the method of identifying outliers to show that 
the European Monetary System (EMS) exchange rates over the period 1979-1993 
seem to be drawn from a mixture of distributions, one with high variance (which 
coincides with speculative attacks and realignments) and one with low variance 
(tranquil periods). They also model the probabilities of switching between states as 
a function of the distance of the exchange rate from the upper band, and find the 
negative relationship between the probabilities of staying in a volatile state and the 
distance of the exchange rate to the top of the band. 
Jeanne and Masson (1998) propose to use the Markov-switching model to bring 
the second generation approach to the data. They characterize the properties of a 
class of second generation Inodels, and then show that financial markets are subject 
to multiple equilibria that link the markets to fundamentals. They also find that 
what are commonly called 'sunspot equilibria' exist, where extrinsic variables (such 
as market sentiinent) might influence the equilibrium outcomes. A liberalization of 
1See Appendix A for a detailed technical review about the Markov-switching model. 
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their model gives a ·Markov-Switching model the probability of devaluation, where 
the switch between regimes corresponds jumps amongst different equilibria. Finally, 
they estimate the Markov-Switching model for the French franc over the period 
1987-93, and find that a model allowing for so-called sunspots performs better than 
a purely fundamental-based model. 
Hsieh (1994) employs an AR(4) version of Hamilton's regime switching model 
to identify speculative attacks on EMS currencies in the period 1979-93. He models 
the behaviour of exchange rates, reserves, and interest rate differentials of EMS 
countries as time series subject to discrete shifts in regimes. But he assumes that 
the transition probability is constant over time. He then compare these episodes 
with those captured by indices of speculative pressure in Eichengreen et al. (1996b). 
Similar to Hsieh (1994), Peria (1998) models the components of the Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) index as autoregressive time series subject to shifts in regimes. While 
Hsieh (1994) only assumes the mean and variance to be different across regimes, 
Peria (1998) also allows the coefficients of the autoregressive terms to be poten-
tially different between regimes. Instead of fitting the switching model to each of 
exchange rates, reserves, and interest rate differentials, Peria (1998) estimates a 
regime switching VAR model that allows him to analyze the attacks associated with 
the combined behaviours of three variables. Furthermore, Peria (1998) allows the 
transition probability to and from the more volatile regime to be time-varying, so 
that he can explicitly examine the behaviours of determinants of crises. Finally, Pe-
ria (1998) also includes the market expectation in his analysis in causing speculative 
attacks. 
We will follow the latest trend in mnpirical works to employ the non-linear regime 
changing models, such as Markov-switching model and the SETAR (Self Exciting 
Threshold Autoregression) model to examine currency crises. While the Markov-
switching model assumes that the evolution of the state follows a first-order Markov 
process, the state is supposed to change to the period of turmoil once the variable 
exceeds its threshold in the SETAR model. 
---------------------------- ---- ---- -- -
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2.3.5 Contagion 
In general, there are two types of approaches in the empirical works to studying 
the contagion effect. The first approach is to examine the impact of contagion 
on the country's vulnerability to speculative attacks, and establish the probability 
of having a crisis given the contagion effect. The second approach takes one step 
back, and focuses on the tests of whether contagion actually exists by examining 
the cross-market co-movements pre and post-crisis. 
In the discrete-choice approach discussed above, many economists include a 
proxy for contagion in their models and have found that it could affect the like-
lihood of a future crisis. The contagion variables are either chosen by statistical 
means or designed to capture regional linkages. 
Glick and Rose (1999) estimate a binary Probit model across countries via maxi-
mum likelihood. The cross-sectional data is from five different episodes of important 
and also widespread cm-rency instability. The default measure of trade linkages is 
given by the degree to which the 'ground zero' country competes with other coun-
tries in the foreign (third country) export markets. It is shown in their results 
that currency crises would affect a cluster of countries tied together by international 
trade. By way of contrast, macroeconomic and financial influences are not closely 
associated with the cross-country incidences of speculative attacks. 
On the other hand, as noted above, some economists step back and ask whether 
contagion really exists or not in the world. The conventional definition of a conta-
gion is a significant ｩｮ｣ｲ･｡ｳｾ＠ in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country (or 
group of countries). In other words, it is contagion only if the correlation between 
two markets increases significantly during crisis periods compared with periods of 
stability. If the cross-market comovement does not increase significantly after the 
shock, then any continued level of market correlation only suggests the interdepen-
dence between the two economies, which exists in all states of the world. 
The most widely-used approach to test for contagion is examining the cross-
market correlation coefficient. Economists measure the correlation in assets, equity 
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returns and exchange rates between two markets during a tranquil period, and 
then test for a significant increase after a shock. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) adopt 
this method to test for contagion in stock prices and brady bonds after the 1994 
Mexican peso crisis. They find that cross-market correlations increase for many 
emerging markets during the crisis. Baig and Goldfajn (1998) also find statistically 
significant increases in the correlations of asset returns during the East Asia crises, 
and therefore evidence of contagion. 
However, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue that the conventional tests based on 
the conditional correlation coefficient, are biased and inaccurate due to heteroscedas-
ticity. During crises when markets are more volatile, estimators of the cross-market 
correlation coefficients tend to increase and be biased upward. When tests do not 
adjust for this bias, they traditionally find evidence of contagion. In Chapter 5, 
we will follow Forbes and Rigobon (2002)'s approach to base our test for contagion 
upon the unconditional cross-market correlation coefficient for 1997/98 East Asia 
Crises. A non-liner Markov-Switching VAR framework will also be adopted for the 
first time to give a better description of the crisis transmission mechanism. 
2.4 Summary 
The frequency of currency crises has increased significantly in the last 30 years. 
Correspondingly, the crises literature has grown and evolved to offer different ex-
planations for these apparently ever-changing phenomena. The initial approach of 
'bad' fundamentals (e.g. Krugman (1979)), indicating that crises could be avoided 
with sound fiscal and monetary policies, is followed by game-theoretic models with 
multiple equilibria (e.g. Obstfeld (1996)). The latter predict that the conflicting 
goals of economic policies when combined with investors' perfect perceptions can 
lead to a self-fulfilled crisis even when the fundamentals are good. 
More recently, as a result of the failure of existing theories to predict the East Asia 
crises, third generation models are developed where the problems of moral hazard 
and the liquidity crunch experienced by the private sector once the currency regime 
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collapsed are believed to be the main causes. Each generation crisis models have 
their own recommendations regarding what econmnic factors play an important role 
in triggering currency crises. Therefore, one would expect that the three generation 
crisis models are best at identifying the potential causes of the different currency 
crises that initially inspired them. We will look at this issue in three groups of 
countries-Latin America, Europe and East Asia-in the following chapter. 
Similarly, the e1npirical works also develop drastically to account for the latest 
crisis episodes. The signalling approach evaluates the usefulness of a number of 
different variables in predicting a potential crisis. These variables are examined to 
determine certain threshold levels, which once crossed would 'signal' an impending 
financial crisis within a pre-specified period of time. The discrete-choice approach 
uses the Logit/Probit model to estimate the probability of having a currency cri-
sis, given a set of potential factors that are selected upon the recommendations of 
relevant crisis theories. The structural models are usually built around a particu-
lar crisis case, and hence are possibly more suitable for monitoring/early warning 
purposes. 
The fourth approach that is increasingly used in crisis literature is the Markov-
switching model. The main advantage of the non-linear changing regiine (state) 
models is that they allow for a continuous dependent variable (compared with the 
0-1 binary dependent variable in the Logit/Probit model), and avoid the arbitrary 
choice of a threshold level to qualify a crisis. Moreover, the non-linear nature of the 
models is also appealing. 
In summary, this chapter surveys the theoretical models and empirical evidence 
on currency crises, which will provide us with the necessary background for the 
following studies, and also offer an invaluable reference during our research. 
CHAPTER 3 
Currency Crises in Latin America, Europe and East Asia 
3.1 Introduction 
The frequency of currency crises has increased dramatically in the last 30 years 
(see Bordo et al. (1998)), and the scale and impact of these crises has inspired the 
crisis literature to grow fast to offer various explanations for these apparently ever-
changing phenmnena. Are currency crises across the world all the results of similar 
policy mistakes? Or are they instead the results of myriad unfortunate shocks? The 
answer is that according to the so-called three generation crisis theoretical models, 
different factors cause currency crises in different regions. 
The initial approach of 'bad' fundamentals (e.g. Krugman (1979) and Flood 
and Garber (1984)) indicating that crises result from expansionary fiscal and/or 
monetary policies, followed the crisis episodes experienced by many Latin American 
countries during the late 1970's and 1980's. The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ER1vl) 
crashes in 1992/93 when most members of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
were forced to devalue their currency outside the original fluctuation bands, provided 
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initiatives for the second generation models (e.g. Obstfeld (1996)). The second 
generation models suggest that conflicting goals of government's policies combined 
with investors' rational expectations can create multiple equilibria, where a crisis 
is triggered by a shift in equilibrium even when the fundamentals are sound. More 
recently, the third generation models evolve to identify the factors that drove the 
East Asian countries, once regarded as the world's most dramatic economic success, 
into the turmoil of 1997/98. They attempt to explain the crises in terms of moral 
hazard and bank liquidity crunch problem. Another striking feature of the East 
Asia crises is that the crisis originating in one country could quickly spread to other 
countries in the region, which is also studied in the context of contagion. Therefore, 
it is interesting to see whether the three generation crisis theories can respectively 
address the different features of currency crises in Latin America, Europe, and East 
Asia where they were originally inspired, as they are supposed to do. 
This chapter examines the country experiences in the three regions for the last 30 
years. The country-specific Market Pressure Index (MPI) is constructed to gauge the 
vulnerability of the exchange rate regime to speculative attacks. These include not 
only the actual devaluations, but also the 'failed' attacks that are successfully fended 
off by selling out reserves and/ or raising interest rates. As opposed to imposing an 
arbitrary threshold a priori (i.e. 10% or a one standard deviation move in MPI) 
as many previous research works did, we employ both the SETAR (Self Exciting 
Threshold Autoregression) model and Markov-switching model to identify the crisis 
incidents for each country. In this way, MPI is allowed to reveal by itself what move 
represents abnormal behaviour, and therefore signals a crisis. 
We examine a wide range of selected economic variables as potential factors for 
the crashes, based on the recommendations made by the three generation crisis mod-
els. The Limited Dependent Variable Model-Logit Model is adopted to link the 
binary crisis variable to the explanatory variables. We obtain our final estimated 
results by dropping variables whose coefficients are not statistically significant at 
the conventional 10% level. It is shown that to some extent, the three generation 
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models successfully ｾｸｰｬ｡ｩｮ＠ the different causes of currency crises in different re-
gions: a rapidly expanding stock of credit and large deficits in current account play 
an important role in the Latin American crises; the real economic cycle is highly 
associated with the European turmoils; and over-borrowing and lack of export com-
petitiveness are the fundamental causes of the crises in East Asia. But the whole 
picture is far from perfect. In our regressions, some ｶ｡ｲｩ｡｢ｬｾｳ＠ are found not to have 
the predicted signs, and some appear not statistically significant in explaining crises 
as they should do. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The following section briefly surveys the 
relevant theoretical models and empirical works on currency crises 1. We then look 
at the interested variables and data set in section 3. Section 4 discusses the way 
to establish Market Pressure Index (MPI). The crisis episodes are defined by both 
the SETAR and Markov-switching model in section 5. Section 6 gives the estimated 
results of the Logit model of the effects of selected variables on crises. Finally, we 
conclude. 
3.2 Related Literature 
3.2.1 Three-generation Theoretical Models 
The initial approach is first put forward by (Krugman (1979)) and then modified 
by (Flood and Garber (1984)) . In its simplest form, the model assumes that under 
a pegged exchange rate system, the central bank has to intervene to prop up the 
fixed rate, whenever investors re-balance their portfolios by buying/selling domes-
tic assets. However, if the government runs expansionary fiscal and/ or monetary 
policies, this is not consistent with the fixed rate and a sudden speculative attack 
will eventually exhaust the remaining foreign reserves. The Krugman-Flood-Garber 
model fits the crisis episodes in Latin American economies during the late 1970's 
and 1980's. At that time, most Latin American countries failed to adopt robust 
1See Chapter 2 Literature Review for more details. 
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domestic policies when they were pursuing low inflation rates by using pegs as an 
anchor. 
In 1992/93, the attacks on the ERM suggested that factors other than weak 
economic fundamentals and irresponsible credit expansion could lead to currency 
crises. This prompted the emergence of the second generation models that emphasize 
the contingent nature of government policies. Obstfeld (1994) and Obstfeld (1996) 
have developed a Barra and Gordon (1983) type model in which conflicting goals of 
economic policies when combined with private agents' perfect foresight, can drive 
the exchange rate off the peg even when the fundamentals are sound. A circularity 
is created that leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria-under one equilibrium, 
the fixed rate is viable, but not under another equilibrium. The crisis could be self-
fulfilling as a sudden worsening of expectations can drive shifts in equilibria, which 
in return validate agents' expectations. 
The East Asia crises took many observers by surprise. The essential features 
that characterize earlier theoretical .models-weak fundamentals, excessive mon-
etary expansion and conflicting government policy goals-were not apparent in 
these countries before the crises. As a result, a whole 'new' generation of mod-
els were developed-the third generation models. Amongst them, Krugman (1998) 
and McKinnon and Pill (1998) suggest that the strong connections between the 
owners of the local financial institutions and the East Asian governments led the 
creditors to believe that there were implicit government guarantee for their !end-
ings. There then appears to be a serious problem of moral hazard (international 
over-borrowing), which is the 1nain force bringing about bubbles in pre-crisis boom-
ing asset markets. Change and Velasco (1998) show that a financial (currency) crisis 
can materialize precisely if many agents lose their confidence in the banks and pull 
their money out immediately, since their actions will force liquidation of the more 
profitable long-term investments. 
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3.2.2 Relevant Empirical Works 
The debate on the causes of currency crises has become more fierce than ever, as 
more economists develop various methods to test the theoretical models. 
Frankel and Rose (1996) adopt a Logit model on a panel of annual data for over 
100 developing countries from 1971 through 1992 to characterize currency crises. 
They define a currency crisis as a large depreciation of the nmninal exchange rate. 
They examine the variables mostly suggested by the first generation models, espe-
cially budget and debt variables. They find currency crashes tend to occur when the 
FDI inflows dry up, the domestic credit growth is high, the real exchange rate shows 
over-valuation, and reserves are low. They also tend to associate crises with reces-
sions, but fail in the end as the causal linkage between the two is not clear. Moreover, 
surprisingly neither current account nor government budget deficits appear to play 
an important role in a typical crisis. 
Jeanne (1998) studies the respective role of the fundamentals and self-fulfilling 
speculation in 1992/93 ERM crisis. She first presents a model of a fixed exchange 
rate system, in which self-fulfilling speculation can arise following a bifurcation in 
the fundamentals. She then estimates the model in the case of the French Frac 
in the period 1991-93. She shows that the model, where the relationship between 
the fundamentals and devaluation expectation is non-linear and may give rise to 
multiple equilibria, gives a better account of the data than the usual linear models. 
In other words, she finds some evidence that self-fulfilling speculation is at work. 
Kumar et al. (1998) also estimate a Logit model on pooled data for emerging 
markets from January 1985 through October 1999. The explanatory variables are 
selected on the basis of an a priori judgement drawn on the three generation crisis 
theories. Their findings ｣ｯｾｦｩｲｭ＠ that the most important factors explaining crises 
are declining reserves and exports according to the first generation models, and 
weakening real activity for the second generation models. Contagion also plays an 
hnportant role in the crisis episodes. But surprisingly, they find that the capital flows 
variables suggested by the third generation models mainly have counter-intuitive 
Currency Crises in Latin America, Europe and East Asia 46 
signs, although not statistically significant. 
Kamin et al. (2001) use annual data on 26 emerging markets from 1981-1999 
to investigate the relative influence of domestic and external factors in bringing 
about currency crises. They estimate a standard Probit model using real exchange· 
rate changes as measurement of speculative pressure in foreign exchange ｭ｡ｲｫ･ｴｳｾ＠
They find that domestic factors are the primary determinants of vulnerability of the 
economies to crisis, but it is external factors that often push the stumbling countries 
over the edge. 
We will carry on this task in this chapter by examining the abilities of the three 
generation crisis models to identify the causes of currency crises by which the models 
were originally inspired. Moreover, our study tries to make some progress in the area 
where until now few studies have been conducted; namely to simultaneously examine 
the different characteristics of currency crises occurring in three major areas-Latin 
America, Europe and East Asia. 
3.3 The Variables and Data Set 
3.3.1 The Variables of Interest 
Firstly, three variables are needed to establish the country-specific Market Pressure 
Index (MPI): the nominal exchange rate, the interest rate and international reserves. 
Based on MPI, a 1-0 crisis variable is created by employing both the SETAR and 
Markov-switching model. The construction of these variables will be discussed in 
more detail in the following section. 
Nine economic variables are then selected as potential factors explaining currency 
crises, on the basis of the three generation theoretical models. 
1. Variables suggested by the first generation models 
As discussed above, the initial approach by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Gar-
ber (1984) suggests that several factors could make the econmny particularly vulner-
able to speculative attacks: namely expansionary fiscal and/ or monetary policies, 
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piling up of credit stock, current account deficits, and loss in foreign reserves. 
Therefore, we include in our model the following variables: (1) Overall Budget 
Balance, including grants (% of GDP); (2) Domestic Credit provided by Banking 
Sector (% of GDP); (3) Current Account Balance (% of GDP); (4) International 
Reserves (months of imports). 
2. Variables suggested by the second generation models 
The 1992/93 ERM crises prompted the emergence of the second generation crisis 
models (Obstfeld (1994), Obstfeld (1996)). They emphasize that the conflicting 
goals of government policies combined with agents' rational expectations could give 
rise to multiple equilibria, where crises are self-fulfilling. Therefore, factors such as 
high unemployment or economic recession play a crucial role in triggering currency 
crises. Here (5) Unemployment and (6) Real GDP growth (annual%) are included 
in our measurement of the real business cycle. 
The assumption of perfect foresight is also important for the second generation 
models. It is assumed that the depreciation rate the market expects must equal the 
rate the government finds optimal given market expectations. (7) Market Interest 
Rate Differential relative to the anchor country (USA for the Latin American and 
East Asian group, and Germany for European countries) is suggested as a measure 
of the market expectation of realignment. 
3. Variables suggested by the third generation models 
Krugman (1998)'s Moral Hazard model also suggests that (2) Domestic Credit 
provided by Banking Sector (% of GDP) plays an important role in 1997/98 East 
Asia Financial/Currency Crises, acting rather as a main force in the creation of 
bubbles in asset markets. 
Change and Velasco (1998) apply the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework 
to currency crises and produce the illiquidity model. In their model, the liquidity 
crunch is suggested to be the main cause of the crises, thus (8) Bank Liquid Reserves 
to Bank Assets ratio is also examined in our model. 
4. Foreign Variables 
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It is also critical to look at not only individual country's internal conditions, but 
the external (global) environment as well. External variables include world economic 
activities, especially shocks from major markets. We include (9) Foreign Real GDP 
growth (USA for Latin America and East Asia, Germany for Europe) as a proxy for 
external demands. 
3.3.2 The Data Set 
The major part of our data set is extracted from the on-line World Bank's World 
Development Indicators (WDI). The data set consists of annual observations from 
1970 through 2001 for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru in 
the Latin American group, for Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain and United 
Kingdom in the European group, and for Indonesia, Korea, ·Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand in the East Asian group as well as Germany and United 
States. We also use the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD 2004 and 
ILO (International Labour Organization) website to fill in the missing observations 
in our data set. 2 
The quarterly data of the exchange rate, interest rate and reserves to construct 
the country-specific MPI, is extracted from the IMF's International Financial Statis-
.tics (IFS) CD 2004. 
3.4 Market Pressure Index (MPI) 
Currency crises can be characterized in many different ways. One approach is to 
define a 'currency crisis' as a nominal depreciation of the domestic currency beyond 
a certain level. However, econmnists argue that it is more appropriate to incorporate 
2 Effort has been made in order to collect more frequent data (e.g., quarterly), but failed at the 
end due to unavailability of some variables in some countries. As the purpose of this chapter is to 
compare the stylized features of currency crises in three regions, it is important to base our analysis 
on a consistent data set. But one should always bear in mind that movement patterns of some 
macroeconomic variables change dramatically during months around crises, when interpreting the 
results of this chapter. 
Currency Crises in Latin America, Europe and East Asia 49 
the behaviour of reserves and interest rates as well, so that we can take into account 
the successful defences at a cost of sizable loss of reserves and/ or high interest 
rates. Now, the latter has become the standard form to gauge the vulnerability of 
a country's exchange rate regime to speculative attacks (see Chui (2000)) 3 
Here, we follow the commonly accepted practice to include in our definition not 
only 'successful' speculative attacks that result in a devaluation, but also 'failed' 
attacks that are warded off by selling off international reserves and/ or raising interest 
rates. ·This approach adopts the idea of unsuccessful speculative attacks by searching 
for a sudden fall in reserves and/or increase in interest rate. Thus, the Market 
Pressure ｉｾ､･ｸ＠ is a linear combination of the changes in a country's exchange rate, 
interest rates and international reserves: 
(3.1) 
where e is the log of nominal exchange rate against the anchor country (USA in 
.Latin America and East Asia groups, Germany in Europe group); L is the domestic 
market interest rate; and r is the log of international reserves. We multiply all the 
3 It is also argued that as for European countries, interest differentials adjusted for expected 
exchange rate drift (the 'drift-adjustment' method, Svensson (1993) and Rose and Svensson (1994)) 
could be better measure of currency crises for Europe. 
where Ot denotes the differential between the domestic interest rate (for a given maturity tlt) and 
the base country's (Deutsche Mark in this case) interest rate. Et is the expectation operator, and 
6.et = ･ｴＫｾｴ＠ - et where et is the spot price of a Deutsche Mark (DM) in domestic currency at time 
t. Then, the expected rate of change of the central parity Et[flct]/ tlt is derived to measure the 
expected rate of realignment, after subtracting deviation of the spot rate from Ct, Et[flxtl/ At. 
But this method does not incorporate movements in either nominal exchange rate or international 
reserves, which are predominant phenomena in almost all currency crises. It is also not suitable 
for the case of Latin America or East Asia where most countries pegged their currencies to US 
Dollar before crises (in other words, Et[Axt]j tlt = 0 and the expected nominal depreciation equals 
expected rate of realignment-no need to adjust for expected exchange rate drift). Moreover, the 
first equality in ( *) implies Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) that is seriously questioned in floating 
exchange rate regimes (e.g., Froot and Thaler (1990)). 
Market Pressure Index, On the other hand, does provide us with a universal measurement 
of (successful and unsuccessful) severe speculative attacks in exchange markets in Latin America, 
Europe and East Asia, taking into account changes in exchange rate, interest rates and international 
reserves. After all, a raw interest differential Ot (an element in MPI) is highly positively correlated 
with Et[Act]/ At and therefore a good approximation of it (Rose and Svensson (1994)). 
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three components by 100. '!:l' denotes the first difference. The minus sign in the 
equation ensures that a reduction in foreign reserves translates to an increase in the 
value of the MPI. 
Since the volatilities of the exchange rate, reserves, and interest rates are very 
different, an un-weighted index would be the index that is dominated by the most 
volatile component(s) . Following Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Sachs et al. (1996b)' 
approach to apply intuitive volatility smoothing weights, we weigh the three com-
ponents according to their relative precisions so that the resulting components have 
equal ｾ｡ｲｩ｡ｮ｣･ｳＮ＠ The relative precision is defined as the inverse of each series' stan-
dard deviation (s.d. )-the precision of that series-over the sum of the precisions of 
all three series for the sample period. The formula to calculate the weights is given 
by: 
Wi= _1_+_1_+_1_ 
s.d.(Lle) s.d.(Llt) s.d.(Llr) 
1 
s.d.(Ai) (3.2) 
We assume that there is no role for intervention by foreign authorities because, 
as most economists argue, intervention by foreign countries accounts for only a small 
proportion of total intervention during currency crises. Note also that, we use the 
quarterly data rather than annual data to construct the MPI, as the annual data 
won't provide enough observations ·that the SETAR model and Markov-switching 
model use to define currency crises for each country. 
The descriptive statistics of the MPis in Latin American, European and East 
Asian countries are shown in l'able 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
It is shown that in general, the countries in Latin America have the largest means 
of MPis , while the means for MPis in European countries are the smallest. The 
standard deviations of MPis for some Latin American countries are more than ten 
times as high as those for European or East Asian countries. This reflects the fact 
that compared with the other two regions, Latin America has experienced the most 
volatile periods in the last 30 years. It is also noticed that Latin American countries 
have most of the highest levels of MPis in our sample, e.g. 310.93 in Argentina in 
Currency Crises in Latin America, Europe and East Asia 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for MPis in Latin American Countries a 
Mean 
Median 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Std. Dev. 
Mean 
Median 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Std. Dev. 
Argentina Brazil Chile 
(1979Q3-2001Q4) b (1970Q2-2001Q4) (1977Q2-2001Q4) 
7.29 -0.47 -1.22 
1.18 -2.96 -0.25 
310.93 158.42 28.90 
-260.41 -90.40 -64.14 
55.16 28.74 10.04 
Columbia 
(1986Q2-2001Q4) 
0.39 
-0.12 
28.94 
-7.42 
4.76 
Mexico 
(1981Q3-2001Q4) 
-0.59 
0.11 
105.98 
-72.03 
17.54 
Peru 
(1970Q2-2001Q4) 
-1.32 
-1.84 
384.77 
-343.44 
53.41 
a Data for Exchange rate, interest rate and reserves used to construct the MPI is quarterly. 
b Period in brackets is the period during which the data is available. 
1989Q2. 
3.5 Identifying Currency Crisis Episodes 
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A currency crisis is commonly defined as more than a certain percentage or a number 
of standard deviation move in the index over a period. However, choice of the 
threshold is arbitrary. This causes proble1ns. A 10% or a one standard deviation 
move in MPI may be a common phenomenon in one country or country group, but it 
may be extremely unusual in another. As shown in Table 3.1 and 3.2, the Standard 
Deviation of MPI in Argentina is 55.16, much higher than 1.72, that for France. As 
a result, 'fitting one size to all' results in characterizing normal moves as crises in 
some places, and crises as normal in others. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 Literature Review, we follow the latest trend in the 
empirical works to instead adopt the non-linear statistic models to identify crises. 
Based on the MPI established above, two econometric techniques-the SETAR (Self 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for MPis in European Countries a 
Mean 
Median 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Std. Dev. 
Mean 
Median 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Std. Dev. 
Belgium France Ireland 
(1970Q2-2001Q4) b (1970Q2-2001Q4) (1973Q2-2001Q4) 
0.15 -0.29 -0.33 
0.19 -0.38 -0.30 
16.04 6.63 6.38 
-22.59 -4.39 -4.83 
6.45 1.72 2.04 
Italy Spain United Kingdom 
(1971Q2-2001Q4) (1974Q2-2001Q4) (1972Q2-2001Q4) 
0.004 -0.04 -0.20 
-0.30 -0.007 -0.15 
6.88 9.45 5.65 
-5.21 -12.51 -6.70 
1.79 3.15 1.54 
a Data for Exchange rate, interest rate and reserves used to construct the MPI is quarterly. 
b Period in brackets is the period during which the data is available. 
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Exciting Threshold Autoregression) model and Markov-switching model (see Hamil-
ton (1989) and Hamilton (1994))-are employed to create a 0 -1 crisis variable for 
each country. A value of 1 indicates a crisis while a value of 0 indicates a tranquil 
state. 
Both models have been popularly used in the business cycle literature to identify 
recessions, and have also been ｩｮ｣ｲ･ｾｳｩｮｧｬｹ＠ adopted to analyze currency crises. The 
major advantage of using non-linear state models is that we can avoid the arbitrary 
choice of the threshold value by allowing the data itself to reveal what move rep-
resents abnormal behaviour and therefore signal a crisis. Moreover, the non-linear 
nature of both models is also appealing for time series such as the IviPI. 
3.5.1 The SETAR Model 
The-SETAR model (see Potter (1995)) can be seen as a special case of a non-linear 
model with a single index restriction. More specifically, the model is defined by 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics for MPis in East Asian Countries a 
Mean 
Median 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Std. Dev_. 
Mean 
Median 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Std. Dev. 
Indonesia Korea 
(1978Q2-2001Q4) b (1977Q1-2001Q4) 
0.36 -0.20 
0.19 -0.30 
41.66 11.72 
-23.43 -9.51 
6.54 2.72 
Philippines 
(1977Q2-2001Q4) 
0.34 
0.42 
12.83 
-9.02 
3.83 
Singapore 
(1972Q3-2001Q4) 
-0.60 
-0.51 
4.36 
-4.68 
1.31 
Malaysia 
(1971Q2-2001Q4) 
-0.22 
-0.16 
4.84 
-5.40 
1.46 
Thailand 
(1977Q2-2001Q4) 
-0.21 
-0.65 
13.56 
-7.37 
2.72 
a Data for Exchange rate, interest rate and reserves used to construct the MPI is quarterly. 
b Period in brackets is the period during which the data is available. 
. { am+ au(L)MPit + P,t, MPit-d:::; c 
MPit= 
ao2 + a12(L)MPit + ftt, MPit-d > c 
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(3.3) 
where ali(L), (i = 1, 2) is a vector of associated polynomials in the lag operator. In 
the model, there are two regimes and the process generating M PIt switches between 
them, depending on whether M P lt-d is greater or less than the threshold value c, 
where d represents the delay in response. The current period value of MPI is chosen 
as the transition variable in our regression ( d = 0). The model in each regime is a 
linear autoregressive process, while it is non-linear overall caused by the endogenous 
switching between the two regimes. In other words, the SETAR model involves 
using the threshold and lagged MPI to explain the MPI itself. 
The SETAR model can be rewritten in the alternative form 
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where I(a) is an indicator function with I(a) = 1 when the condition a is true 
and I (a) = 0 when a is false. The SETAR procedure is designed to estimate a 
threshold level of the MPI, which once crossed, signals a regime change in the MPI. 
The value of the threshold, c, is chosen to deliver the lowest standard error in the 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
3.5.2 The Markov-switching Model 
The Hamilton's ｍ｡ｲｫｯｶｾｳｷｩｴ｣ｨｩｮｧ＠ model 4 (see Hamilton (1989) and Hamilton 
{1994)) allows us to assume that the time series (MPI) is drawn from the differ-
ent distributions conditional on the state-contingent parameter sets. But since we 
can not observe the shifts between regimes (normally two-one tranquil state and 
the other turmoil state) directly, we must instead draw a probabilistic inference 
about whether and when changes may occur using the observed behaviour of the 
MPis. The Markov-switching model is therefore drawn in the following formula: 
MPit = v(st) + ¢(L)MPit + rJt (3.5) 
where <f>(L) is a vector of associated polynomials in the lag operator. In the model, 
the intercept term v( St) is assumed to switch between the two states: 
if St = 1 ( 'stable' ) 
if St = 2 ( 'crisis' ) 
(3.6) 
and 'T}t rv NID(O, :E(st)), where :E(st) is also assumed to be different between the 
two regimes. Equation (3.5) is called the 'measurement equation' in the Hamilton's 
state space model. The state St is presumed to follow a first-order Markov process 
so that we can write the 'transition equation' as 
Pr(st = ｩｬｾｴＭ､＠ = Pr(st = ilst-1 = j) = Pij (3.7) 
4See Appendix A for a detailed statistical review of the Markov-switching model. 
-----------------------------------------
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where et-1 is a vector representing all the information available at timet -1, which 
includes lagged values of M PIt. As shown in Appendix A, the Hamilton filter 
(Hamilton (1989)) provides a nonlinear algorithm for generating inference about a 
discrete-valued unobserved state vector. As a by-product of that algorithm, the log 
likelihood function for the observed data evaluated at the estimates of parameters 
can be calculated. Then, the EM method is adopted to obtain maximum likelihood 
estimators for the Markov-switching model. Moreover, the smoothed estimators 
of the state vector based ｾｮ＠ all the information provided by the sample can be 
calculated by the backward recursion algorithm (Kim (1994)), in order to show the 
'best guess' of which state the economy is in at period t. 
3.5.3 Defining Currency Crises by using the SETAR and 
Markov-switching Model 
As opposed to imposing a threshold a priori (i.e., a 10% or a one standard deviation 
move in the MPI), we employ the SETAR and Markov-switching Model to allow the 
data itself to reveal what move represents abnormal behaviour and therefore signal 
a crisis. The crisis periods that are identified by the SETAR and Markov-switching 
model for Latin American, European and East Asian countries are shown in Table 
3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 respectively 5 • 
As the MPI used in the models is quarterly data, we construct the annual crisis 
variable in the way that a year of turmoil is defined if there is a crisis (or crises) in 
any quarter(s) in that year. We adopt a conservative measurement to only grant the 
'crisis' status to a year when both the SETAR and Markov-switching model identify 
crises in that year. Also note that no years shown in the table mean that the 
SETAR model performs poorly to produce too many unnecessary crises. Because of 
the single index restriction in the SETAR model, this normally happens when there 
5The estimated results of both models on countries in three regions are reported in Table 3.9-
Table 3.14. Figure 4.22-Figure 3.39 show both the filtered and smoothed. probabilities of being in 
volatile state for all countries respectively. 
------------------------------------------ -
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is too frequent fluctuation in the country's MPI, as, for example, in some European 
countries that adopt floating exchange rates. In this case, we ignore the SETAR 
model and regard the Markov-switching model as the only way to identify crises. 
Table 3.4: Identification of Currency Crises in Latin America 
Countries Currency Crises identified Cur rency Crises defined Currency Crises defined 
by SETAR Model a byMa rkov-switching Model b by. Both Models c 
Argentina 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985 1989, 1990 1989, 1990 
{197_!}-2001) d 1989, 1990, 1991 
Brazil 1980, 1982, 1986, 1987 198 9, 1990, 1992, 1993 1989, 1990, 1993 
{1970-2001) 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993 
1998, 1999, 2000 
Chile 1978, 1981, 1982, 1984 197 9, 1980, 1982, 1983 1982, 1984, 1985, 1991 
{1977-2001) 1985, 1989, 1991, 1993 198 4, 1985, 1988, 1991 1993 
1998 1993 
Columbia 1994, 1995, 1998 199 2,1994,1995,1998 1994, 1995, 1998 
{1986-2001) 1999 
Mexico 1982, 1985, 1986, 1987 1988, 1994, 1995 1988, 1994 
(1981-2001) 1988, 1990, 1994 
Peru 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978 197 9, 1990, 1994, 1998 1990, 1994, 1998 
{1970-2001) 1981, 1987, 1988, 1990 
1994, 1998, 1999 
a The estimated Non-linear SETAR model has 'a regime-dependent intercept and slope parameters. 
b The estimated non-linear Markov-switching model has a regime-dependent intercept and allows for 
heteroscedasticity. 
c A currency crisis is considered to occur in a year only if both the SETAR and Markov-switching model 
define a turmoil quarter (or quarters) during that year. 
d Period in parenthesis indicates the period during which the data is available. 
The constructed binary crisis variables for the three country groups have the 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 3. 7. It is shown that there are 18 crises in Latin 
America, 35 crises in Europe and 37 crises in East Asia from 1970 through 2001. 
The small number of currency crises that Latin American countries experienced in 
last 30 years does not necessarily mean that Latin America has suffered less than 
other regions. In contrast, however, Latin American countries experienced the most 
serious turmoils that ever happened, as indicated in Table 3.1. On the other hand, 
most of the speculative attacks on European and East Asian currencies picked up 
by the models, are not so severe and are mostly fended off by the authorities. 
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Table 3.5: Identification of Currency Crises in Europe 
Countries Currency Crises defined Currency Crises defined Currency Crises defined 
by SETAR Model a by Markov-switching Model b by Both Models c 
Belgium - e 1975, 1977, 1980, 1984 1975, 1977, 1980, 1984 
(1970-2001) d 1987, 1991, 1992 1987, 1991, 1992 
France _e 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 
(1970-2001) 1976, 1979, 1980, 1981 1976, 1979, 1980, 1981 
1982, 1991, 1993 1982, 1991, 1993 
Ireland _e 1992 1992 
(1973-2001) 
Italy 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977 1974, 1975, 1976 
(1971-2001) 1976, 1979, 1980, 1981 
1982, 1983, 1984, 1985 
1987, 1988, 1989, 1991 
1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 
1997, 1998 
Spain _e 1975, 1976, 1977, 1980 1975, 1976, 1977, 1980 
{1974-2001) 1981, 1982, 1983, 1992 1981, 1982, 1983, 1992 
1993 1993 
UK _e 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 
(1972-2001) 
a The estimated Non-linear SETAR model has a regime-dependent intercept and slope parameters. 
b The estimated non-linear Markov-switching model has a regime-dependent intercept and allows for 
heteroscedasticity. 
c A currency crisis is considered to occur in a year only if both the SETAR and Markov-switching 
·model define a turmoil quarter (or quarters) during that year. 
d Period in parenthesis indicates the period during which the data is available. 
e No years shown here means that the SETAR model performs badly as it produces too many un-
necessary crises. In this case, we ignore the SETAR model and treat turmoil years defined by the 
Markov-switching model as years of crises. 
3.6 The Results 
3.6.1 The Methodology 
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We follow the discrete-choice approach to link the dichotomous crisis variable to the 
selected variables, on the basis of recommendations made by the three generation 
crisis models. The limited dependent variable model is also called the qualitative 
or categorical variable model. Throughout each country group, we pool all the 
observations across both countries and time periods, and estimate the regression 
model of the form as 
Pr( crisis = 1) = P = f(f3'X) (3.8) 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables and {3 is a vector of parameters. Here, 
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Table 3.6: Identification of Currency Crises in East Asia 
Countries 
Indonesia 
{1978-2001} d 
Korea 
{1977-2001} 
Malaysia 
{1971-2001) 
Philippines 
{1977-2001} 
Singapore 
(1972-2001} 
Thailand 
(1977-2001) 
Currency Crises identified 
by SETAR Model a. 
1978, 1982, 1983, 1984 
1986, 1997' 1998 
1980, 1981, 1983, 1989 
1990, 1991, 1996, 1997 
1998, 2001 
_e 
_e 
_e 
1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 
1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 
1985, 1988, 1990, 1994 
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 
1999, 2000, 2001 
Currency Crises defined Currency Crises defined 
by Mw.·kov-switching Model b by Both Models c 
ｾｾ］Ｊｾｾｾｾｾｾｾ］＠1982, 1983, 1984, 1986 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986 
1990, 1997, 1998 . 1997, 1998 
1980, 1988, 1996, ＭＺＭＱｾＹＹｾＷ］ＭＭＭＫＭＭＺｯＱＹＺ［［Ｍ［Ｘ［ｶＰＺＭＬ＠ ＭＺＭＱＢａＹＹｾＶＺＺＺＭＧＭＬＭＺｬＭＺＺＺＹｾＹＷＺＺＭＬＭＺＱ［Ｍ［［ＹｾＹＸｾ＠
1998 
1981, 1986, 1992, 1997 1981, 1986, 1992, 1997 
1998 1998 
1982, 1983, 1984 I 1990 19821 1983, 19841 1990 
1993, 1997, 1998, 2000 1993 , 1997, 1998, 2000 
1973, 1975, 1983, Ｍ］ＱａＹＹｾＲＮＭＭＭＫＭＭＭ］ＭＱｾＹＷ］］ＳＺＺＭ］ＬＧＢ］ＱＭ］Ｙ］Ｗｳ］ＭＧＬＧＭ］Ｑ［Ｍ［［ＹＭ］ＸＳ［［ＭＬ］Ｍ］ＱＧＢＢＹＺＭ［ＺＺＺＹＭ［ＺＺＭＲＭ
1995, 1997, 1999 1995, 1997, 1999 
1980, 1981, ＱＹＸＲＬＭ］ＱＭ］ＹＸ［［Ｍ［Ｕ］ＭＭＭＫＭＭＭＺＭＱＭＺＺＭＹＸＺＺＺＺＰＺＺＭＬＭＺＱｾＹｾＸＱＺＭＬＭＺＱｾＹｾＸＲ［［ＭＬＭＺＱ［Ｍ［［ＹＺＭ［ＺＺＺＸＭ［［ＭＵＭ
1995, 1997, 1998 1995, 1997, 1998 
a. The estimated Non-linear SETAR model has a regime-dependent intercept and slope parameters. 
b The estimated non-linear Markov-switching model has a regime-dependent intercept and allows for 
heteroscedasticity. 
c A currency crisis is considered to occur in a year only if both the SETAR and Markov-switching model 
define a turmoil quarter (or quarters} during that year. 
d Period in parenthesis indicates the period during which the data is available. 
e No years shown here means that the SETAR model performs badly as it produces too many un-
necessary crises. In this case, we ignore the SETAR model and treat turmoil years defined by the 
Markov-switching model as years of crises. 
we assume a Logistic distribution for f(·) and a standard normal distribution with 
unit variance for the error term, giving us 
1 
Pr( crisis = 1) = P = -----:-
1 + exp( -X'{3) (3.9) 
In other words, we estimate a Logit Model. The parameter vector f3 can be 
estimated by Maximum Likelihood. In order to interpret the estimated coefficients 
in the Logit model, we present the effect of a unit change in the jth explanatory 
variable on the probability P as 
8Pr( crisis = 1) = f3·P(1 - P) 
OXj J (3.10) 
which can be evaluated at the sample mean P. 
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Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics for Cri-
sis Variables 
I Latin America I Europe I East Asia 
Mean 0.12 0.19 0.23 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std. Dev. 0.33 0.40 0.42 
Sum 18.00 35.00 37.00 
3.6.2 Results for Latin American Countries 
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Following the conventional method, we include both the current and one-period 
lagged value of explanatory variables in the Logit model as the data we use is 
annual. Using the 10% significant level, we drop variables that are not statistically 
significant. The final estimated results for Latin American Countries are shown in 
Table 3.8. The fitted value of the crisis variable for Latin American countries during 
1970-2001 is graphed on Figure 3.1 with its actual value. 
As suggested by the first generation models, our results show that an unsus-
tainable expansion in domestic credit increases the probability that a current fixed 
exchange rate can be abandoned in Latin America. More specifically, an increase in 
Domestic Credit provided by the Banking Sector by one percent of GDP raises the 
likelihood of a current devaluation by 0.58%. However, Overall Budget Balance is 
not statistically significant in this case. 
It is also shown that a deteriorating situation in current accounts of Latin Amer-
ican countries has a both statistically and economically significant effect on the 
vulnerability of exchange rate regimes to speculative attacks. This too underlines 
the significant role that weak economic fundamentals play in Latin American tur-
moil. An increase in Current Account Deficits-a decrease in Current Account 
Balance-by one percent of GDP pushes the economy closer to a crash by more 
than 3% in short run. In return, currency crashes in Latin A1nerican countries drag 
the economies further into turmoil and lead to even higher current account deficits. 
Interestingly, one-period lagged International Reserves appears statistically signif-
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Figure 3.1: Actual and Fitted value of Crisis Variable for Latin American 
Countries 
icant but has a negative sign, which contradicts what the Krugman-Flood-Garber 
model claims-the central bank's foreign reserves would gradually decrease to mon-
etize the budget deficits, until an abrupt speculative attack quickly exhausts all the 
remaining reserves and forces an abandonment of the parity. 
Moreover, estimated results show that there exists a positive relationship between 
the domestic interest rates and the odds of a currency crisis occurring in Latin 
America. An increase in the domestic Interest Rates by one point (1%) relative to 
USA has a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of a crash, pushing it up 
by 0.004%. The relative small magnitude of the effect is a result of the extremely 
high market interest rates experienced by smne Latin American countries during the 
crisis periods, e.g., 15778.6% in Brazil in 1990. This may offer some evidence that 
market expectations had played some role in Latin American crises before it was 
introduced in the second generation models. Other variables do not have statistically 
significant coefficients. 
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tries 
It is seen in Figure 3.1 that trends in the short dash line representing the actual 
crisis variable are well matched by the solid line representing the fitted value for 
crisis variable. This means that nearly all the crisis incidents occurring in Latin 
America are explained by the Logit model. The McFadden R-Squared of the Logit 
model for Latin American countries is 0.39, high enough to show the good fitness of 
our model for the data. 
3.6.3 Results for European Countries 
Our estimated results for European countries are also shown in Table 3.8. As before, 
we drop the explanatory variables with parameters not statistically significant at the 
conventional level of 10%. Figure 3.2 provides a graph for both the actual and fitted 
value of crisis variables for European countries during 1970-2001. 
As predicted by the second generation models, the real economic circle measured 
by the Real GDP Growth (annual %) is strongly associated with crisis incidences 
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in our results; a recession by one percent in real GDP undermines the possibility 
that the exchange rate regime will be successfully defended in the future by 5.6%. 
Surprisingly, one-year lagged unemployment does not have a predicted sign. 
\ 
It is also shown in estimated results that one-period lagged domestic ｉｮｴ･Ｑｾ･ｳｴ＠
Rate Differential (relative to German market) has a statistically significant effect 
of -3.82% on occurrence of a crisis. Together with no effect of its current value, 
it indicates a negative long-run relationship between interest rate differential and 
probability of a currency crash. But it is argued that it is .the dramatic increases 
in market interest rate in Germany (the anchor country) rather than the decreases 
in other European countries' interest rates that increases the likelihood of a future 
crisis in Europe. For example, German interest rate goes up from 4.3% to 10.18% in 
1972-1973, from 5.87% to 11.26% in 1979-1981, and from 4% to 9.41% in 1988-1992, 
all of which are the periods of turmoil for most European countries. 
Moreover, an abrupt and large loss of International Reserves coincides with the 
occurrence of a currency crash (14.02%) in European countries. This is in conformity 
with the first generation models which claim that all the remaining reserves will be 
eliminated when the speculative attacks force an abandonment of the exchange rate 
regime. As in the case of Latin America, one-period lagged reserves variable has 
a counter-intuitive sign, and thus the long-term relationship between international 
reserves and the likelihood of a crisis could be more complex than what Krugman 
(1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) predict. Moreover, Overall Budget Balance is 
significantly associated with currency crashes in Europe; higher budget deficits in 
European countries by 1% of GDP increase the likelihood of a future currency crisis 
by 5.32%. Therefore, our results show that factors identified by the first generation 
models, such as weak economic fundamentals and irresponsible government policies, 
still play a significant role in later currency crises in Europe. 
Interestingly, the variable suggested by the third generation models-ratio of 
Bank Liquid Reserves to Bank Assets-also has a significant coefficient at 10% in 
European case. A one percentage point drop in the ratio of liquidity reserves to 
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assets in the banking sector makes the economy more vulnerable to speculative 
attacks in the future by 3.57%, while the current value of the variable reverses the 
effect, but by a smaller magnitude (1.38%). This shows that the problem of liquidity 
crunch experienced by East Asian countries in 1997/98 had existed in Europe, but 
the impact that it has undermining credibility of the exchange rate regime seems 
rather long-term than short-term as suggested by Change and Velasco (1998). 
Finally, a strong performance by the German economy coincides with the crisis 
episodes occurring in other European countries; an increase in German real GDP 
growth by one percent reduces the probability that the exchange rate regimes in 
other European economies will be maintained in the future by 10.30%. This reflects 
the fact that the currency crises experienced by most European countries in the 
early 1990's are the periods when these economies had to adjust (devalue) their 
currencies against the Deutsche Mark as a result of their relatively poor economic 
performances. 
Figure 3.2 shows that the actual crisis variable depicted by the short dash line 
moves nearly simultaneously with its fitted value represented by the solid line. 
In other words, it is shown that the periods of turmoil predicted by the model 
mostly match the actual crisis episodes in Europe. The McFadden R-Squared-
measurement of Goodness of Fit-is 0.36 in the model for European countries, which 
again means that our Logit model is a good representation of the experiences of Eu-
ropean countries in 1970-2001. 
3.6.4 Results for East Asian Countries 
We also report estimated results for East Asian countries in Table 3.8. All the 
explanatory variables with statistically insignificant coefficients at 10% have been 
dropped from the Logit model. We also present the actual and fitted value of crisis 
variables for East Asian countries during 1970-2001 in Figure 3.3. 
According to the third generation 1nodels, the problem of moral hazard (interna-
tional over-borrowing) plays a crucial role in the crisis episodes in East Asia, acting 
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Figure 3.3: Actual and Fitted value of Crisis Variable for East Asia Coun-
tries 
as a main force for bubbles in asset markets. The estimated results show that an 
increase in Domestic Credit provided by Banking Sector by one percent of GDP 
raises the probability of a current forced abandonment of the parity by 1.75%. But 
the long-term effect of the credit expansion is more ambiguous, as its one-period 
lag has an opposite sign and a similar magnitude. Another suggested variable-
Ratio of Bank Liquid Reserves to Bank Assets-is not statistically significant in the 
regression. 
But we find evidence that shows factors identified by the first and second gen-
eration models still play significant parts in currency crises in East Asia. A sudden 
significant loss of International Reserves driven by speculative attacks would im-
mediately pushes East Asian economies off the edge (by 24.46%). But as in the 
previous two cases, the positive sign of one-period lagged reserves variable means 
that reserves have a more sophisticated long-term relationship with the likelihood 
of a currency crash. It is also shown that there are signs of deteriorating economic 
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fundamentals in East Asian before crises. An increase in Current Account Deficits 
by one percent of GDP undermines the likelihood of a parity will be successfully 
defended in the future by 2.88%. But different from the case of Latin America, im-
mediate improvements in all East Asian countries' current accounts at:e under way 
just after the crises-for example, the 1997/98 crises saw that the current account 
balance(% of GDP) changed from -2.27% to 4.29% in Indonesia, from -4.42% to 
12.73% in Korea, from -5.92% to 13.20% in Malaysia, from -5.28% to 2.37% in 
Philippines, from 13.82% to 19.18% in Singapore and from -2.15% to 12.29% in 
Thailand. Moreover, the Overall Budget Balance has a counter-intuitive sign in the 
regression, which may reflect the fact that before crises most East Asian govern-
ments, unlike their counterparts in Latin America, are not engaged in irresponsibly 
expansionary fiscal policies. 
A slowdown in East Asian economies also has a significant impact on the credi-
bility of exchange rate regimes; an economic recession by one percent in Real GDP 
Growth in the previous and current ye&· is associated with an increase in the prob-
ability of a currency crisis in East Asia by 3.29% and 3.55% respectively. A higher 
Interest Rate Differential (relative to USA market), which is a measure of inflation-
ary expectations, pushes up the odds of a currency crash in East Asian markets 
{by 4.34%) as well. A high speculation of an · impending depreciation may result 
in higher unemployment through wage inflation and also make serving debts more 
costly to the government who may find it optimal to devalue the domestic currency. 
As in the case of Europe, one-period lagged Interest Rate Differential does not 
have a predicted sign in the regression for East Asia. It is also argued that a strong 
performance of the USA economy (although USA Real GDP Growth does not have 
a statistically significant coefficient) and the resultant high market interest rate in 
the second half of 1990's are major factors behind the reverse of capital flows in East 
Asia. The USA interest rate increases from 3.02% in 1993 significantly to 5.84% in 
1995, and then gradually to 6.24% in 2000. 
It is seen in Figure 3.3 that the short dash line for the actual crisis variable 
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almost coincides with the solid line for the fitted crisis variable. Thus, it means 
that most of the currency crises in East Asian region can be explained by the Logit 
model. The McFadden R-squared in the model is 0.32 for East Asia, a promising 
figure showing that our model fits well the East Asian episodes. 
3.7 The Conclusion 
The initial approach to modeling currency crisis emphasizes the important role that 
unsustainable credit expansion and unsound economic fundamentals play in the 
late 1970s and 1980s' crises in Latin American countries. The second generation 
models suggest elements other than irresponsible policies and weak fundamentals-
conflicting goals of government policies (the contingent nature of the government) 
combined with private sectors' perfect foresight-are the main causes of the 1992/93 
ERM crises. The latest crisis models are inspi:red by the 1997/98 East Asian Cur-
rency /Financial Crises, identifying factors like moral hazard and illiquidity as poten-
tial factors that trigger the crises. In this chapter, however, we search for the stylized 
facts associated with currency crises occurring in these three regions-Latin Ainer-
ica, Europe and East Asia, in order to see how good the three generation models 
are in explaining these crisis episodes that originally inspired them. 
We construct a country-specific Market Pressure Index (MPI), which is the 
weighted average of the percentage change in ·nominal exchange rate, the differ-
ence in interest rate and the negative percentage change in international reserves. 
The aim in doing so is to capture not only the actual depreciations of currencies but 
also the 'failed' attacks successfully fended off by raising interest rates and/or sell-
ing out international reserves. The weights are chosen so that the three components . 
have the same conditional standard deviations. The higher the index, the higher 
the speculative pressure the country is facing. 
Based on the MPI, a 0-1 crisis variable is created by employing the SETAR (Self 
Exciting Threshold Autoregression) and Markov-switching model for each country. 
The advantage of adopting these non-linear state models is that we can avoid the 
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arbitrary choice of a threshold level a priori, as both 1nodels allow the data to 
reveal what move represents abnormal behaviour and therefore signal a crisis. Our 
results stem from the Limited Dependent Variable Model-Logit Model, which links 
the binary crisis variable to a wide range of selected variables based on the three 
generation models. We only keep the variables that are statistically significant at 
10% conventional level. 
We find that currency crises in Latin American countries seem to take place 
when (1) the domestic credit is expanding at an unsustainable pace, (2) the current 
account balance is deteriorating, and (3) there is currently a high expectation of 
realignment in markets. 
Crises in European countries tend to occur when (1) the economy has slid into 
recession, (2) the international reserves 31·e drying out, (3) the government has been 
engaged in irresponsibly expansionary fiscal policies, (4) the banking sector is facing 
a liquidity crunch, and (5) the German economy has performed relatively strongly 
and its interest rate has been high. 
Finally, currency crashes-in East Asian countries seem to happen when (1) there 
is a current unsustainable credit expansion as a result of moral hazard (international 
over-borrowing), (2) the government is running out international reserves, (3) the 
situation in current account has deteriorated, ( 4) the economy has been slowing 
down, (5) there is a high speculation of an impending devaluation, and (6) USA 
market interest rate has been high. 
In summary, the estimated results from our research provide some evidence that 
the three generation models address the different features of currency crises occurring 
in three regions. For example, irresponsible credit expansion and unsound economic 
fundamentals identified by the first generation models are predominating factors in 
Latin America before crises, the close relationship between the economic cycle and 
occurrence of crises in Europe is pointed out in the second generation models, and 
moral hazard (international over-borrowing) defined by the third generation models 
does act as the main force behind the bubbles in East Asian asset markets. 
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But the overall picture is far from perfect. It is also shown in our results that 
some variables appear to have counter-intuitive signs and some are not statistically 
· significant at the conventional level as they should be. This raises enquiries for 
further research in introducing new theories to explain the nature/ causes of currency 
crises, which is discussed in the following Chapter. 
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Table 3.8: Logit Model Results for Latin America, Europe and East Asia a 
I Latin American Countries b I European Countries c I East Asian Countries d 
Variable a Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
BANKLIQUID - 1.38%* 
BANKLIQUID(-1) f - -3.57%** 
CREDITBYBANK 0.58%*** gb. 
CREDITBYBANK(-1) -
RESERVES --
RESERVES(-!) 3.84%** 
INTDIFF 0.004%* 
INTDIFF(-1) --
UNEMPLOYMENT --
UNEMPLOYMENT(-!) -
CURACCOUNT -3.23%*** 
CURACCOUNT(-1) -
BUDGET -
BUDGET(-1) -
REALGDP --
REALGDP(-1) -
USA(GM)GDP -
-14.02%* 
18.80%*** 
-3.82%** 
-7.53%*"'* 
-5.32%** 
-5.60%* 
1.75%*** 
-1.85%*** 
-24.46%*** 
18.67%*** 
4.34%** 
-4.80%*** 
3.26%** 
-2.88%** 
2.62%* 
-3.55%** 
-3.29%* 
USA(GM)GDP(-1) - 10.30=-=%,_**_*--1-----=-==------
McFadden R-squared 0.39 0.36 0.32 
a. Estimate Method: Maximum Likelihood (Quadratic hill climbing) for the Binary Logit model. Covari-
ance matrix computed using second derivatives. 
b Latin American countries include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico and Peru. 
c European countries include Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain and UK. 
d East Asian countries include Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
e Dependent variable is the 0 - 1 crisis variable. I 
f Number in brackets is the lag for the variable. 
g Effect of one-unit change of the explanatory variable on the probability of a currency crisis (expressed 
in percentage) i!:! evaluated at the sample mean. 
h Parameters with '*' are significant at 10% level. Parameters with '**' are significant at 5% level. Pa-
rameters with'***' are significant at 1% level. 
BANKLIQUID-Bank Liquid Reserves to Bank Assets ratio 
CREDITBYBANK-Domestic Credit provided by Banking Sector (% of GDP) 
RESERVES-International Reserves (months of imports) 
INTDIFF-Interest Rate Differential relative to USA (Germany for Europe) 
UNEMPLOYMENT-Unemployment (%) 
CURACCOUNT-Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 
BUDGET-Overall Budget Balance, including grants(% of GDP) 
REALGDP-Real GDP Growth (annual %) 
USA(GM)GDP- Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP in USA (Germany for Europe) 
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Table 3.9: SETAR Model a Estimated Results b in Latin America 
Countries Argentina Brazil Chile Columbia Mexico Peru 
(1979-2001)C (1970-2001) {1977-2001) (1986-2001) {1981-2001) {1970-2001) 
Intercept (Tranquil) -1.52 d -6.60 -1.66 -0.78 -3.85 -9.99 
(-0.46) (-4.31) ( -3.30) (-2.94) (-2.65) (-2.96) 
Intercept (Volatile) 63.74 54.69 13.27 11.17 35.51 72.32 
(2.06} (3.97} (4.27) (2.75) (3.17} (2.70} 
Coefficients on AR(1) 
(Tranquil) -0.25 0.10 -0.08 -0.02 -0.12 -0.13 
(-4.38) (1.80) (-1.09) (-0.18) (-1.53) {-2.13) 
(Volatile} 2.77 0.02 0.25 -0.17 -2.13 0.58 
(2.40) (0.05) (0.90) (-0.50) (-1.63) (0.67) 
Coefficients on AR(2) 
(Tranquil) -0.07 
(-0.97) 
(Volatile) -0.16 
(-0.50) 
Coefficients on AR(3) 
('fra.nquil) 0.003 
(0.05) 
(Volatile) 0.17 
(0.34) 
Coefficients on AR( 4) 
(Tranquil) 0.13 
(2.56) 
(Volatile} 0.02 
(0.03) 
Std. Dev. (Tranquil) 29.65 16.17 4.55 1.92 12.29 35.85 
Std. Dev. (Volatile) 80.10 46.96 7.89 8.22 25.66 95.72 
Threshold 36.78 21.92 4.34 2.78 10.61 25.83 
SO criterion 10.17 8.90 6.61 4.94 8.40 10.47 
LR Linearity test e 89.77 111.80 60.93 84.95 43.77 73.44 
(0.000] [0.000] (0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
a Estimated Model: Non-linear SETAR (Self Exciting Threshold Autoregression) with a regime-dependent inter-
cept and slope parameter. 
bAll results are obtained using H-M. Krolzig's MSVAR package for Ox. 
c Period in parenthesis indicates the period during which the data is available. 
d Number in parenthesis below regression coefficient is t-value. 
e Number in square bracket below test statistic is p-values. 
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Table 3.10: Markov-switching Model a Estiinated Results b in Latin America 
Countries Argentina Brazil Chile Columbia Mexico Peru 
(1979-2001)c (1970-2001) (1977-2001) (1986-2001) (1981-2001) (1970-2001) 
Intercept (Tranquil) 2.64 d -2.68 0.12 -0.11 -0.70 -1.72 
{1.26) {-1.64) (0.30) (-0.56) (-0.76) (-0.97) 
Intercept (Volatile) 69.91 13.21 -0.74 2.82 6.53 12.76 
(0.50) (0.31) (-0.23) (0.93) (-0.19) (0.20) 
AR(1) 0.06 0.06 -0.003 0.16 -0.04 0.03 
{1.32) (1.13) (-0.03) (2.44) (-0.94) (0.77) 
AR(2) 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 
(2.21) (0.51) (0.35) (0.37) (-1.34) (-0.52) 
AR(3) -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.17 -0.02 0.05 
(-0.56) (0.15) (-0.66} (-2.46) (-0.34) {1.65} 
AR(4) 0.15 0.06 0.21 0.11 -0.05 0.05 
(3.17) (1.23) (2.94) (1.81) (-0.74) (1.51) 
Std. Dev. (Tranquil) 18.25 16.40 2.94 1.22 7.28 17.93 
Std. Dev. (Volatile) 263.67 121.96 13.64 10.03 68.82 191.97 
'fra.nsition Prob. (%) 
(Tranquil ----t 'franquil} 0.97 0.95 0.86 0.92 0.95 0.96 
(Volatile-+ Volatile) 0.33 0.33 0.42 0.66 0.03 0.40 
SC criterion 9.63 9.36 6.54 5.21 7.89 9.63 
LR Linearity teste 144.76 115.65 53.84 77.55 88.24 190.48 
[0.000) [0.000] [0.000) [0.000] [0.000) [0.000) 
a Estimated Model: Non-linear Markov-switching Autoregressive (MS-AR) model with a regime-dependent inter-
cept and allowing for heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term. 
bAll results are obtained using H-M. Krolzig's MSVAR package for Ox. 
c Period in parenthesis indicates the period during which the data is available. 
d Number in parenthesis below regression coefficient is t-value. 
e Number in square bracket below test statistic is p-values. 
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Table 3.11: SETAR Model a Estimated Results bin Europe 
Countries Belgium France Ireland Italy Spain UK 
(1970-2001) c (1970-2001) (1973-2001) (1971-2001) (1974-2001) (1972-2001) 
Intercept (Tranquil) -4.69 cl -1.33 -2.29 -1.03 -2.48 -0.96 
(-7.89) ( -9.71) (-7.72) ( -7.69) (-8.84) (-7.04) 
Intercept (Volatile) 5.76 0.99 1.33 1.45 2.07 1.11 
(14.00) (5.97) (7.11) (8.35) (7.56) (7.15) 
Coefficients on AR(1) 
(Tranquil) 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.41 0.21 
(0.52) (0.63) {1.00) (0.39) (3.48) (2.51) 
(Volatile) -0.23 0.30 0.33 0.52 0.17 0.03 
(-3.59) (3.11) (3.59) (4.63) (2.18) (0.24) 
Coefficients on AR(2) 
(Tranquil) 0.03 0.12 0.05 -0.14 
(0.30) (1.39) (0.69) (-1.49) 
(Volatile) -0.02 -0.06 0.12 0.01 
(-0.28) (-0.46) (1.06) (0.09) 
Coefficients on AR(3) 
(Tranquil) 0.10 0.04 0.08 -0.14 
(1.18) (0.39) {1.06) {-1.47) 
{Volatile) 0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.07 
(0.45) {-0.46) (0.52) (0.73) 
Coefficients on AR{4) 
(Tranquil) 0.02 -0.05 -0.17 0.25 
{0.23) (-0.68) {2.33) (2.73) 
(Volatile) 0.07 0.02 -0.23 -0.07 
{1.12) (0.18) (-2.05) (-0.73) 
Std. Dev. (Tranquil) 4.56 0.94 2.06 1.07 1.78 1.13 
Std. Dev. (Volatile) 2.89 1.16 1.31 1.03 1.92 1.05 
Threshold 0.99 -0.08 -0.35 0.48 -0.39 0.10 
SC criterion 6.00 3.46 4.14 3.51 4.69 3.30 
LR Linearity teste 124.30 86.41 84.02 98.87 89.74 72.82 
(0.000] (0.000} [0.000} [0.000} [0.000} [0.000] 
a Estimated Model: Non-linear SETAR (Self Exciting Threshold Autoregression) with a regime-dependent intercept 
and slope parameter. 
bAll results are obtained using H-M. Krolzig's MSVAR package for Ox. 
c Period in parenthesis indicates the period during which the data is available. 
d Number in parenthesis below regression coefficient is t-value. 
e Number in square bracket below test statistic is p-values. 
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Table 3.12: Markov-switching Model a Estimated Results bin Europe 
Countries Belgium France Ireland Italy Spain UK 
(1970-2001) c {1970-2001) (1973-2001) {1971-2001) {1974-2001) (1972-2001) 
Intercept (Tranquil) -5.60 a -1.58 -0.53 0.05 -2.38 -2.25 
(-4.26) (-3.03) (-1.98) (0.35) (-2.18) {-1.65) 
Intercept (Volatile) 6.48 0.82 3.25 -0.16 2.91 0.89 
(12.66) (1.34) (0.70) {-0.18) {3.29) {1.07) 
AR(1) -0.26 0.27 0.04 0.43 0.10 0.27 
(-4.25) (2.59) (0.37) (4.64) (0.82) {3.41) 
AR(2) -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.09 
(-1.34) (-1.06) (-0.54) (-0.68) ( -1.06) 
AR(3) -0.02 0.005 -0.10 0.04 
(-0.30) {0.05) (-0.83) (0.57) 
AR{4) 0.01 0.12 -0.14 0.005 
(0.13) (1.29) (-1.30) (0.06) 
Std. Dev. (Tranquil) 5.77 1.33 1.81 1.20 3.66 2.27 
Std. Dev. (Volatile) 1.13 2.00 2.20 3.40 2.54 2.26 
'fransition Prob. (%) 
('franquil -+ Tranquil) 0.79 0.67 0.96 0.98 0.88 0.87 
(Volatile-+ Volatile) 0.40 0.74 0.32 0.90 0.87 0.83 
SC criterion 6.96 4.12 4.53 4.09 5.62 4.01 
LR Linearity test c 22.15 27.72 3.80 23.01 14.91 33.37 
[0.000] [0.000} [0.150] {0.000] [0.005] (0.000] 
a Estimated Model: Non-linear Markov-switching Autoregressive (MS-AR) model with a regime-dependent intercept 
and allowing for heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term. 
bAll results are obtained using H-M. Krolzig's MSVAR package for Ox. 
c Period in parenthesis indicates the period during which the data is available. 
d Number in parenthesis below regression coefficient is t-value. 
0 Number in square bracket below test statistic is p-values. 
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Table 3.13: SETAR Model a Estimated Results b in East Asia 
Countries Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
(1978-2001) c (1977-2001) (1971-2001) (1977-2001) (1972-2001) (1977-2001) 
Intercept ('franquil) -1.02 <I -0.76 -1.18 -2.94 -2.04 -1.77 
(-2.43) (-3.80) (-8.73) (-7.77) (-12.18) (-9.38) 
Intercept (Volatile) 12.37 3.76 0.81 2.35 0.13 2.12 
(3.09) (3.27) (7,69) (7.27) (1.22) (5.11) 
Coefficients on AR(1) 
('franquil) . 0.09 0.04 0.17 0.11 -0.02 -0.12 
(0.96) {0.44) (2.14) (1.19) (-0.20) (-1.58) 
(Volatile) -0.01 0.40 0.46 0.31 0.10 0.21 
(-0.02) (1.52) (5.38) (3.58) (1.40) (1.43) 
Coefficients on AR(2) 
('franquil) -0.12 -0.07 
(-1.31) (-0.98) 
(Volatile) -0.01 0.22 
(-0.18) (1.53) 
·coefficients on AR(3) 
('franquil) 0.03 
(0.36) 
(Volatile) 0.34 
(3.36) 
Coefficients on AR( 4) 
('franquil) -0.19 
(-2.51) 
(Volatile) -0.20 
(-1.70) 
Std. Dev. ('franquil) 3.83 1.86 1.01 2.06 0.85 1.41 
Std. Dev. (Volatile) 10.80 3.48 0.81 2.41 0.87 2.37 
Threshold 4.34 1.65 -0.15 -0.18 -0.96 0.21 
SC criterion 6.08 4.54 2.92 5.10 2.83 4.32 
LR Linearity teste 71.61 54.30 94.68 83.09 93.78 84.23 
(0.000] [0.000) (0.000) [0.000] (0.000] (0.000] 
a Estimated Model: Non-linear SETAR (Self Exciting Threshold Autoregression) with a regime-dependent intercept 
and slope parameter. 
bAll results are obtained using H-M. Krolzig's MSVAR package for Ox. 
c Period in parenthesis indicates the period during which the data is available. 
d Number in parenthesis below regression coefficient is t-value. 
a Number in square bracket below test statistic is p-values. 
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Table 3.14: Markov-switching Model a Estimated Results bin East Asia 
Countries Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
{1978-2001)c (1977-2001) (1971-2001) (1977-2001) (1972-2001) (1977-2001) 
Intercept (Tranquil) -0.35 Q -0.08 -1.07 -3.43 -0.89 0.45 
(-0.99) (-0.58) (-1.84) (-2.66) (-1.51) (1.71) 
Intercept (Volatile) 4.10 -0.36 0.66 4.54 0.66 1.42 
(0.71) (-0.15) (0.75) (3.05) (0.07) (1.08) 
AR(1) 0.06 0.20 0.37 -0.08 0.13 -0.11 
{0.97) (2.67) (3.87) (-0.86) (0.56) (-1.01) 
AR(2) 0.21 0.13 -0.05 -0.12 
(3.43) (1.71) (-0.54) (-1.32) 
AR(3) 0.06 0.02 -0.15 
(0.83) (0.41) (1.95) 
AR(4) -0.18 -0.02 0.03 
(-3.24) {-0.34) (0.34) 
Std. Dev. ('1\-a.nquil) 2.48 1.16 1.69 2.60 1.41 1.17 
Std. Dev. (Volatile) 15.19 7.58 1.97 4.44 1.82 5.21 
Transition Prob. (%) 
(Thanquil -t '1\-anquil) 0.90 0.93 0.67 0.46 0.74 0.86 
(Volatile -t Volatile) 0.30 0.44 0.61 0.70 0.01 0.80 
SC criterion 6.02 4.41 3.84 5.86 3.68 4.84 
LR Linearity teste 66.39 72.97 21.43 22.78 23.31 57.27 
[0.000] (0.000] (0.000] [0.000] (0.000) (0.000) 
"' Estimated Model: Non-linear Markov-switching Autoregressive (MS-AR) model with a regime-dependent inter-
cept and allowing for heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term. 
bAll results are obtained using H-M. Krolzig's MSVAR package for Ox. 
c Period in parenthesis indicates the period during which the data is available. 
d Number in parenthesis below regression coefficient is t-value. 
e Number in square bracket below test statistic is p-values. 
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Figure 3.4: Argentina: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State 
by SETAR Model 1979-2001 
Figure 3.5: Belgium: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model 1970-2001 
1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 
Figure 3.6: Brazil: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model 1970-2001 
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Figure 3.7: Chile: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model 1977-2001 
Figure 3.8: Columbia: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State 
by SETAR Model 1986-2001 
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Figure 3.9: France: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model 1970-2001 
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Figure 3.10: Indonesia: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State 
by SETAR Model 1978-2001 
1973 < -1919 1988 1991 1997 2000 
Figure 3.11: Ireland: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model 1973-2001 
1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 
Figure 3.12: Italy: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model 1971-2001 
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Figure 3.13: South Korea: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile 
State by SETAR Model 1977-2001 
Figure 3.14: Malaysia: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State 
by SETAR Model 1971-2001 
Figure 3.15: Mexico: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model 1981-2001 
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Figure 3.16: Peru: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model 1970-2001 
Figure 3.17: Philippine: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State 
by SETAR Model 1977-2001 
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Figure 3.18: Singapore: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State 
by SETAR Model 1972-2001 
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Figure 3.19: Spain: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model1974-2001 
Figure 3.20: Thailand: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State 
by SETAR Model 1977-2001 
Figure 3.21: UK: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model 1972-2001 
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Figure 3.22: Argentina: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model 1979-2001 
Figure 3.23: Belgium: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model 1970-2001 
predicted 
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Figure 3.24: Brazil: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model1970-2001 
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Figure 3.25: Chile: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in Volatile 
State by Markov-switching Model 1977-2001 
Figure 3.26: Columbia: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model 1986-2001 
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Figure 3.27: France: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model 1970-2001 
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Figure 3.28: Indonesia: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model 1978-2001 
Figure 3.29: Ireland: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model1973-2001 
predicted 
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Figure 3.30: Italy: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in Volatile 
State by Markov-switching Model 1971-2001 
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Figure 3.31: South Korea: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being 
in Volatile State by Markov-switching Model1977-2001 
Figure 3.32: Malaysia: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model 1971-2001 
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Figure 3.33: Mexico: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model 1981-2001 
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Figure 3.34: Peru: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in Volatile 
State by Markov-switching Model 1970-2001 
Figure 3.35: Philippine: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model 1977-2001 
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Figure 3.36: Singapore: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model1972-2001 
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Figure 3.37: Spain: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model 197 4-2001 
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Figure 3.38: Thailand: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model 1977-2001 
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Figure 3.39: UK: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in Volatile 
State by Markov-switching Model 1972-2001 
CHAPTER 4 
Public Debt, Debt Maturity and Currency Crises 
4.1 Introduction 
The mainstream literature on the credibility issue of an exchange rate regime (see 
Backus and Driffill (1985a) and Backus and Driffill (1985b)) argues that a defence of 
the fixed parity can signal the monetary authority's 'toughness' towards inflation, 
and thus improve the credibility of the regime. More recently, literature has re-
examined this issue in the context of a dynamic model where there are persistence 
effects from failing to devalue following an adverse supply effect. Thus in Drazen 
and Masson (1994) there is persistence in unemployment, and defending the fixed 
parity leads to higher future unemployment undermining the possibility that the 
currency peg will be maintained. In Benigno and Missale (2001) -henceforth BM-
the fundamentals are driven not by unemployment, but by public debt. In both 
models if there is little uncertainty about the government's preferences, or if the 
difference between a perceived 'tough' and a 'weak' government is small, resisting a 
currency crisis may in fact reduce the credibility of the exchange rate regime. 
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Following BM's approach, we adopt a three-period stochastic version of the Barro 
and Gordon (1983) model, where the probability of devaluation in each period is 
derived from the monetary authority's optimization problem. Monetary policy is 
conducted in terms of an escape clause that specifies the threshold value of a negative 
supply-side shock above which devaluation will occur. We present a more general 
framework than BM does for studying the policymaker's optimization problem, a 
framework which distinguishes between the commitment and discretionary optimal 
escape clauses. We also extend BM's model to allow for non-deflatable debt, that 
is in cases where the government also issues securities whose real returns cannot be 
eroded through an unexpected devaluation. 
First, we .examine the case where the central bank can commit itself to a 2-period 
escape clause rule that is publicly known. Minimization of the bank's loss function 
delivers the optimum solution with respect to the policymaker's utility, which we 
regard as a benchmark. Then, we move to the complete information game, where 
the monetary authority cannot commit, but its type is known to the public. As 
in BM, it is shown that defending the fixed parity and refraining from inflationary 
financing increases the debt burden and thus the likelihood of having to resort to 
future devaluation. In other words, with a high level of nominal debt a current 
devaluation always increases the probability that a future defence of the new parity 
will succeed. This is the (debt-burden' effect. We also confirm the BM result that 
the probability of a first-period devaluation also increases with the level of public 
debt and, more interestingly, with the share of short-term debt. Comparison with 
the commitment case shows that the discretionary two-period escape clause rules 
are sub-opti1nal and involve an expected inflation bias. This can be lessened by the 
delegation of monetary policy to a tough banker, but this relocates the problem to 
one of establishing the credibility of such toughness. 
This leads to an asymmetric information game where the monetary authority's 
preferences are not known to the private sector. The decision to devalue 1night reveal 
a weak authority, thus leading to inflationary expectations which, in turn, increase 
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the likelihood of a future devaluation. This is the 'signalling' effect. This effect 
is important when there is substantial uncertainty about the cost of devaluation 
to the monetary authority and when the debt is small. In this case, reputational 
motive, especially when a monetary authority is facing a high level of debt, could 
increase the probability that the fixed parity will be maintained in the first period, 
as the tough authority wants to signal its type and the weak authority pretends to 
be tough in order to exploit lower interest rates. Whether the debt-burden or the 
signalling effect prevails depends on the importance of debt fundamentals relative 
to the monetary authority's credibility. 
The probability of a second-period devaluation does not depend on either debt 
maturity or reputational considerations. Therefore, the theoretical model predicts 
that for any given level of uncertainty, in countries where the debt-burden effect dom-
inates, a higher ratio of short-term debt implies higher short-term interest rates (and 
a higher probability of current devaluation) and a flatter yield curve. In contrast, in 
countries where the signalling effect prevails, a larger proportion of short-term debt 
is associated with lower current interest rates and a steeper yield curve. 
We use the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) index to define the actual changes in 
the exchange rate regime for 11 emerging economies from 1993Q2 to 2001Q4. We 
adopt the Self Exciting Threshold Autoregression (SETAR) model and the Markov 
Regime Switching (MRS) model to identify periods with high pressure in exchange 
markets. We identify observations where foreign exchange market pressure is ac-
commodated (i.e. there is a shift in the regime) and where it is not (i.e. the 
monetary authority successfully defends the peg by selling international reserves 
and/or increasing interest rates). Countries where the debt-burden effect dominates 
are subsequently distinguished from others where the signalling effect prevaHs, based 
on the behaviour of market expectations following successful defences and/ or actual 
crises (regime shifts). The theory's two predictions about the impact of debt ma-
turity on the likelihood of crisis and the yield curve are then tested using GMM 
(General Method of Mmnents) estimation for dynamic panel data. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out an open-economy stochas-
tic Barro-Gordon model with short-term and long-term debt. Section 3 examines 
three cases: commitment, and non-commitment, first with symmetric information 
and then with asymmetric information. The results are demonstrated by numerical 
simulation in Section 4. Section 5 presents the interested variables and data set 
needed for the empirical analysis. In Section 6, 11 emerging economies in our sam-
ple are split into two groups-'signalling' countries and 'debt-burden' countries. We 
then test the two predictions made by the theoretical model in Section 7. Section 8 
concludes. 
4.2 The Model 
We consider a three-period open economy of the Barro and Gordon (1983) model 
where the unexpected inflation that follows a devaluation increases output both 
through a standard price-output effect and through a tax-reduction effect. As in 
Obstfeld (1994) and Velasco (1996), we assume that taxes are only levied in the last 
period and that taxes involve an output cost. These tax distortions increase the 
incentive to devalue. Following the escape clauses approach of Obstfeld (1997), we 
assume that output is stochastic to take into account that even a tough policymaker, 
with a high aversion to inflation and therefore to devaluation, will devalue if the 
economy is hit by unusually large shocks. We also take the size of a devaluation 
as given, i.e. not depending on the magnitude of the shock. In other words, the 
monetary authority's choice is between maintaining a fixed parity and the alternative 
of a devaluation of a fixed size. 
Because of Purchasing Power Parity, we can make the simplifying assumption 
that the inflation rate 1ft, in periods t = 1, 2 equals the rate of devaluation. There-
fore, the output in period 1 is given by 
(4.1) 
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where y* is the target output, 1r1 - E01r1 is inflation surprise and k is a goods or 
labour market distortion. 1ft = 0 when the monetary authority maintains the fixed 
parity and 1ft = d when the monetary authority devalues. Thus the equilibriu1n 
level of output under perfect foresight (no shocks) is y*- k, which is considered to 
be too low by the authority. The output in period 2 is given by 
(4.2) 
where T is the output cost of distortionary taxation required to repay debt B = 
B10 + B20 , where Bw = one-period (short-term) real debt and B20 = two-period 
(long-term) real debt, both issued in period 0. Let ft E [0, 1] be the proportion of 
inflation-sensitive debt. 
Consider accumulated short-term and long-term debt, Bu and B2t respectively, 
at the end of periods t = 1, 2. Let Tt = real interest rate in period t given by 
Tt = Lt- 1ft to a linear approximation. For nominal inflation-sensitive short-term 
debt, Lt = Et-ITl + Et-l1ft, is the nominal interest rate at the beginning of period t 
demanded by the private sector to achieve an expected real interest rate of Et-!Tt. 
Therefore Tt = Et-lTt- (1ft- Et-11ft) = r*- (1ft- Et-11ft) where we assume Et-!Tt = 
r*, the fixed foreign real interest rate. Similarly for long-term debt Tt = r* - (1ft -
Eo1ft)· Assuming r* = 0 for convenience, we then have accumulated short-term and 
long-term debt at the end of period 2 given by 
(4.3) 
At the end of period 2, taxes T must be levied to repay the accumulated debt, 
[B12 + B22]. Then assun1ing the effect on output to be proportional to debt we then 
have from (4.3) 
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(4.4) 
Normalizing r = 11 and substituting ( 4.2) into the output equation ( 4.2) then 
yields 
where B = B 10+B2o as before, is the real value of total debt at period 0, m = a+p,B, 
S = a + p,B10 and K = k + B is the expected deviation of output from target. Our 
basic model is then given by (4.1) and (4.5). The output effect of a revision in 
expectations depends not only on total debt B, but also on S = a + p,B10 which 
increases with short-term inflation-sensitive debt, p,B10 . If a devaluation ｬｾ｡､ｳ＠ to an 
upward revision in the interest rate (a first-period devaluation produces expectations 
of a further depreciation), then the authority is worse off the shorter the maturity 
of its debt (the higher S), because short-term debt is refinanced at higher-than-
expected interest rates. On the other hand, however, if the inflation created by 
devaluation in the first period eases the real debt burden and thus diminishes the 
need for further devaluation, then the benefits for the monetary authority increase 
with short-term debt (the higher S) because interest rates turn out to be lower than 
expected. 
At t = 0, the monetary authority of type i = W(Weak), T(Tough) is assumed to 
minimize its loss function: 
Lt =Eo [tp•-1 £!] = ｅｯ｛ｌｾ＠ + /JLt] 
t=l 
(4.6) 
where Eo denotes expectations conditional on the information in period 0, 0 < /3 < 1 
is the discount factor and ｌｾ＠ is a single-period loss function in which the monetary 
authority weighs the cost of devaluation against the output deviation from the target 
1This implies that debt itself is measured in terms of output loss. 
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y*: 
(4.7) 
where Oi measures the cost of devaluation relative to output for type i. Our model 
demonstrates that Li and Lt are functions: 
Ll = Ll(7rt, Eo1r1, u1); 
ｌｾ＠ ｌｾＨＱｲＱＬ＠ Eo1r1, 1r2, Eo1r2, E11r2, u2) 
(in addition to fixed parameters k, y*, Bw and B20 ) since in period 2 taxes T are 
repaid. 
4.3 Three Possible Equilibria 
4.3.1 Commitment under Complete Information 
This section assumes complete information and presents a more general framework 
than BM in that it considers the case where the monetary authority can commit 
itself to some predefined rules. Firstly, we set out the general framework. 
The two-period expected loss function in period 0 can be rewritten as 
(4.8) 
where p1 =probability of a first-period devaluation and L 2(h) is the welfare loss in 
period 2 following a history h = D( Devaluation ), F( Maintaining the fixed parity ). 
Here we focus on p1 and p2 (h) as instruments for the monetary authority to min-
imize its loss. As we shall see, this is equivalent to choosing a threshold u1 in the 
first period for the magnitude of negative supply-side shock at which the authority 
devalues, and a state-contingent shock u2 which depends on the realization of u1 in 
period 1 in BM. Under complete infonnation, the type of the monetary authority 
(the cost of devaluation, B) is known to the private sector so we suppress the type 
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superscript in this and the next section to ease the notation. 
The sequence of events under commitment is as follows. At period 0, the mone-
tary authority issues fixed-rate one-period (short-term) and two-period (long-term) 
bonds, including debts denominated in a foreign currency-or the monetary au-
thority is obliged to pay off all the debts issued by the government. The monetary 
authority commits itself to the two-period rule consisting of probability of devalua-
tion in period 1, p1 and in period 2, P2(h), h = D, F following a history h = D, F 
in period 1. As mentioned above, the rule is equivalent to the shock thresholds ih 
and ii2 = u2(h) at which devaluation occurs in period 1 and in period 2 respectively. 
The interest rates of the debts are determined by (rational) expectation of inflation 
rates (rates of devaluation). Then in periods 1 and 2 shocks occur and the monetary 
authority implements this commitment rule to devalue or maintain the parity. At 
the end of period 1 the one-period debt is rolled over and at the end of period 2 the 
total debt service is repaid by levying distortionary taxes. 
Now let f(u) be the probability density function for the disturbance Ut, t = 1, 2 in 
(4.1) and (4.5). Then the probability, as of period 1, of a second-period devaluation 
is given by 
(4.9) 
where il2 (h) is a threshold value such that if u2 > il2(h) devaluation occurs in period 
2. As before, the index h = D, F indicates that the monetary authority devalued or 
maintained the fixed parity in period 1. We assume that the shock u2 is uniformly 
distributed over the interval [-v, v], then f(u) = Ｒ ｾＮ＠ So we can rewrite (4.9) as 
(4.10) 
where u2(h) E [-v, v]. Similarly, we can evaluate the probability of a devaluation in 
period 1 as 
v- ill 
Pl=--
2v 
(4.11) 
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If the bounds for the shocks are large then Pb p2(h) E [0, 1] is ensured. In fact in 
what follows we assu1ne that 
2v >dm (4.12) 
which (recalling m = a+ p,B and S =a+ p,B10) implies that 2v > dS. 
The expected inflation in period 2 formed in period 1 is now 
(4.13) 
Using backward induction, we can then obtain the expectation of inflation in period 
2 formed in period 0: 
and the expected inflation in period 1: 
(4.15) 
The expected inflation rates (E01r1 , E01r2 ) are then a measure of the yield curve 
over the 2 periods. Integrating L2(h) = ＰＱｲｾ＠ + [y2(h)- y*f over the interval [-v, v] 
and using equation (4.11), we can evaluate the expected loss E1L2(h) in period 2, 
h=D,F,as 
(4.16) 
because 1r1 = 0 if h = F, and 1r1 = d if h = D. This expectation in period 1 is 
formed knowing the history h = D, F, but not yet knowing the realization of the 
shock u2. 
After considerable algebra we obtain fron1 (4.16): 
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where 
which depends on the history h = D, F at the end of period 1. We can now rewrite 
(4.5) as 
Y2- y* = m1r2 + II(h)- u2 (4.19) 
In period 0, the expected welfare loss for the first period is 
Let 8 = -aEo1r1 - k = -ap1d- k. Then Y1 = y* + a(1r1 - Eo1r1) - k - u1 = 
y* + a1r1 + 8- u1 . Then using (4.17), we can rewrite E0L 1 as 
Note that EoL2(h) = Eo(E1L2(h)) = E 1L2(h), since L2(h) is independent of the 
first-period shock u1 that is the only randmn variable in period 1. 
Substituting (4.13) - (4.15) into (4.18) and noting that m = a+ J.LB = a+ 
ｾＭｴＨｂＲｯ＠ + B10), S =a+ J.LBw, we arrive at 
IT(F) -J.LB2o(PIP2(D) + (1- P1)p2(F))d- PidJ.LB- P2(F)dS- f( (4.22) 
IT( D) = -J.LB2o(PIP2(D) +(I- PI)P2(F))d + (1- ｰｩＩ､ｾＭｴｂＭ P2(D)dS- f( 
(4.23) 
It is convenient to treat these expressions as constraints that the 1nonetary au-
thority faces when it miniinizes its loss function A0 with respect to its instruments 
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P1, p2(h) in period 0. Therefore, we .form a Lagrangian: 
Co = Ao + Ap(Il(F) + /-LB2o(P1P2(D) + (1- pt)p2(F))d + p1dp,B + p2(F)dS + K) 
+ AD(IT(D) + p,B2o(P1P2(D) + (1- pl)p2(F))d- (1- Pl)dp,B + p2(D)dS + J() 
(4.24) 
Minimizing Co with respect to p11 P2(h), IT( h), we get the five first-order condi-
tions (f.o.c.) as shown below: 
8£o d[(8 + ci)d + 2ap1(2v- ad)- 2av)] + f3(E0L2(D)- EoL2(F)] = 8pl 
+ (.XF + An)(p,B2o(P2(D)- P2(F)) + p,B)d = 0 (4.25) 
8Co f3p1d[8d + 2mii(D) + 2mv(2p2(D) - 1) + dm2] 8p2(D) 
+ ( Ap + AD) p,B2oP1 + ADdS = 0 (4.26) 
8Co 
,8(1- pl)d[8d + 2miT(F) + 2mv(2p2(F)- 1) + dm2J 8p2(F) 
+ (.AF + An)J-LB2o(1- Pl) + ApdS = 0 (4.27) 
8£o 2,Bp1(II(D) + mdp2(D)) +AD= 0 (4.28) 8IT(D) -
8£o 2,8(1- Pl)(II(F) + mdp2(F)) + Ap = 0 (4.29) 8IT(F) 
These 5 equations plus (4.22) and (4.23) can now be solved for the seven variables 
Pb p2(D), p2(F), II(D), IT(F), AD and Ap. Tllis is the commitment solution for the 
monetary authority; in other words, in period 0 the monetary authority con1mits 
to the 'policy rules' in the fonn of escape clauses p1, p2(h) which are carried out in 
period 1 and 2. 
It is of particular interest to examine the effect of devaluation or not in period 1 
on the probability of devaluation in period 2. Eliminating the Lagrangian multipliers 
from (4.28) and (4.29) in (4.26) and (4.27) and after a little algebra we arrive at 
(4.30) 
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Condition (4.12) ensures that (a+ p,B)(2v- dS) - p,B20dS > 0.2 Thus under 
commitn1ent p2(F) - P2(D) 2:: 0, so ｴｾ･＠ probability of a devaluation following a 
fixed parity in period 1 is at least as big as that following a devaluation. If there 
is no long-term debt B2o = 0 then debt has no effect on P2 and P2(F) = p2(D), 
and as the long-term composition of debt increases to the point where B = B 20 and · 
S =a+ p,B10 = 1 then P2(F)- P2(D) increases to 2v(o:+1£it!:(a+2JLB). Thus we have: 
Proposition 1. Under commitment, the probability of a devaluation in ·period 2 
following a fixed parity in period 1, p2 (F), is the same as that following a devaluation, 
p2 (D) if there is no long-term debt. As the composition of long-term debt increases, 
then p2(F)- P2(D) > 0 and increases. If there is any long-term debt then p2(F)-
p2 (D) > 0 also increases with total debt. 
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The central bank when committing 
to Pll p2(D), p2 (F) implies a commitment to the first-period nominal interest rate 
(equal to p1d) and the second-period nominal interest rate following first-period 
devaluation (D) or not (F), equal to p2 (D)d and p2 (F)d respectively. This is also 
confirmed by our prerequisites that the realization of the shocks and devaluation 
or not in the first period by the monetary authority, are publicly observed under 
complete information. If there is only short-term debt, then any actions taken by 
the authority in period 1 (devalue or not) do not have any impact on how the 
short-term debt is rolled over at end of that period, as everything has been defined 
in the commitment. Therefore, p2 (D) = p2 (F). However, if there is any long-
tenn debt then a first period devaluation that follows a sufficiently large negative 
supply-side shock, will erode some of the debt and thereby reduce the need for a 
further devaluation in the second period. Thus the optimal second-period choice 
with commitment sees P2 (D) < P2 (F). 
It is useful to examine a special case where there is no debt and B = T = 0 and 
2This follows because (4.12)::::? 2v > d(a + f-LB) > d ( S + (a:pB)f-£B2o). 
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m = S = a. In this case we have 
Yt = y* +a( 1ft- Et-11ft)- k- Ut ; t = 1, 2 (4.31) 
and there is no structural dynamics in the model. The policy-problem in each period 
is now identical and is an escape-clause version of the Ban·o-Gordon stabilization 
problem. It is straightforward to show that this special case of the above problem 
leads to 
1 Bd 
Pl = P2(D) = P2(F) = 2- 2a{2v- ad) (4.32) 
If we strengthen (4.12) to 
2v 2:: dm+Bd (4.33) 
then expected inflation in each period is non-negative, even when there is no debt. 
4.3.2 Discretion under Complete Information 
As private expectations of inflation in period 1 are formed in period 0, 1r1 = p1d 
where p1 is found from the f.o.c. above, will no longer be optiinal once the monetary 
authority can choose its own monetary policies (without commitment). Similarly in 
period 1, the authority will also find 1r2{h) = p2(h)d no longer an optimal policy after 
the private sector revises its expectation of the second-period inflation where again 
p2(h) is the commitment rule in period 2. With discretion the monetary authority 
will minimize its loss function taking private expectations of inflation in all periods 
as given, i.e., taking 8 and Il{h) as given. This means that the constraints (4.22) 
and (4.23) do not bind; i.e., AF =AD= 0 in our original Lagrangian function (4.24). 
The sequence of events under discretion is now as follows. At period 0, the 
private sector forms expectations about inflation in periods 1 and 2, which determine 
the fixed interest rates of the one-period (short-term) and two-period (long-term) 
bond issues respectively. In period 1, after the realization of the output shock, the 
monetary authority decides whether to devalue or maintain the fixed parity. At 
the end of period 1, the one-period debt is rolled over at the interest rate that 
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is determined by the revision of the private sector's expectation of second-period 
inflation. In period 2, after the realization of a second shock, the authority decides 
whether to devalue and finally repays the debt by levying distortional taxes. The 
game tree for this sequence of events is given in Figure 4.1. 
Weak(W 
Nature 
Tough(T) 
Moneta.J.y authority 
chooses debt maturity [period O] 
Monetary authority 
D devalues or maintains [period 1] 
fixed parity following a shock 
Monetary authodty 
devalues or maintains [period 2] 
fixed parity following 
a shock then repays debt 
Figure 4.1: The Game Tree under Discretion. The dotted lines refer to the 
case of asymmetric information examined in Section 4.3.3. 
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To solve the discretionary case, we first examine the impact of a first-period 
devaluation on the probability of a second-period devaluation and then go back to 
the first-period problem. Putting AF =AD= 0 in our f.o.c (4.26) and (4.27) above, 
we arrive at 
1 1 [Od dm ] P2(h) = 2 - 2v 2m+ 2- mEo1r2 + (1r1- Eo7rt)B- (E11r2(h) - E01r2)S- J( 
(4.34) 
The likelihood of a devaluation in period 2, p2 (h), depends on whether the authority 
has devalued in period 1, both directly through, 7ft, and through a revision in 
expectations, E11r2(h) - E01r2 • A devaluation in period 1, i.e. 1r1 = d, reduces the 
likelihood of a second-period devaluation as unexpected inflation reduces the real 
debt burden. This is also because a downward revision in expected inflation, E11r2 , 
and thus in the interest rate, decreases the debt burden in the second period to the 
extent that the debt is short-term. 
Using equation (4.34) and (4.13), we have 
P2(F) 
which leads to 
di-£B 
P2(F) - P2(D) = 2v _ dS > 0 (4.37) 
Thus under discretion, the probability of a second-period crisis after maintaining 
the parity, p2 (F), is greater than that after a devaluation, p2(D). Once again, it is 
shown that-given complete infonnation-a first-period devaluation always at least 
improves the likelihood that the new parity will be maintained. But in the discretion 
case, we can now see that p2 (F) is always greater than p2(D) no matter whatever the 
composition of debt is. Let ｢Ｎｰｾ＠ and b.pf be the difference in probabilities under 
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commitment and discretion respectively. Then from ( 4.30) and ( 4.37) we have 
t::,. D _ t::,. c _ dp,BS(2v- dm) > 0 P2 p2 - (2v- dB)[( a+ p,B)(2v- dS)- p,B2odS] (4.38) 
since by the large shock condition ( 4.12), 2v - dm > 0 and the numerator has been 
shown to be positive. To summarize: 
Proposition 2. Under complete information and discretion, the probability of a 
devaluation ｾｮ＠ period 2 following a fixed parity in period 1, p2(F), is greater than 
that following a devaluation, p2 (D) irrespective of the composition of debt. The 
difference P2 (F) - P2 (D) is greater under discretion than under commitment. 
A first-period devaluation causes unexpected inflation, which reduces the real 
debt burden and thus the expected deviation of second-period output from target. 
Devaluation also affects the probability of a devaluation in period 2 through a down-
side revision in expectations and hence a lower-than-expected interest rate at which 
the short-term debt is rolled over. Thus, a devaluation in period 1 reduces the 
likelihood of a second-period crisis. 
As shown in proposition 1, in the commitment case with complete information, 
short-term debt cannot act as a channel whereby the first-period devaluation de-
creases the likelihood of a second-period crisis. In other words, whether the authority 
devalues in period 1 or not does not affect the probability of a devaluation in period 
2 if B = B10 • But as we have already found in the case of discretion under complete 
information, the current devaluation can ease the debt burden for the future, and 
the short-term debt is crucial to this effect since the benefits of first-period devalua-
tion are magnified by the amount of debt that is rolled over. On the one hand b,.pf 
does not depend on B 10 in the commitment case, while on the other hand a rise in 
B 10 , increases the difference P2(F)- p2(D) in the discretion case. Therefore, L:::,.pf 
is greater than jj,pf as long as there exists some short-term debt. 
Now consider the authority's choice in period 1. We can rewrite equation ( 4.17) 
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as 
(4.39) 
Substituting >..n = AF = 0 into (4.25) and noting that E0L2(h) = E 1L2(h), we can 
get the likelihood of a first-period devaluation as follows: 
which is equivalent to 
the threshold value of the first-period shock for a crisis to occur. 
From (4.14), which still applies, (4.35) and (4.36) we have 
d Bd drn 
Eo1r2 = [v + K - - - -) 2v- drn 2m 2 ( 4.41) 
which shows that expected inflation and thus the probability of a devaluation in 
period 2 does not depend on either the term structure of debt or pr, the probability 
of the first-period devaluation. This is because the maturity of the debt affects both 
the probability of a devaluation in period 1 and (both short- and long-term) interest 
rates. For given interest rates, a shorter Inaturity, which increases the probability 
of a devaluation in period 1, tends to reduce the likelihood of a second devaluation. 
However, a shorter maturity also increases interest rates and tax distortions with 
offsetting effects on the probability of a second-period devaluation. 
Using (4.39), (4.40) and (4.41), the probability of a first-period devaluation can 
be derived as follows 
1 (2ak- Bd)(2v- dS)2 + 4v,B(2v- dS)J.tB(k +B) (4.42) Pl = 2 + 2a(2v - ad) (2v - dS) 2 - 4vf3(2v - drn )d(J.LB)2 
The probability of a devaluation decreases with its cost to the authority, B, and 
------------------------------------ --- - -- --
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increases with distortions, chiefly, with the debt burden, B. By differentiating p1 
with respective to B10 while holding the total debt constant, we can get 
8p1 2v- dm 
BBw ex: k + 1-LB + 2v _ dS (2Eo1r1 - d)!-LB ;::: 0 (4.43) 
Hence we arrive at 
Proposition 3. Under complete information and discretion, the probability of a 
first-period crisis increases with the share of short-term debt B 10 and with the volume 
of inflation-sensitive debt, p,B. 
The effect of a history of devaluation or maintaining the fixed rate in period 
1 on the probability of a crisis in period 2 depends on the term S = a+ fLB10 , 
which increases with short-term debt B 10 . The biggeT proportion of short-term 
debt makes maintaining the fixed parity in the first period more costly leading to 
a greater chance that the monetary authority might choose to devalue in period 1. 
Intuitively, it would appear that more short-term debt makes the inflation rate which 
is expected after maintaining the parity higher while making inflation expected after 
a devaluation lower. In other words, long-term debt can minimize the probability 
of an exchange-rate devaluation in the first period when the monetary authority's 
preferences are known to the market. 
As we did for commitment, it is useful to examine a special case where there is 
no debt and B = T = 0 and m = S = 1 for discretion as well. It is straightforward 
to show that this special case of the above problem leads to 
1 Bd- 2ak 
PI= P2(D) = P2(F) = 2- 2a(2v- ad) (4.44) 
Comparing (4.44) and (4.32) we see that monetary policy with discretion (and no 
debt) leads to a familiar expected inflationary bias of Ｈ Ｒ ｶｾ｡､Ｉ＠ which arises because 
the central bank has an ambitious output target above the natural rate of k > 0. One 
way of eliminating this inflationary bias is for a government with preference e = ea 
to delegate to an independent 'conservative' banker in the Rogoff-sense with ev > ea 
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such that ( ()D - ()0 )d = 2ak. However the toughness of the new authority may lack 
credibility, which leads us to the next section where information is asymmetric. 
Our results yield testable predictions regarding the yield curve (Eo1f1 , E01r2 ). 
As shown from (4.41), the expected second-period inflation rate increases with the 
total volume of debt3 , B, and with the proportion of inflation-sensitive ､ｾ｢ｴ＠ ,_,, but 
is independent of its maturity structure. Combined with the previous proposition 
we then have: 
Proposition 4. The expected second-period inflation rate increases with the total 
volume of debt and the ratio of inflation-sensitive debt, but is independent of its 
maturity structure. Together with proposition 3 this implies ·that in the case of dis-
cretion under complete information, the yield curve becomes flatter as the proportion 
of short-term debt increases. 
4.3.3 Discretion under Asymmetric Information 
We now consider the case where monetary policy is conducted by a monetary au-
thority with preferences unknown to the public. We assume there are two possible 
types of authorities: a 'tough' authority with a relatively high weight on inflation 
in ( 4. 7) f) = ()T' and a 'weak' authority with a preference parameter ew < ()T. As 
discussed above, one interpretation of this asyrnmetric information is that the au-
thority with preference e = ea delegate to an independent 'conservative' banker in 
the Rogoff-sense with en > 8°, but the credibility of this central bank independence 
from the authority needs to be tested by the public in a process of Bayesian learning. 
The solution to the case of discretion under asyrnmetric information follows the 
con1plete infonnation case, proceeding by backwards induction starting in period 2 
but with the following changes: the probabilities of devaluation in periods 1 and 2 
now are pi, p;(D), ｰｾＨｆＩＬ＠ i = T, ltV are now type-dependent; in periods t = 0, 1, 2, 
the private sector attaches a probability qt that the authority is tough (i.e., f) = ()T) 
3 This follows from the fact that ､ｾ＠ [ v + J( - d!:] > 0. 
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and a probability 1 - qt that it is weak (0 = ow); in period 0 the private sector 
has a prior q0 which is up-dated at the end of each of the following two periods 
observing devaluation D or a maintenance of the fixed exchange rate F and possibly 
the realization of output shocks (or an estimate of shocks) Ut, t = 1, 2 occurring 
during the period. It is also assumed that the debt maturity is the same for both 
types of authorities, as are their interest rates, E01r1 and E01r2 . Then following the 
first-period shock each type of monetary authority will decide whether to devalue 
or not taldng into account the impact of this decision on the beliefs of the private 
sector entering period 2. 
Private sector beliefs now become 
Eo1r1 [qopf + (1 - qo)pf]d ( 4.45) 
Eo1r2 - qod[pf PI(D) + (1- pf)pi(F)] 
+ (1- qo)d[pf p'{ (D)+ (1- pf)p'{ (F)] (4.46) 
E11r2(h) = (1- q1(h))dp'{ (h)+ ql(h)dpi(h) (4.47) 
where the history h = [j, u1], j = D, F consists of two observations by the public, 
whether there is a change in exchange rate or not and the shock in period 1. From 
the Appendix B we can now show 
(4.48) 
Then using ( 4.35) and ( 4.36), we have 
(4.49) 
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The right-hand-side of ( 4.49) can be either positive or negative. On the one 
hand, a first-period devaluation may diminish the likelihood of a second-period 
devaluation by easing the debt burden. If a devaluation in period 1 leads to a 
lower interest rate than a successful defence of the parity, then the authority gets a 
second-period gain. That is because the short-term debt, p,B10 , is rolled over at a 
lower-than-expected interest rate. This is exactly what we see·in the case of complete 
information. Intuitively, for the 'debt-burden' effect to dominate, the level of the 
inflation-sensitive debt must be high relative to uncertainty about the government 
type. 
On the other hand, a devaluation in period 1 could send a signal of a weak 
authority which is heading for further devaluation and thus may lead to higher-
than-expected inflation and interest rates in period 2. In the case that the interest 
rate rises following a devaluation turn the (4.49) negative, the authority expects 
a second-period loss from abandoning fixed parity. This case is relevant when the 
uncertainty over monetary authority's preferences is great (or the difference between 
preferences, er - ew, is large) relative to the level of deflatable debt, p,B, and 
successful defence of the current exchange rate regime sends a strong signal of the 
authority's determination not to devalue; that is, when the 'signaling' effect prevails 
over the debt-burden effect. 
Interestingly, (4.49) shows that whether the exchange rate regime gains or loses 
credibility does not depend on the maturity of the debt; instead, the short-term debt, 
B10 , increases the difference in the probabilities of a second-period devaluation, since 
either benefits or costs of first-period devaluation are magnified by the amount of 
debt that is rolled over. In addition, comparing ( 4.37) with ( 4.48) we arrive at the 
result: 
Proposition 5. Under discretion and asymmetric information, the credibility of 
the exchange regime is increased by a successful defence if and only if the difference 
between preferences, er - ew, is large relative to the level of deftatable debt, p,B. 
Moreover, the difference in probabilities p2(Fnu1) -p2(Dnu1) is less than that under 
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complete information owing to the signalling effect which depends on the degree of 
uncertainty (JT - (JW. 
This is because reputation considerations provide both type of authorities with 
an incentive to defend the exchange rate-for a tough authority to signal its type, 
and for a weak authority to pretend to be tough in order to exploit lower interest 
rates. The greater the difference in the authority's preferences (JT - ew is, the 
stronger the incentive is. 
--D 
If we denote D..p2 = P2(F n u1)- p2(D n u1) under discretion with asymmetric 
information, and !:l.pf and D..pf under discretion with complete information, and 
commitment with complete information respectively, as before, we now see that if 
､ｂｾ＠ q1(F n ul)((JT- (JW) > 0 then 
(4.50) 
In fact given the level and composition of debt, and q1 ( F n u1) under discretion, 
there exists an optimal degree of 'ambiguity' (eT -Ow) that will achieve the first-best 
difference in probabilities, 
(JT _ (Jw = 2mBS(2v - dm) 
[(1 + B)(2v- dS)- B2odS]q1(Fnu1) (4.51) 
Interestingly, this is another an example where if commitment is impossible, com-
plete transparency (complete information) is counterproductive. 
The First-period Solutions for the Separating ｾｱｵｩｬｩ｢ｲｩｵｭ＠
The characterization of the possible equilibria when the private sector can make 
inferences after observing both whether there is a devaluation or not and the shock 
in the first period, is rather complicated involving pooling or separating equilibria 
depending on the realization of u1• Here we follow the simplifying assumption 
of Drazen and Masson (1994) to focus only on such separating equilibrium that 
action would fully reveal, with a weak authority finding it optimal to devalue and 
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a tough authority not to devalue, at the realization of shocks. In other words, a 
monetary authority is believed to be weak if it chooses to devalue, Qt(D nUt) = 
0, t = 1, 2; while it is expected to continue defending the parity if it maintains the 
fixed rate in the first period, Qt(F nUt) = 1, t = 1, 2. It should be noted that this 
assumption does not imply that the tough authority will never devalue or the weak 
authority always devalues. Actually, both types of authorities will choose to devalue 
if the economy is hit by shocks that exceed their respective threshold levels. The 
separating equilibrium can be summarized by the following ･ｱｵ｡ｴｩｯｾｳＺ＠
Pi= ( l d)d {d(2a(k+ v)- (IJ' + a?)d)- ,B[EiL2(D)- Ei L,(F)]}; i = W, T 2a 2v- a 
(4.52) 
where Ef[·] signifies the private expectations of the monetary authority of type i. 
2 . 
ｅｬｌｾＨ＠ h)= ｾ＠ + [II(h)]2 + ､ｰｾＨｨＩ｛ｂｩ､＠ + 2mii(h) + ＲｭｶＨｰｾＨｨＩ＠ -1) + dm2]; h = D, F 
(4.53) 
where, as before, 
where 1r1(D) = d and 1r1(F) = 0. 
i 1 1 Bid dm 
P2(h) = ---[-+-+II( h)] 2 2v 2m 2 (4.55) 
Substituting (4.55) into (4.53), we can obtain 
2 ｅｬｌｾＨｨＩ＠ = ｾ＠ + [II(h)]2 - Ｒ､ｭｶＨｰｾＨｨＩＩ Ｒ＠ (4.56) 
which replaces (4.53). From (4.46) and (4.55) we now have 
Eo1f2 = d [v + K- (qoBT + (1- qo)Bw)d- dm] (4.57) 
2v- dm 2m, 2 
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The second-period devaluation expected by the private sector in period 0 is the same 
as in the case of complete information, except for the cost of devaluation, 8, which 
is now replaced by its expectation under asymmetric information. As before, the 
debt maturity does not affect E01r2. We also have 
Eo1r1 = [qopf + (1 - qo)Pr']d 
E11r2(h) - ((1- ｱＱＨｨＩＩｰｾ＠ (h)+ ｱＱＨｨＩｰｾＨｨＩ｝､＠
The equilibrium is completed with the up-dating equations 
q1(F) = (1 - pf)qo = 1 (1 - pf)qo + (1 - pf)(1 - qo) 
T P1 qo = 0 
pfqo + pf(1- qo) 
(4.58) 
(4.59) 
(4.60) 
(4.61) 
and q0 = ｾ＠ (uniform distribution for the prior belief that the authority is tough by 
the private sector). Using Equations (4.52) to (4.61), we can solve for the likelihood 
of a first-period devaluation, Pi, i = W, T as follows: 
where 
A 
¢ 
z 
wi 
g 
'fJ 
pf = A 4v 
-
= 
1 
2 
(3pww + k - ｾ＠ - ow d A 
d 2 2 +-
d + {3 J-LB'f/4> - 2v 4v 
Ｔ ｾ＠ (2v- {3f/>)(8T- BW) ｾ＠ 0 (·: (JT ｾｏｗＩ＠
2}-LBvdg- Z 
sd2((JT- OW) 
2m(2v- dS) 
k- d2 (OT + Bw- 2Bi) 
8v 
1 
2v-dS 
2v- dm < 1 2v- dS - (·: m = s + B2o) 
(4.62) 
(4.63) 
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The expected devaluation in period 1 is then given by 
(4.64) 
As in Benigno and Missale (2001), it is shown in (4.64) that apart from the 
first two terms in the numerator capturing the first-period effects, the sign of E 01r1 
depends on¢= 2J..LBvdg- Z. The term 2J.LBvdg captures the 'debt-burden' effect 
as J.LB is the level of inflation-sensitive debt, while the term Z represents the im-
pact of the uncertainty over the authority's preferences which is determined by the 
difference, ()T - ew. Hence, the expectation of a first-period devaluation depends 
on whether the 'debt-burden' or the 'signalling' effect prevails: it is smaller when 
there is substantial uncertainty as to which type of authority is involved whereas it 
is greater when the debt level is high. Furthermore, we can show 
Ｒｶ｛ｰｾＨｄＩＭ ｰｾＨｆＩ｝｛､ｭＨｰｾＨｄＩ＠ + ｰｾＨｆＩＩ＠ + II(D) +II( F)] 
= Ｒｶ｛ｰｾＨｄＩＭ ｰｾＨｆＩ｝｛ｅｩｹＲＨｄＩ＠ + Eiy2(F)- 2y*] (4.65) 
where y2 (h) is second-period output following h = D, F. Thus, the sign of the 
difference between the expected second-period 1oss from devaluation and that from 
the parity maintenance in period 1 depends on ｰｾ＠ (D)- ｰｾ＠ (F), which in turn, depends 
on whether the debt-burden effect or the signaling effect dominates. 
The Impact of Short-Term Debt 
As in Section 4.3.2, it is interesting to examine the role of debt maturity in deter-
mining the current and forward interest rates. Differentiating E 01r1 with respect to 
the short-term debt B 10 while holding the total debt constant gives: 
8E01r1 _ fJkg</J'd + f3Bdg'f!(¢ + </J')(Eo1fi- ｾＩ＠
8B10 - 2v - d- f3B'f!¢ 
(4.66) 
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where 
¢/ = 2Bvdg - Z' < </> 
vd(OT- ew) 
Z' - > Z (·: 2v > dS) 
m(2v- dS) 
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As the sign of this derivative is determined by ¢ = 2p,Bvdg-Z ( ¢' = 2Bvdg-Z'), the 
effect of debt maturity on the expected devaluation in the first period depends on the 
relative importance of 'debt-burden' effect to 'signalling' effect. When there is little 
uncertainty about the authority's type so that z = sd2 (0T -ow) (Z' = vd(OT -ow)) 
' 2m(2v-dS) m(2v-dS) 
tends to zero, the short-term debt increases the probability, as perceived by the 
private sector, of a first-period devaluation, as it does under complete information. 
On the other hand, if the authority's resolve is uncertain-i.e., when¢ and¢' are 
negative-the probability of a devaluation in period 1 decreases with short-term 
debt, as defending the exchange rate in adverse circu1nstances (larger short-term 
debt) sends a stronger signal of anti-inflation stance. 
Proposition 6. In the case of discretion under asymmetric information, the debt 
maturity increases the probability of a first-period devaluation if the 'debt-burden' 
effect dominates, while when the (signalling' effect prevails short-term debt enhances 
the credibility of the exchange rate regime. Both effects are magnified by the volume 
of inflation-sensitive debt, p,B. 
The reason for a short maturity of debt to play a role when the 'signalling' effect 
prevails is that it may boost market confidence in the parity if it is maintained. In 
this case, an increase in short-maturity debt-i.e. a larger p,B10-would force the 
monetary authority to resist a possible crisis in order to avoid rolling over the debt 
at a higher-than-expected interest rate. This is because when the signaling effect 
dominates, a first-period devaluation would increase the expected second-period de-
valuation and thus the interest rate. However, when there is little uncertainty about 
the authority's preferences, the probability of a first-period devaluation increases 
with short-term debt, as it does under complete information. 
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Hence, together with (4.57) we have 
Proposition 7. The 'signalling' effect is crucial in determining the slope of the 
yield curve. If the uncertainty about the authority's type is substantial, a higher 
ratio of short-term debt implies a lower short-term interest rate and a steeper yield 
curve as the forward rate keeps constant. On the other hand, when there is little 
uncertainty about authority's preferences, a short maturity leads to a higher current 
interest rate and thus a flatter yield curve, as in the case of complete information. 
4.4 Numerical Simulation 
Simulation is conducted using Matlab to demonstrate the numerical results from 
our theoretical model for the three cases: commitment, discretion under complete 
information, and discretion under asymmetric information. 
In our design, we set v = 0.1 so that output shock is uniformly distributed over 
the internal [-0.1, 0.1]. As we assu1ne a fixed-size depreciation if monetary authority 
decides to devalue, the sized is chosen as 0.2. The real value of total debt at period 
0 B = 0.075, consisting of half one-period debt and half two-period debt. We choose 
k = 0 to eliminate other sources of credibility problems apart from those associated 
with debt accumulation. The proportion of inflation-sensitive debt is set at J.L = 1 
so that all debt is defiatable. () = 0.044 is chosen to give E 0 (1r2) = 12.5% on an 
annual basis. The discount factor is set at {3 = ( ＱＮｾ Ｕ＠ ) 5 based on a 'period' of 5 years. 
The benefits gained from commitment is equivalent to the permanent percentage 
increases in output 4 
4 A variety of different set of parameters were also chosen to test sensitivity of our model, in-
cluding v = 0.5,d = 0.4,B = 0.25,k = O,p. = 0.8,0 = 0.45so thatEo(1r2) = 5.0%,/J = (1.12 ) 5• The 
simulation results confirm our findings about relationships between interested variables, although 
the magnitudes of intercepts and slopes may change from graph to graph. 
-------------------------------- ---- -- --
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Figure 4.2: p1 with Commitment and Discretion 
4.4.1 Commitment versus Discretion under Complete In-
formation 
In Figure 4.2, the relationship between the ratio of short-term debt (in public debt) 
and the probability of a first-period crisis under commitment is compared with that 
under discretion and complete information. As shown in the theoretical model, the 
likelihood of having a crisis in the first period when the authority fully commits itself 
to a 2-period rule, is generally smaller than that when it pursues a discretionary 
policy under complete information. That is also known as 'inflation bias' when 
combining the contingent nature of economic policies with phvate sector's perfect 
foresight. 
When the authority's preferences are publicly known, the probability of a first-
period crisis increases with the ratio of short-term debt, as the authority tries to 
exploit the lower-than-expected interest rates following a devaluation. A first-period 
unexpected devaluation also reduce the real value of debt. 
Figure 4.3 shows that in the case of commitment, the probability of a devalua-
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tion in period 2 after maintaining the parity in the first period is higher than that 
following a devaluation, as long as there is some long-term debt. But the difference 
between the two probabilities decreases gradually as the composition of short-term 
debt increases, and could eventually diminish when all the debt is short-term. 
Correspondingly, Figure 4.4 shows the situation when the monetary authority 
lacks a commitment mechanism but instead pursues discretionary policies under 
complete information. In contrast, the likelihood of a devaluation in period 2 after 
a successful defence is higher than that following an earlier devaluation, regardless 
of the composition of debt. If only the fundamentals matter, a current devaluation 
always eases the authority's debt burden and thus increases the probability that a 
new parity will be successfully defended. 
It is also shown from comparing Figure 4.3 with 4.4 that the difference of the two 
probabilities is greater in the case of discretion under complete information than in 
the case of commitment. 
Yield curves under both commitment and discretion with complete information 
are depicted in Figure 4. 5. In the case of discretion under · c01nplete information, 
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the expected inflation rate in period 1-formed in period 0-increases with the 
proportion of short-term debt. But the expectation of the second-period inflation 
rate does not depend on the maturity of debt. In other words, as B.Bo increases, 
E0 (1r1) goes up but Eo(1f2) keeps constant, so ｾｾｾ［ｾｾ＠ goes down. Therefore, we would 
expect a flatter yield curve when the authority pursues a discretionary policy that 
is known to private sectors. 
The substantial gain that the authority acquires when committing itself to a 
certain rule is shown in Figure 4.6. It is equivalent to a permanent output increase 
of around 7%. This is an example that the commitment rule is the first-best choice 
for the monetary authority when designing macroeconomic policies. 
4.4.2 Discretion under Asymmetric Information 
Figures 4. 7 to 4.9 show us the numeric results-in particularly about the yield 
curves-when the authority pursues a discretionary policy that is not publicly 
known. It is known from our theory that the expectation of a second-period de-
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valuation that is formed in period 0 (hence the forward rate), does not depend 
on either the debt maturity or the authority's reputation. The credibility of the 
exchange rate regime in the long term only depends on fundamentals. 
However in the short run, both tough and weak authorities have the incentive 
to defend the parity, in order to enhance their reputation and thus exploit the low 
interest rates. The larger the difference between the two types of authorities ()T-ow, 
the stronger the incentive is for any given expected cost, q0()T +(1-q0)0w. Therefore, 
an increase in uncertainty over the authority's preferences (OT- ow) would lower 
the market expectation of an imminent align1nent of exchange rate, E01r11 which 
implies a steeper yield curve. Figure 4. 7 shows this effect with the short-term debt 
fixed at 50% of total debt. 
The effect of a shorter debt maturity on the expectation of a first-period deval-
uation is ambiguous. If the 'debt-burden' effect prevails over the 'signalling' effect, 
the likelihood of a current devaluation increases with the ratio of short-term debt, 
as it does under complete infonnation. Therefore, we would expect a flatter yield 
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curve in Figure 4.8. 
However, if the uncertainty over the authority's type is substantial, a short debt 
maturity provides the authority with an incentive to resist a current crisis, in order to 
roll over the debt at lower-than-expected interest rates. As a result, the probability 
of a first-period devaluation decreases with the proportion of short-term debt. In 
this oase, a steeper yield curve is shown in Figure 4.9. 
4.5 The Variables and Data Set for Empirical Works 
4.5.1 The Variables of Interest 
We adopt the difference in interest rates between domestic market and US mar-
ket to represent the probability of a current crisis as perceived by private sector. 
This measurement follows Drazen and Masson (1994) and BivL A wide interest rate 
spread implies an increased likelihood of an impending currency crisis, whereas a 
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Figure 4.9: Yield Curves with Discretion and Asymmetric Information: 
Low Debt Case (B = 0.01, eT- ew = 0.055); the 'Signalling' Effect Domi-
nates. 
narrow interest rate differential highlights confidence in the market that the parity 
will be maintained. An approximation of the yield curve is obtained by dividing 
the government long-term bond yield (a proxy for forward interest rates) by the 
market interest rate. The proportion of short-term debt is calculated by dividing 
the domestic debt with remaining maturity up to one year by the total domestic 
public debt. 
A Market Pressure Index (MPI) is adopted to capture both large depreciations 
of local currency and failed attacks that are fended off by raising interest rates 
and/or selling international reserves. The continuous MPI is a weighted sum of 
the percentage change in the nominal exchange rate, the difference in the market 
interest rate, and the negative percentage change in the foreign exchange reserves5 , 
according to their relative precisions. 
As suggested by the relevant crisis theories and empirical works, three economic 
5 As in Chapter 3, the minus sign ensures that a reduction in foreign reserves translates to an 
increase in the value of the MPI. 
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variables are also included in our model: (1) the Current Account Balance (%'of 
GDP) that is the sign of the country's export-competitiveness; (2)the Overall Budget 
Balance (% of GDP) to capture the authority's fiscal position; and (3) the Interna-
tional Reserves (minus gold, months of imports) always .found significant to explain 
currency crises in many empirical works. 
4.5.2 The Data Set 
We obtain quarterly observations from 1993Q3 to 2003Q4 for 11 developing/ emerging 
economies: Argentina, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and Thailand. 
The data for domestic public debt as well as the share of short-term debt comes 
from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Data of the remaining variables 
(budget balance, current account balance, etc.) come from the IMF's International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) . The monthly exchange rate regime index (henceforth RR) 
is from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). We convert this to a quarterly index. We use 
Datastream to extract quarterly data on long-term government bond yields and 
when it is not available, we interpolate yearly data to obtain quarterly observations. 
We could not obtain information on long-term government bond yields for Argentina, 
Brazil and India. 
4.6 Differentiating Debt-Burden and Signalling Coun-
tries 
In order to test the predictions made by our theory, we need to distinguish countries 
where the debt-burden effect prevails from those where the signalling effect domi-
nates. We know from our theoretic model that a strenuous defence of the parity can 
signal the government's commitment and thus enhance credibility of the exchange 
rate regime, when there is substantial uncertainty about the authority's type; but 
with the debt-burden effect prevailing, this policy worsens fundamentals by increas-
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ing the debt burden, making the economy more vulnerable to adverse shocks in the 
future. 
As indicated in Proposition 5, countries where the debt burden is more impor-
tant than signalling will find that a current devaluation increases the probability 
that a future defence of the new parity will succeed. In other words, we should 
observe a drop in the interest rate differential following an actual crisis (and/ or a 
rise following a successful defence) in those countries. On the other hand, in the 
countries where there is substantial uncertainty over the authority's resolve not to 
devalue, a depreciation in the current-period would reveal a weak authority heading 
towards further devaluations. This generates inflationary expectations and a higher 
interest rate differential. Meanwhile, resisting a crisis enhances the reputation of the 
authority and ｾｨｵｳ＠ the expectation that the parity will be maintained. Therefore, 
in signalling countries the interest rate spread rises after a crisis while it drops after 
maintaining the fixed rate. 
Here, we figure out the type of each emerging economy, by looking at the pat-
terns shown by its interest rate differentials following an actual devaluation and/ or 
successful defence. 
4.6.1 Identifying Actual Crises and Successful Defences 
Before distinguishing between the two types of countries, it is necessary to identify 
the actual crises and successful defences experienced by them during the sample 
period. 
We use the continuous Market Pressure Index (MPI)6 to gauge foreign exchange 
market pressures. The SETAR 7 and MRS model8 are employed to define periods 
of severe attacks on exchange rate regimes9 • The estimated results of both models 
on 11 emerging economies are reported in Table 4.5-Table 4.8. Figure 4.22-Figure 
6 Refer to Section 3.4 for more details. 
7Refer to Section 3.5 for more details. 
8 Refer to Section 3.5 and Appendix A for more details. 
9 Note that we only regard a period as a period with severe pressure if both SETAR and Markov-
switching model define it as such a period. 
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4.43 show both the filtered and smoothed probabilities of being in volatile state for 
all countries respectively. 
The advantages of the non-linear state models is that they avoid imposing an 
a1·bitrary threshold levels a priori-by allowing the data itself to reveal what move 
shows abnormal behaviour and hence signal a crisis. Moreover, the non-linear na-
ture of both models is also appealing for the time series variables such as the MPI. 
Because of its single index restriction, the SETAR model seems to be slightly less ef-
fective in identifying periods of high pressure in foreign exchange markets, especially 
where there are frequent fluctuations in exchange markets. 
The actual crisis episodes in the 11 emerging economies are identified by the 
regime changes in the Reinhart-Rogoff index. We then compare the actual crises 
(produced by the RR index) with the periods of high market pressure (defined by the 
SETAR and MRS model) for each country. It is shown in Table 4.1 that nearly all 
the actual devaluations are accommodated by periods of severe pressures in foreign 
exchange markets. This places confidence in the usage of the SETAR and MRS 
models. 
A successful defence is then defined as a period when the high pressure in foreign 
exchange m&·kets does not lead to a regime change in the RR index. In other words, 
the parity is maintained by the authority facing serious attacks at a great cost of loss 
of foreign reserves and high interest rates. Therefore, we can differentiate between 
the actual crises and the successful defences for the 11 selected countries10• 
Table 4.1: Actual Crises and Successful Defences 
Countries Crises 
ARG 95Q1 
SETAR 
94Q4-95Q3 
OlQl 
MRS Both 
95Ql 95Q1 
Defence 
10Note that if a long period of more than one quarters, which is defined by both SETAR and 
MRS model as a high pressure period, includes one quarter that is identified by the RR index 
as an actual crisis, we regard the whole period as just one crisis incident. Furthermore, We only 
consider the sample size ranging from 1999Q3 to 2001Q4 as data for the RR index after 2001 is 
not available. 
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Table 4.1: Actual Crises and Successful Defences 
Countries Crises SETAR MRS Both Defence 
01Q4 01Q3-02Q2 01Q3-02Q4 01Q3-02Q2 
BRA 94Q3 94Ql-94Q2 94Ql-94Q3 94Ql-94Q2 
97Q4 
98Q3 98Q3 98Q3 98Q3 
99Ql 99Ql 98Q4-99Ql 
OOQ2 OOQ2 OOQ2 OOQ2 
CZE 95Ql 
96Ql 96Ql-96Q2 
97Q2 96Q4-97Q2 97Q2 97Q2 
97Q4 
99Ql-99Q2 
OOQ1-00Q4 
01Q2 
HUN 94Q2 94Q2 
94Q4-95Q2 94Q3-95Q2 94Q4-95Q2 94Q4-95Q2 
96Ql-96Q2 96Ql 96Ql 96Ql 
96Q4-97Q3 96Q4-97Q3 96Q4-97Q3 96Q4-97Q3 
98Q3 
99Q2 
OOQ2-00Q4 OOQ2 OOQ2 OOQ2 
01Q4 
IND 95Q3 95Q2-96Ql 95Q4 95Q4 
96Q3 
97Q2 
97Q3-98Ql 98Ql 98Ql 98Ql 
98Q3 98Q3 98Q3 98Q3 
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Table 4.1: Actual Crises and Successful Defences 
Countries Crises SETAR MRS Both Defence 
99Q2-99Q3 
OOQ3 OOQ3 OOQ3 OOQ3 
2001Q2-2001Q3 
MYS 94Q4 
95Q4 95Q3-95Q4 95Q4 95Q4 
97Q3 97Q2-98Ql 97Q2-98Q1 97Q2-98Ql 
99Ql 
MEX 94Q2 
95Ql 94Q4-95Q1 94Q4-95Q1 94Q4-95Ql 
95Q4 
98Q3 
OOQ2 
RUS 96Q2-96Q3 
97Q3-97Q4 97Q2-97Q4 97Q3-97Q4 97Q3-97Q4 
98Q3 98Q1-99Ql 98Q3-98Q4 98Q3-98Q4 
99Q3 99Q3 99Q3 99Q3 
01Q3 
ZAF 96Q2 96Q2 96Q2 
98Q3 98Q3 98Q3 
01Q4 01Q4 01Q4 
ROK 94Q3 94Q3 94Q3 94Q3 
95Ql 
96Q3 96Q3 96Q3 96Q3 
97Q1 97Ql 97Q1 97Q1 
97Q4 97Q3-98Ql 97Q3-97Q4 97Q3-97Q4 
98Q2 
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Table 4.1: Actual Crises and Successful Defences 
Countries Crises SETAR MRS Both Defence 
OlQl 
THA 95Ql-95Q2 
96Q3 
97Q3 97Ql-98Ql 97Q2-97Q3 97Q2-97Q3 
OOQl 
OOQ3 
01Q2 
Notes: The actual crisis periods are defined by the Reinhart and Rogoff (1994) index. The estimated non-linear 
SETAR model has a regime-dependent intercept and slope parameters. The estimated non-linear Markov-switching 
model has a regime-dependent intercept and allows for heteroscedasticity. A period of severe market pressure on 
exchange rate is a period that is identified by both SETAR and Markov-switching models as such a period. A period 
of successful defence is therefore a period when there is serious market pressure but not a 'softening' of the exchange 
rate regime. 
4.6.2 11 Emerging Economies 
After making the distinction between the actual devaluations and the successful 
defences, we can now look at the situation facing each country following crises and/ or 
successful defences, in order to identify its type as either debt-burden or signalling. 
The differentials of domestic market interest rates relative to USA is adopted to 
measure the probability of a currency crisis as perceived by the market. 
1. Argentina 
The interest rate spread in Argentina (INTDIF) is shown in Figure 4.10 along-
side with the actual crises (identified by the RR index, XRINDEX) and periods of 
severe attacks (defined by both the SETAR and MRS model-CRISISSETAR and 
CRISISMS respectively). 
It is shown in Table 4.1 that a currency /debt crisis breaks out in Argentina from 
2001 Q3 to 2002Q2, which sees the abandonment of its currency board at the end 
of 2001. Figure 4.10 shows that the interest rate differential drops dramatically 
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Figure 4.10: Argentina's Interest Rate Differential relative to USA 
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after the crisis, indicating that the actual devaluation eases the authority's debt 
burden and lowers the market expectation of a future crisis. Therefore, Argentina is 
categorized as a country where the 'debt-burden' effect prevails over the 'signalling' 
effect. 
A successful defence of Argentina's peso can also be seen in 1995Ql. Surprisingly, 
the interest rate spread drops to its normal level after an increase under the pressure. 
An explanation for that is the 'currency board' that Argentina adopts following the 
periods of turmoil in the early 1990's, works well, boosting the authority's reputation 
after it is successfully defended. However, when there is little uncertainty about the 
authority's type later on, the ever-growing public debt becomes a more dominating 
issue. 
2. Brazil 
The peak in the interest rate differential in Brazil appears in the early days of 
the sample (Figure 4.11), corresponding to an actual crisis in 1994Q3 (Table 4.1). 
The interest differential falls drastically afterwards, showing signs of improvement 
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in the fundamentals that reduces the probability of a future forced devaluation. 
Because the peak is so high that the rest of the graph shows little movements, we 
produce Figure 4.12 to only focus on the remainder of the period (1994Q3-2003Q4). 
It is shown that before running into a full-scale crisis in 1999Ql, Brazil manages to 
defend its exchange rate regime in 1998Q3. However, this successful defence does 
not enhance the credibility of the regime, but instead by refraining the authority 
from inflationary financing its debts, leads to a forced devaluation several months 
later. It is then the actual devaluation that finally pulls the interest rate differential 
back to its normal level. 
The parity is successfully defended again in 2000Q2, but the results are the same: 
the interest rate spread soon goes up to a new height in 2001 Q4 and even higher in 
2003Q2. Overall, Brazil is considered as a debt-burden country, where the public 
debt plays a prevailing role. 
3. Czech Republic 
From Table 4.1, it is seen that there are two major crises in Czech Republic 
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Figure 4.12: Brazil's Interest Rate Differential relative to USA 1994Q3-
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Figure 4.13: Czech Republic's Interest Rate Differential relative to USA 
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Figure 4.14: Hungary's Interest Rate Differential relative to USA 
in the last decade. Different frmn Argentina and Brazil, the Czech Republic's first 
devaluation at the beginning of 1996 leads to the second, more full-grown crisis in 
1997Q2. In other words, the interest rate spread keeps rising after 1996Q1 's crisis 
and reaches its peak in 1997Q2, as shown in Figure 4.13. This shows that Czech 
Republic is a 'signalling' country where a devaluation reveals a weak ｡ｵｴｨｯｲｩｾ＠ and 
thus increases the expectation of a further crisis. 
4. Hungary 
The interest rate differential in Hungary shows the same pattern as in Czech 
Republic (Figure 4.14). 
An actual crisis occurs in Hungary in the early days of our sample (1994Q2), 
ｷｨｾ｣ｨ＠ pushes the interest spread to an even higher point-over 25% in 1995Q2 up 
from 20%. On the other hand, a series of successful defences conducted by the 
authority-starting from 1994Q4-1995Q2, 1996Q1, 1996Q4-1997Q3 to 2000Q2-
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dampens market speculations concerning a possible realignment, and eventually 
pushes the interest rate differential to its lowest level since the start of our sample. 
Thus, Hungary is regarded as a signalling country, where resisting a currency crisis 
and bearing the cost of servicing public debt sends a strong signal of the authority's 
resolve against devaluation (inflation), and hence enhances the credibility of the 
exchange rate regime. 
5. India 
Shown in Figure 4.15, India's interest rate differential has a general shape of 
the letter 'V'. The big drop on the left hand side starts months after a crisis in 
1995Q4. On the right hand side of the graph, a successful defence pushes the 
differential up from the bottom. They are signs that an early crisis eases the debt 
burden for India and leads to a fall in market speculation, while the country's debt 
condition deteriorates after a successful defence and the market expects a future 
forced devaluation. Therefore, India is a debt-burden country according to our 
theory11. 
6. Malaysia 
In Table 4.1, we can see that Malaysia experiences a period of turmoil during 
1997Q2-1998Ql, when it decides to drop the crawling band and adopt a freely 
floating exchange rate regime (1997Q3). Figure 4.16 shows that this decision pushes 
the interest rate differential to an even higher level until its peak in 1998Q2. In 
contrast, a successful defence in 1995Q4 keeps the interest spread low throughout 
the whole year of 1996. It is therefore shown that Malaysia is a country where the 
'signalling' effect prevails over the 'debt-burden' effect. 
7. Mexico 
Mexico's situation in the last ten years is simple. In Figure 4.17, we see that 
the interest rate spread drops dramatically after it reaches its highest point-when 
Mexico abandons its crawling peg and the Mexican peso sharply depreciates against 
11There are another two successful defences carried out by the Indian authority: one in 1998Ql 
that leads to an initial small drop in the differential, but together with another one in 1998Q3 
which raises the spread to its new height in 1998Q4. 
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Figure 4.15: India's Interest Rate Differential relative to USA 
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Figure 4.16: Malaysia's Interest Rate Differential relative to USA 
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Figure 4.17: Mexico's Interest Rate Differential relative to USA 
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Figure 4.18: Russia's Interest Rate Differential relative to USA 
US Dollar in 1995Q1 (4.1). Mexico is thus considered as a country where a current 
devaluation improves the fundamentals and makes a future crisis less likely. 
8. Russia 
Russia's interest rate differential relative to USA is shown in Figure 4.18. 
We can see that the spread initially goes down until1997Q3-1997Q4 when there 
is a successful defence against speculative attacks. The defence, on the other hand, 
starts to push the spread up and to its peak one year later when a full-scale currency 
crisis occurs (1998Q3-Q4). The Russian market seems to settle down after the 
1998 Crisis as the interest rate differential falls dramatically to its nonnallevel in 
1999Q2. That is exactly what we would expect from a 'debt-burden' country-
resisting a crisis worsens the fundamentals and thus increases the likelihood of a 
future devaluation, whereas a devaluation dampens market speculations concerning 
a further devaluation. Hence, Russia is a country with a significant 'debt-burden' 
effect12. 
12 Another successful defence is recorded in 1999Q3 when the interest rate differential randomizes 
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Figure 4.19: South Africa's Interest Rate Differential relative to USA 
9. South Africa 
As the SETAR model produces too many unnecessary high pressure periods for 
South Africa, we here only consider the MRS model that identifies 1996Q2, 1998Q3 
and 2001Q4 as periods when the country's currency is facing serious attacks (Table 
4.1). 
It is shown in Figure 4.19 that the initial successful defence of the exchange rate 
in 1996Q2, although initially keeping the interest rate differential in the rising trend 
in the first two quarters, draws the spread down to a low level in 1998Ql. This 
pattern is more clear when we analyze the second successful defence in 1998Q3, 
when the interest rate differential drops drastically from it peak of nearly 15% to 
around 3%. It seems that the market takes the reputation of the authority seriously 
into its account13• Therefore, South Africa is categorized as a country where the 
around its normal level. As the magnitude of these changes in interest spread are relatively small 
(increase from 6.7% in 1993Q3 to 7.6% in 1993Q4), we do not take it into account when judging 
Russia's status. 
13 Another successful defence is identified in 2001Q4-2002Ql, when the interest spread continues 
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Figure 4.20: South Korea's Interest Rate Differential relative to USA 
'signalling' effect dominates. 
10. South J(orea 
It is shown in Figure 4.20 that in 1994Q3, a speculative attack is successfully 
warded off by South Korean authority, which draws the interest rate differential 
down from its peak. 
The figure also sees another two separate attacks that are fended off in 1996Q3 
and 1997Ql. The result of the first successful defence is a lower interest spread, and 
the second defence also holds the market expectation of a realignment down. On 
the other hand, failing to resist the pressure in exchange markets and choosing to 
devalue its currency in 1997Q4 drags South Korea into deep chaos-the interest rate 
differential shoots to a record high of 18.26 after the reputation of the authority is 
rising. This could be seen as an early sign that the market starts to lose its confidence on the 
authority, since South Africa's economy has been struggling to thrive in the early 2000's. But it 
does not affect the main picture of South Africa 
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Figure 4.21: Thailand's Interest Rate Differential relative to USA 
ruined. Thus, there is little doubt that South Korea is a (signalling' country. 
11. Thailand 
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As shown in .Figure 4.21, the interest rate differential in the Thai market is 
pushed to 15% in 1998Q2, even higher than 13.6% during the 1997 crises-rather 
than drawn down to its normal level as expected by many people. In other words, 
the Thai crisis in 1997Q2-Q3 is not the end of the story, but instead the beginning 
of it-a devaluation reveals a weak authority, generates inflationary expectation and 
thus even higher interest rates. 
Overall, this procedure places Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico and Russia in 
the debt-burden group and the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malaysia, South Africa, 
South Korea and Thailand in the signalling group. 
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4. 7 Tests of Two Predictions 
4. 7.1 Two Predictions 
It is shown in our theoretical model that if the domestic currency is pegged to a 
foreign currency, defending the peg with higher interest rates may be too expensive, 
especially when there is a large share of short-term debt needed to be rolled over. 
Instead, the authority may decide to devalue in order to improve the fundamentals 
(through reducing the real debt burden), and thus increase the likelihood that a 
future exchange rate regime will be maintained. 
This logic, however, ignores the 'signalling' effect; in other words, it neglects to 
take into account the effects that the decision to devalue may reveal a weak authority 
and hence lead to a further devaluation-if there is substantial uncertainty about 
the authority's preferences in market. 
This forms our first testable prediction. When there is little uncertainty over 
the authority's preferences and the level of debt is high, a devaluation leads to a 
lower interest rate. The greater the amount of short-term debt that is to be rolled 
over, the greater the incentive to devalue and exploit the lower rate. Thus the 
likelihood of a first-period devaluation increases with the share of short-term debt. 
On the other hand, when the uncertainty about the authority type is substantial, 
it is the no-devaluation decision that produces a lower interest rate. In this case, 
the probability of a first-period devaluation decreases with the proportion of short-
term debt, because defending the exchange rate sends a strong signal of a tough 
authority, especially in adverse circumstances such as a high ratio of short-term 
debt. Therefore, the effect of the debt maturity on the probability of a current 
devaluation depends on whether the signaling or the debt-burden effect prevails (see 
Proposition 6) . 
Equation ( 4.57) shows that the expected second-period devaluation formed in 
period 0 is independent of the debt maturity. In other words, the short-term debt 
does not affect the forward interest rate, which only depends on fundamentals. 
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Together with the first prediction, we,can draw the term structure of interest rates 
for the debt-burden countries as well as the signalling countries (Proposition 7) as our 
second prediction. The reputational incentive lowers the short-term interest rate but 
has no impact on the forward rate. Therefore, when there is substantial uncertainty 
about the authority's preferences, a higher ratio of short-term debt implies lower 
current interest rates and a steeper yield curve. In contrast, if the fundamentals 
outweigh the reputational considerations, a higher proportion of short-term debt 
is associated with higher current interest rates and a flatter (or more downward-
sloping) yield curve. 
4.7.2 The Methodology 
The methodology we adopt to test the above two predictions is the generalised 
method of moments (GMM)14 for a dynamic panel data model (see Arellano and 
Bond (1991)). ·The model we estimate has the form 
Yit = ayi(t-1) + f3'(L)xit +At+ 7Ji + Vit, t = q + 1, ... , Ti; i = 1, ... , N. (4.67) 
where Yit is the dependent variable that is either the market interest rate differential 
relative to the USA or the yield curve, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables, 
{3' ( L) is a vector of associated polynomials in the lag operator, and 7Ji a:r;td At are 
the individual- and time-specific effect respectively. The number of time periods 
available on the ith individual is Tt and the number of individuals is N. 
We include four lags of the independent variables in the original regression as the 
data we use is quarterly. One period lagged dependent variable is also included in the 
RHS of the model to capture all the other effects that are not explicitly considered. 
As Arellano and Bond (1991) argue, when the Vit are heteroscedastic, simulations 
suggest that the asymptotic standard errors for the two-step estimators can be a 
poor guide for testing hypothesis in a typical sample size. In our case, both the 
14Refer to the Appendix C for model details. 
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interest rate differential and yield curve appear to be more volatile during currency 
crises than in relatively stable periods. Therefore, we report on the one-step GMM 
estimators with the asymptotic heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, based 
on which the inference tests are more reliable.15 
The assumption of no serial correlation (or only moving average) in the distur-
bance term Vit is essential for the consistency of our one-step GMM first-difference 
estimators, as the lagged dependent variable in the model is instrumented by it-
self with further lags. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is performed, 
and the test statistics that are based on the two-step GMM estimators and are 
heteroscedasticity-consistent are also reported16 • 
4. 7.3 The Results 
More short-term debt-a heavy };lurden or a good incentive for the au-
thority to defend the parity in short run? 
In each of the two groups of countries, we pool all the observations across countries 
and time periods, and regress the interest rate differential on its one-period lag 
and four explanatory variables-short-term debt ratio, current account balance, 
budget balance and international reserves. The results for both the debt-burden 
and signaling countries are shown in Table 4.2. 
The estimated results show that in countries where the debt issue plays a dom-
inating role over uncertainty on the authority's preferences, the probability of a 
current crisis increases with the ratio of short-term debt in total public debt. The 
2-, 3-, 4-period lagged short-term debt ratio variaples are statistically significant at 
the 10% level with positive and negative signs; the sum of the three significant pa-
rameters {62.44, -48.24 and 42.41) is 56.61 indicating an overall long-term positive 
relationship. For the signalling countries, the relationship between the probability 
15See Blundell and Bond (1998) for more details. 
16 Again, see Arellano and Bond (1991) for comprehensive discussions on several different test 
procedures. 
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Table 4.2: Effect of Short-term Debt on Likelihood of Current Devaluation I 
Variable Debt burden Signalling 
DINTDIF(-1) 0.30*** 0.50*** 
DSTDEBT -1.17 -5.35* 
DSTDEBT(-1) -0.88 
DSTDEBT(-2) 
DSTDEBT( -3) 
DSTDEBT(-4) 
DCACC 
DCACC(-1) 
DCACC(-2) 
DCACC(-3) 
DCACC(-4) 
DBUDG 
DBUDG(-1) 
DBUDG(-2) 
DBUDG(-3) 
DBUDG(-4) 
DRES 
DRES(-1) 
DRES(-2) 
62.44*** 
-48.24** 
42.41 ** 
0.82* 
-1.34* 
2.37*** 
-2.57*** 
1.06** 
1.62 
-2.37*** 
2.17*** 
0.70* 
-2.08*** 
-2.48 
5.36 
-8.19* 
DRES(-3) 7.19*** 
-6.93** 
-1.60 
1.37 
-1.53 
0.17** 
-0.002 
-0.12 
-0.11 
0.06 
0.04 
-0.03 
-0.02 
-0.04 
-0.0003 
-3.91*** 
1.71 
0.15 
-0.90 
DRES(-4) -2.40* 1.61 * 
Constant -30.37** -0.45 
Wald test(joint) 1.008e + 011*** 6.960 
Sargan test -1.395e - 013 2.875e - 016 
Estimation Method: GMM for dynamic panel data. All results are obtained using the DPD package by Doornik, 
Arellano and Bond for Ox. The transformation we adopt is the ｦｩｲｳｴｾ､ｩｦｦ･ｲ･ｮ｣･＠ of the level equations. The time 
dummies are also included in both models. Debt-burden countries include Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Russia. 
Signaling countries include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malaysia, South Africa, South Korea and Thailand. 
INTDIF, the interest rate differential with the USA is the dependent variable. 'D' indicates first-difference. The 
number in bracket is the lag of the variable. Parameters with '*' are significant at 10% level, parameters with '**' 
are significant at 5% level, and parameters with '***' are significant at 1% level. Estimators are one-step GMM 
estimators, with p-values based on their asymptotic heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. The Sargan test 
statistics are based on the two-step GMM estimators and are heteroscedasticity-consistent. STDEBT -Ratio of 
Short-term Domestic Public Debt to Total Domestic Public Debt, CACC -Current Account (%of GDP), BUDG 
-Overall Budget Balance(% of GDP), RES -International Reserves (months of imports). 
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of an impending crisis and the ratio of short-term debt is negative. In Table 4.2, 
the current and 1-period lagged short-term debt ratio variables have statistically 
significant and negative coefficients ( -5.35 and -6.93 respectively). 
Therefore, the first prediction by our theoretical model is supported: in coun-
tries where the 'debt-burden' effect dominates, a bigger proportion of short-term debt 
leads to a higher market expectation of a devaluation, as the incentive to devalue 
and improve fundamentals is greater; while in countries where the 'signalling' effect 
prevails, a bigger short-term debt ratio lowers the probability of a crisis, as resisting 
great pressure not to devalue strengthens the authority's stance. 
The one-period lagged dependent variables in both cases are statistically signif-
icant even at 1% level, which provides support for our usage of a dynamic setting. 
All other explanatory variables also have at least one significant coefficient in our 
regressions. Wald tests show that all the explanatory variables are jointly significant 
at even I% level in the regression for debt-burden dominating countries, although 
not for signalling countries. Sargan tests show that the one-step GMM-estimators 
in our results are asymptotically consistent in the sense that it is valid to instrument 
the lagged dependent variable with its further lags. 
In order to test the robustness of our estimated results, we drop the variables 
whose coefficients are not statistically significant at 10% level from our original 
regressions. The new results are shown in Table 4.3. 
The results are very similar. The 2-, 3-, and 4-period lagged value of short-term 
debt ratio are statistically significant and have a sum of 52.20 in the 'debt-burden' 
group, which means that the probability of a current devaluation increases with the 
proportion of short-term debt in those countries. However in 'signalling' countries, 
the statistically significant variables of the short-term debt ratio are its current value 
and one-period lag (with coefficients of -4.33 and -5.07 respectively). This shows 
that an increase in the short-term debt by 1% of total public debt lowers the interest 
rate differential (likelihood of a current crisis) by 9.40%. 
The one-period lagged dependent variables are still statistically significant at the 
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Table 4.3: Effect of Short-term Debt on Likelihood of Current Devaluation II 
Variable 
DINTDIF(-1) 
DSTDEBT 
DSTDEBT(-1) 
DSTDEBT(-2) 
DSTDEBT( -3) 
DSTDEBT( -4) 
DCACC 
DCACC(-1) 
DCACC(-2) 
DCACC(-3) 
DCACC(-4) 
DBUDG 
DBUDG(-1) 
DBUDG(-2) 
DBUDG(-3) 
DBUDG(-4) 
DRES 
DRES(-1) 
DRES(-2) 
DRES(-3) 
DRES(-4) 
Constant 
Wald test (joint) 
Sargan test 
Notes: Same as in Table 4.2. 
Debt burden 
0.27*** 
68.38*** 
-57.96*** 
41.78** 
1.81*** 
-2.38*** 
1.20*** 
-1.67*** 
2.39*** 
-1.43*** 
-4.76*** 
6.20*** 
-2.78* 
-30.83** 
9.888e + 009*** 
-1.637e- 013 
Signalling 
0.63*** 
-4.33** 
-5.07** 
0.06* 
-2.01*** 
1.35*** 
-0.39 
139.7*** 
-4.580e- 016 
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1% level in both cases. The Wald test for joint significance of all explanatory vari-
ables turns out to be statistically significant even at 1% level for both the signalling 
group and the debt-burden group. Sargan tests show no signs of serial correlation 
in the disturbance terms in both regressions. 
Will the emerging economies all face a favourable term structure of in-
terest rates-a steep yield curve? 
We have shown that developing countries facing substantial uncertainty about their 
authorities' types, should reap lower short-term interest rates as they strengthen 
their anti-inflation stances with a shorter debt maturity. Because the long-term rate 
is only determined by fundamentals, these countries face a steeper yield curve as a 
reward for their willing to fight against speculative attacks in adverse circumstances. 
It is also shown that in countries with a high level of debt, a larger amount of short-
term debt always pushes short-term interest rates higher as the incentive to roll it 
over at a lower-than-expected rate is greater. As a result of the fact that the debt 
maturity does not affect the forward rate, these countries face a flatter yield curve. 
As already mentioned, it has not been possible to find data for Argentina, Brazil 
and India and we can only run regressions for the signalling group. As before, we 
pool all the available data across both countries and tirne periods, and estimate a 
dynamic panel data model by GMM linking the yield curve (calculated by dividing 
the government long term bond yield by current market interest rate) to the short-
term debt ratio and other 3 explanatory variables. The estimate results are shown 
in Table 4.4. 
It is shown that coefficients of the current period and 1-, 3-, 4-period lagged 
short-term debt ratio variable are statistically significant at the 10% level. But the 
positive parameters (2. 7 4 for 1st lag and 1.09 for 3rd lag) outweigh their negative 
counterparts ( -0.83 foT current value and -1.87 for 4th lag). In other words, a 
one percentage point increase in the proportion of short-term debt to total public 
debt raises the long-term to short-term interest rate ratio by more than one percent. 
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Table 4.4: Effect of Short-term Debt on Yield Curve 
Variable Signalling I 
DYC( -1) 0. 78*** 
DSTDEBT -0.83* 
DSTDEBT(-1) 2.74*** 
DSTDEBT( -2) -0.49 
DSTDEBT(-3) 1.09*** 
DSTDEBT(-4) -1.87*** 
DCACC -0.01 ** 
DCACC(-1) 0.008 
DCACC( -2) 0.02*** 
DCACC( -3) 0.02** 
DCACC( -4) -0.006 
DBUDG 0.005 
DBUDG(-1) 0.005 
DBUDG(-2) 0.008* 
DBUDG( -3) 0.002*** 
DBUDG(-4) -0.002 
DRES 0.19* 
DRES(-1) 0.01 
DRES(-2) -0.36 
DRES(-3) 0.35** 
DRES(-4) 0.005 
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Signalling II 
0.78*** 
-0.84** 
2.45*** 
1.15*** 
-2.04*** 
0.02*** 
0.005* 
Constant 0.25 0.29 
Wald test(joint) 13.39 835.4*** 
Sargan test -4.320e- 017 -2.651e- 016 
Notes: The second column shows primary results, the third column shows results after dropping variables whose 
coefficients are statistically insignificant. YO -the government long-term yield over the market interest rate. 
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Therefore, the yield curve in countries where the 'signalling' effect prevails over the 
'debt-burden' effect, becomes steeper when the short-term debt ratio increases. The 
second prediction made by our theory is proven. 
Dropping the variables whose coefficients are not statistically-significant at the 
10% level does not alter the results. The current value and 1-, 3-, 4-period lag of the 
short-term debt ratio are still significant with a sum of the respective parameters 
equal 0.72. This shows the positive relationship between the yield curve and the 
proportion of short-term debt in 'signalling' countries, as we predict. 
The one-period lagged dependent variable are both significant even at the 1% 
level in two regressions. This justifies our adoption of the dynamic panel data 
model. The Wald test statistic, although not significant in the initial regression, 
becomes significant after we drop the insignificant variables. The Sargan test based 
on two-step GMM estimators also shows that there is no serial correlation in the 
error term in either regression. In other words, our one-step GMM-estimators are 
asymptotically consistent. 
4.8 Conclusions 
It is shown in this chapter that a successful defence of the parity may signal the 
authority's anti-inflation resolve and thus enhance the credibility of an ･ｾ｣ｨ｡ｮｧ･＠
rate regime, or on the other hand, it may increase the debt burden for the authority 
and make the economy more vulnerable to adverse shocks in the future. Which 
effect a successful defence against speculative attacks may have on the credibility of 
exchange rate regime is therefore uncertain-depends on the importance of public 
debt relative to authority's reputation incentive. 
We adopt a three-period stochastic version of the Barro and Gordon (1983) 
model, where the decision to devalue the currency creates unexpected inflation, 
which increases output both through a standard price-output effect and through 
reduction of the distortionary taxes. The probability of a devaluation in each period 
is derived by solving the opti1nal problem facing the authority. 
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Three cases are studied. The first case where the authority can commit itself 
to a public-known 2-period rule (fixed P1 and p2) produces the socially optimal 
solution regarded as .the benchmark. The second case where the authority pursues 
discretionary policies under complete information, shows that resisting a currency 
crisis and refraining from inflationary financing could worsen the fundamentals and 
thus increase the need for future devaluation. But a devaluation, on the other 
hand, reduces the real debt burden and hence improves the prospects that the new 
exchange rate regime will be maintained. 
However, the 'signalling' effect can not be ignored when determining the impact 
of current actions on future policy, if the uncertainty over the authority's preferences 
is substantial. As a result, defending the parity could send a strong signal of the 
authority's type and thus enhance the credibility of the regime, while a devaluation 
reveals a weak authority ｾｮ､＠ leads to higher expectations of a further devaluation. 
Which effect prevails depends on the relative importance of the fundamentals and 
the monetary authority's reputation. The results from our theoretical model are 
demonstrated by the numerical simulation using Matlab. 
A central focus of our study is on the effect of debt, especially debt maturity on 
the term structure of interest rates in the two types of countries. In countries where 
the debt-burden effect dominates, a larger proportion of short-term debt strengthens 
the incentive to roll it over at a lower-than-expected interest rate, and thus increases 
the probability of a current devaluation and leads to a higher short-term interest rate. 
As the forward rate is independent of debt maturity, we then expect a flatter yield 
curve. But in countries where there is substantial uncertainty about the authority's 
type, the intention to send a strong signal of authority's anti-inflation stance when 
facing a high ratio of . short-term debt, may imply a lower current interest rate. 
Together with a forward rate that only depends on fundamentals, this leads to a 
steeper yield curve. 
In our empirical work, the 'debt-burden' countries are first distinguished from 
'signalling' countries by analyzing the different patterns shown by their interest 
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rates after actual devaluations and/ or successful defences. The actual crises are 
defined by the regime changes in the Reinhart-Rogoff index. Both the SETAR 
(Self Exciting Threshold Autoregression) model and the Markov Regime Switching 
model are adopted to define the periods when there is severe pressure in the exchange 
markets. The periods of successful defences are then identified as periods when the 
serious market pressure does not lead to actual devaluations. 
The two predictions made by our theoretical model have then been tested in 11 
emerging countries by using GMM (General Method of Moments) for the dynamic 
panel data model, except for the yield curve in the debt-burden countries where 
data is not available. The likelihood of a current crisis is represented by the current 
market interest rate differential relative to USA, while the yield curve is calculated by 
dividing the government long term bond yield (measurement of forward rate) by the 
market interest rate. Besides the short-term debt ratio, another three explanatory 
variables are selected to include in our regressions. The estimated results confirm 
the two predictions made by our theoretical model. 
There are still some factors in currency crises which we have not examined un-
der the issue of credibility. For example alongside unemployment and public debt, 
domestic bank credit 1nay be another channel through which current actions would 
affect future policies. The experience of East Asian countries in the last two decades 
shows that defending the fixed rate while enhancing authority's anti-inflation stance, 
may send a wrong signal to the financial market to encourage aggressive and risky 
lending and thus making the economy more vulnerable to adverse shocks in the 
future. This is a task left for future research. 
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Table 4.5: SETAR Model a Estimated Results b for 11 Emerging Economies 
(1) 
Countries Argentina Brazil Czech Republic Hungary India Malaysia 
Intercept (Tranquil) -2.55 c -5.10 -2.63 -1.06 -0.55 -0.39 
(-3.14) (-2.68) (-6.33) (-3.26) (-5.41) (-2.25) 
Intercept (Volatile) 10.24 24.15 2.45 1.30 0.66 1.35 
(2.67) (12.14) (3.51) (10.06) (4.03) (9.53) 
Coefficients on AR(l) 
('.franquil) -0.06 -0.35 0.03 0.58 0.27 0.25 
(-0.61) (-3.52) (0.28) (2.14) (2.19) (2.05) 
. (Volatile) 0.96 0.78 0.26 0.23 0.30 0.78 
(2.96) {8.31) (0.86) (3.85) (1.70) (9.75) 
Coefficients on AR(2) 
('.franquil) 0.04 
(0.15) 
(Volatile) -0.14 
(-1.83) 
Coefficients on AR(3) 
('.franquil) 0.29 
(1.48) 
(Volatile) 0.12 
(0.85) 
Coefficients on AR( 4) 
('.franquil) -0.32 
(-0.93) 
(Volatile) -0.05 
(-0.63) 
Std. Dev. ('franquil) 4.72 10.94 2.00 1.33 0.50 0.98 
Std. Dev. (Volatile) 7.07 4.92 2.59 0.51 0.60 0.25 
Threshold 4.48 12.41 0.17 0.33 0.04 1.27 
SC criterion 6.71 7.99 5.05 3.80 2.22 3.04 
LR Linearity test a 46.20 55.29 31.51 45.88 31.04 32.91 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000} [0.000} [0.000] 
a Estimated Model: Non-linear SETAR (Self Exciting Threshold Autoregression) with a regime-
dependent intercept and slope parameter. 
bAll results are obtained using H-M. Krolzig1s MSVAR package for Ox. 
c Number in parenthesis below regression coefficient is t-value. 
d Number in square bracket below test statistic is p-values. 
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Table 4.6: SETAR Model a Estimated Results b for 11 Emerging 
Economies (2) 
Countries Mexico Russia South Africa South Korea Thailand 
Intercept ('franquil) -2.43C -5.77 -2.48 -1.73 -1.47 
(-2.78) {-5.21) (-8.75) ( -4.85) (-4.06) 
Intercept (Volatile) 18.51 7.62 1.23 3.93 3.31 
(4.37) (2.46) (3.55) {3.05) (3.62} 
Coefficients on AR(1) 
('franquil) -0.09 -0.02 0.06 0.32 0.11 
(-0.98) (-0.38} (-0.61) (2.69) (0.86) 
(Volatile) 0.83 0.74 0.22 0.42 0.47 
(2.50) (3.56) (1.28) (1.55) (1.91) 
Coefficients on AR(2) 
('franquil) 0.17 -0.42 0.003 
(3.66} (-4.29) (0.02) 
(Volatile) -0.46 -0.97 -0.37 
(-1.83) (-1.44) (-1.20) 
Coefficients on AR(3) 
('franquil) -0.10 -0.18 
(-2.20) (-1.79) 
(Volatile} 0.39 0.66 
(2.02) (1.13) 
Coefficients on AR(4) 
('franquil) 
(Volatile) 
Std. Dev. ('franquil) 5.08 4.86 1.03 1.87 1.78 
Std. Dev. (Volatile) 10.27 9.68 1.74 3.07 2.47 
Threshold 2.53 1.11 -0.59 0.75 0.95 
SC criterion 6.94 7.63 4.22 5.11 5.22 
LR Linearity test c1 46.99 43.34 37.76 28.40 28.75 
(0.000] {0.000] [0.000] [0.000] (0.000] 
a Estimated Model: Non-linear SETAR (Self Exciting Threshold Autoregression} with a 
regime-dependent intercept and slope parameter. 
bAll results are obtained using H-M. Krolzig's MSVAR package for Ox. 
c Number in parenthesis below regression coefficient is t-value. 
d Number in square bracket below test statistic is p-values. 
------------------------------- ------- - -
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Table 4.7: Markov-switching Model a Estimated Results b for 11 Emerging 
Economies (1) 
Countries Argentina Brazil Czech Republic Hungary India Malaysia 
Intercept (Tranquil) -0.14 c -17.71 -0.67 -4.77 -0.24 -0.62 
(-0.20) (-8.48) (-1.50) (-5.03) (-2.87) (-2.15) 
Intercept (Volatile) 1.15 22.54 -0.52 1.60 0.41 1.66 
(0.18) (2.42) (-0.17) (10.76) (0.75) (12.41) 
AR(1) -0.17 -0.53 0.08 0.25 0.19 0.51 
(0.40) (-6.28) (0:66) (4.07) (1.98) (6.62) 
AR(2) 0.44 -0.34 0.05 -0.14 -0.23 0.30 
(4.09) (-5.15) (0.44) (-2.35) (-2.07) (2.44) 
AR(3) -0.06 -0.08 0.05 0.15 -0.44 
(-1.28) (-1.50) (0.39) (1.44) (-3.98) 
AR(4) 0.02 0.08 0.01 - 0.05 -0.09 
(0.43) (1.51) (0.11) (-0.61) {-0.88) 
Std. Dev. {Thanquil) 2.26 4.41 2.14 1.25 0.38 0.95 
Std. Dev. (Volatile) 18.80 12.89 6.92 0.42 1.38 0.26 
Thansition Prob. (%) 
(Thanquil -+ Thanquil) 0.93 0.60 0.82 0.81 0.72 0.77 
(Volatile -t Volatile) 0.77 0.44 0.01 0.60 0.05 0.53 
SC criterion 7.06 8.96 5.97 4.52 2.90 3.99 
LR Linearity test d 43.48 15.36 8.64 24.94 12.37 20.12 
[0.000] [0.004] [0.013] [0.000] [0.002) [0.000] 
a Estimated Model: Non-linear Markov-switching Autoregressive (MS-AR) model with a regime-
dependent intercept and allowing for heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term. 
bAll results are obtained using H-M. Krolzig's MSVAR package for Ox. 
c Number in parenthesis below regression coefficient is t-value. 
d Number in square bracket below test statistic is p-values. 
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Table 4.8: Markov-switching Model a Estimated Results b for 11 
Emerging Economies (2) 
Countries Mexico Russia South Africa South Korea Thailand 
Intercept ('n.-anquil) -1.68 c -3.33 -1.93 -3.36 -0.44 
(-3.19) (-3.29) (-6.06) (-11.02) (-1.38) 
Intercept (Volatile) 36.84 12.59 4.74 1.66 1.68 
(4.43} (1.49) (3.30) (0.58) (0.74) 
AR(1) -0.08 0.38 -0.06 0.84 0.35 
(-1.24) (4.08) (-0.92) (15.71) (3.06) 
AR(2) -0.48 0.07 0.11 -0.30 0.22 
(-8.76) (1.53) (1.76) (-4.64) (1.81) 
AR(3) 0.06 -0.20 -0.11 0.19 -0.22 
(0.98) (-4.05) (-1.75) (3.67) (-1.71) 
AR(4) -0.17 -0.14 -0.15 -0.09 -0.18 
(-3.08) (-3.58) (-2.75) (-2.17) (-1.65) 
Std. Dev. ('franquil) 3.10 4.19 1.10 0.43 1.62 
Std. Dev. (Volatile) 11.70 17.81 2.22 7.10 5.38 
'fra.nsition Prob. (%) 
('fra.nquil -to 'fra.nquil) 1.00 0.86 0.62 0.96 0.90 
(Volatile ｾ＠ Volatile) 0.62 0.52 0.23 0.16 0.56 
SC criterion 6.36 8.01 5.43 5.02 5.55 
LR Linearity test 0 66.94 22.38 20.03 57.05 13.16 
[0.000] [0 .000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
a Estimated Model: Non-linear Markov-switching Autoregressive (MS-AR) model with a 
regime-dependent intercept and allowing for heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term. 
bAll results are obtained using H-M. Krolzig's MSVAR package for Ox. 
c Number in parenthesis below regression coefficient is t-va.lue. 
d Number in square bracket below test statistic is p-values. 
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Figure 4.22: Argentina: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State 
by SETAR Model 1993Q3-2003Q4 
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Figure 4.23: Brazil: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model 1993Q3- 2003Q4 
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Figure 4.24: Czech Republic: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile 
State by SETAR Model 1993Q3- 2003Q4 
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Figure 4.25: Hungary: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State 
by SETAR Model 1993Q3-2003Q4 
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Figure 4.26: India: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model 1993Q3-2003Q4 
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Figure 4.27: Malaysia: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State 
by SETAR Model 1993Q3- 2003Q4 
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Figure 4.28: Mexico: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model 1993Q3- 2003Q4 . 
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Figure 4.29: Russia: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State by 
SETAR Model 1993Q3- 2003Q4 
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Figure 4.30: South Africa: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile 
State by SETAR Model 1993Q3- 2003Q4 
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Figure 4.31: South Korea: Estimated Probabilities of being in · Volatile 
State by SETAR Model 1993Q3-2003Q4 
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Figure 4.32: Thailand: Estimated Probabilities of being in Volatile State 
by SETAR Model 1993Q3- 2003Q4 
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Figure 4.33: Argentina: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model1993Q3- 2003Q4 
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Figure 4.34: Brazil: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Modell993Q3- 2003Q4 
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Figure 4.35: Czech Republic: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being 
in Volatile State by Markov-switching Model1993Q3- 2003Q4 
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Figure 4.36: Hungary: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model1993Q3- 2003Q4 
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Figure 4.37: India: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in Volatile 
State by Markov-switching Model1993Q3-2003Q4 
1Q9Q 2000 200'1 2002 2003 Ｑｾ＠
Figure 4.38: Malaysia: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model1993Q3-2003Q4 
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Figure 4.39: Mexico: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model 1993Q3-2003Q4 
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Figure 4.40: Russia: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model1993Q3-2003Q4 
Figure 4.41: South Africa: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being 
in Volatile State by Markov-switching Model1993Q3-2003Q4 
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Figure 4.42: South Korea: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being 
in Volatile State by Markov-switching Model 1993Q3-2003Q4 
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Figure 4.43: Thailand: Filtered and Smoothed Probabilities of being in 
Volatile State by Markov-switching Model 1993Q3-2003Q4 
CHAPTER 5 
Empirical Tests of Contagion 1n 1997/98 East Asia Crises 
5.1 Introduction 
The newly industrializing countries in Eft Asia, once regarded as the world's 
most dramatic economic success, suddenly slipped into financial/currency turmoil 
in September 1997. The most striking aspect of the crises was that the crisis quickly 
spread from Thailand where it originated, to the other countries in the East Asian 
region as well as to Brazil and Russia in 1998. In other words, the crises demon-
strate that a sharp depreciation in one country's currency can have a strong, negative 
impact on the vulnerability of exchange rate regimes in its neighboring countries-
which may or may not share a similar economic structure· and deyelopment. Do 
these episodes of highly correlated co-movements amongst different exchange mar-
kets ｰｲｯｾｩ､･＠ any evidence of contagion? 
Before answering the question, it is necessary to define contagion. The Inain-
stream literature suggests that contagion occurs if the cross-market correlation 
｡ｾｮｯｮｧｳｴ＠ countries increases significantly during periods of turmoil, compared with 
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periods of stability. Based on this concept, some economists find evidence of conta-
gion effects in several crisis ･ｰｩｳｯ､ｾｳＬ＠ including the 1997/98 East Asia Crises. But as 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue, these traditional tests for contagion that are based 
on conditional correlation coefficients, are biased due to heteroscedasticity. We will 
follow their approach to adjust the correlation coefficients for this bias, and base our 
contagion tests on the resultant unconditional cross-market correlation coefficients. 
The main contribution of this chapter lies in the adoption of the non-linear 
Markov-switching VAR model to describe the crisis transmission mechanism for the 
first time. We focus our research on recent experiences in East Asia-from July 
1991 to December 1998, while Thailand is chosen as the country where the crisis 
originally takes place. We also use the Market Pressure Index (MPI) to capture 
both the successful and unsuccessful attacks on the East Asian currencies. 
The estimated results justify our usage of the !vlarkov-switching VAR model 
in depicting crisis episodes in East Asia during the 1990's. It is also shown that 
tests based on the conditional correlation coefficients find evidence of contagion 
between Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. However, the adjustment 
for heteroscedasticity shows a significant impact on the test results, as in Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002). The unconditional (adjusted) correlation coefficients fall down 
during the crises and are smaller than ones in more stable periods in all cases, 
indicating that all evidence of contagion disappears after adjustment. Instead, the 
high level of market co-movements between Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Indonesia shows the strong economic linkage-interdependence-amongst these East 
Asian economies, which exists in all states of the world. 
This chapter is organized as follows. A definition of contagion is given in section 
2 where we also briefly survey the relevant empirical literature. Section 3 discusses 
the disadvantage of the conventional technique of using conditional cross-market 
correlation coefficients to test for contagion. One adjustment method suggested by 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) is given to correct the bias due to heteroscedasticity. 
Section 4 gives the interested variables and data set. The Markov-switching VAR 
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model is then employed to test for contagion in East Asian economies during the 
1997/98 crises in section 5. The final section draws up the conclusion. 
5.2 Survey of Recent Contagion Literature 
5.2.1 Definition of Contagion 
We follow the mainstream literature to define contagion as a significant increase 
in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country (or group of countries). ·It 
is therefore regarded as contagion only if the magnitude of co-movement amongst 
different markets shows a drastic increase during periods of turmoil, compared with 
periods of stability. On the other hand, if the cross-market correlation does not 
increase significantly after the shock, then any continued level of market correlation 
during crises only suggests interdependence amongst markets, which exists in all 
states of the world. 
One advantage of adopting. this definition is that it can distinguish between 
alternative approaches to explaining how crises are transmitted across markets. The 
current literature about contagion is so extensive that it could be useful if we can 
differentiate some theories that assume that investors behave differently after a crisis, 
from others that argue the shock is propagated via a channel that exists pre-crisis, 
such as trade linkages. Furthermore, empirical works based on this definition of 
contagion can provide evidence how the transmission mechanisms behave during 
various currency crises, as it is argued that only those countries that are affected 
by crisis through a channel magnified by the crisis should qualify for multilateral 
bailouts. 
5.2.2 Survey of Recent Evidence on Contagion 
The literature that attempts to test for the effects of contagion is extensive. Based 
on the same definition as ours, four different methodologies are employed to measure 
how shocks are transmitted across markets: the cross-market correlation coefficient, 
Empirical Tests of Contagion in 1997/98 East Asia Crises 165 
the ARCH ( GARCH) model, the cointegration model, and direct estimation of a 
specific trans1nission mechanism. 
Amongst them, the cross-market correlation coefficient is the most widely used 
method to test for contagion. The correlation coefficients between two economies 
are measured in both crisis and relatively stable periods, in order to see whether 
the coefficient strengthens after a shock to one country. Calvo and Reinhart {1996) 
adopt this approach to test for contagion in stock prices and brady bonds after the 
1994 Mexican peso crisis. They find that the cross-market correlation coefficients 
increase significantly for many emerging markets. Baig and Goldfajn (1998) also 
find evidence of contagion in asset returns during the 1997/98 East Asia Crises, 
based on significant increases in cross-market correlation. 
However, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue that these tests are biased and in-
accurate due to heteroscedasticity, as the cross-market correlation coefficients are 
conditional on market volatility. Therefore, during crises when markets are more 
volatile, estimated correlation coefficients tend to increase and be biased upward. 
When tests do not adjust for this bias in the correlation coefficients, they tradition-
ally find evidence of contagion. In this chapter, we adopt a recommended formula 
to adjust the cross-market correlation coefficients for heteroscedasticity, and employ 
a non-linear Markov-Switching VAR model to deliver a better description of crisis 
transmission mechanism. 
The second approach is to adopt an ARCH or GARCH framework to estimate 
the variance-covariance transmission mechanism between countries. Edwards (1998) 
examines linkages between bond markets after the 1994 Mexican peso crisis. He finds 
that there are significant spillovers frmn Mexico to Argentina, but does not explicitly 
test if this transmission mechanism changes significantly after the shock. 
The third method tests for changes in the cointegrating vector between markets 
over a long period of time. One disadvantage of this approach is that the cross-
market relationship over such a long period can change for a number of reasons 
other than contagion, such as greater trade integration. 
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The final approach attempts to measure how the vulnerability of an exchange 
rate regime in one country can be affected by shocks to another country, along 
with other economic variables. The literature following this approach is extensive 
and normally incorporates other empirical methodologies as well, e.g., Logit/Probit 
model, as discussed in Chapter 2 Literature Review. Many find that the probability 
of a crisis in one country is highly associated with speculative attacks on the currency 
of a neighboring country. 
Also note that as in Chapter 2 Literature Review, the regime switching Inodels 
are increasingly applied to currency crises over the past few years (see Piard (1999) 
and Jeanne and Masson (2000)). But most of them analyze the effects of a range of 
variables on the probabilities that a country switches from one regime to another. 
Our research, however for the first time, employs the Markov-switching VAR model 
to examine the crisis transmission mechanism in 1997/98 East Asia Crises. However, 
it is necessary to first go through the argument about the bias in the traditional test 
for contagion that is based on the conditional cross-market correlation coefficient. 
5.3 Bias in the Conditional Cross-market Corre-
lation Coefficient 
The discussion how changes in market volatility during crises can bias the test for 
contagion based on the cross-market correlation coefficient, is initially motivated by 
Ronn (1998). He addresses the issue in his estimation of intra-market correlation 
in stocks and bonds. Ivlore recently, Boyer et al. (1999) and Loretan and English 
(2000) start to investigate the problem in more detail. They use their own statistical 
framework to address the bias when testing for contagion. 
A more complete documentation of this issue is found in Forbes and Rigobon 
(1999) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002). They not only provide some initiative 
examples of how heteroscedasticity can affect the cross-market correlation coefficient 
(while the underlining mechanism remains unchanged), but also give the formal 
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proof of the bias. As a byproduct, a formula is proposed to adjust for the bias when 
testing for contagion. 
Assume x and y are two stochastic variables that represent exchange market 
pressure in two different markets. The relationship between them is specified in the 
following equation: 
Yt = a + f3xt + Et 
If we assume the absence of endogeneity and omitted variables: 
then we can write the conditional cross-market correlation coefficient as 
p* = p [1fl; 
or p 
p* 
-
yl1 + 8[1 - (p*)2] 
(5.1) 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
where p* is the conditional correlation coefficient, p is the unconditional cor-
relation coefficient (the underlying transmission mechanism), and 8 is the relative 
increase in the variance of x defined by: 
9(5.6) 
It is clear in Equation (5.4) that the conditional correlation coefficient could in-
crease in 8. In other words, even though the unconditional correlation coefficient 
(the underlying transmission mechanism) remains unchanged, the conditional cor-
relation coefficient becomes ｬ｡ｾｧ･ｲ＠ in crises when x is more volatile. Therefore, the 
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traditional test for contagion that is based on the conditional correlation coefficients 
is biased and inaccurate-as the market tends to be more volatile during the cri-
sis, the estimated conditional correlation coefficient tends to increase although the 
cross-market linkage remains the same as during more stable periods. 
Equation (5.5) also provides us with a method to adjust for this bias, as it 
is a relatively good approximation of the unconditional cross-market correlation 
coefficient. Therefore, the null hypothesis that we would like to test in our analysis is 
that adjustment for heteroscedasticity does not change the results of traditional tests 
for contagion. The alternative hypothesis, on the other hand, is that adjustment 
proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) has a significant impact on the test results. 
However, three criteria are required to justify this method for adjustment: (1) a 
major shift in market volatility; (2) clear identification of the original country where 
the shift is generated; and (3) including only one neighboring country each time in 
the regression to test for contagion. 
5.4 The Variables and Data Set 
5.4.1 The Variables of Interest 
As in previous chapters, we establish the Market Pressure Index (MPI) to capture 
not only the actual depreciations of the domestic currency, but also speculative 
attacks that are warded off by ｩｮ｣ｲ･ｾｩｮｧ＠ interest rates and/ or selling international 
reserves. The MPI is a weighted sum of the nominal exchange rate depreciation, 
the change in market interest rate, and the negative percentage change in foreign 
exchange reserves1 according to their relative precision. 
Krugman {1998) suggests in his Moral Hazard model that moral hazard (inter-
national over-borrowing) in the banking sector plays a crucial role in the 199.7/98 
East Asia Crises, acting as a main force for bubbles in asset markets. Therefore, we 
1 As in Chapter 3, the minus sign ensures that a reduction in foreign reserves translates to an 
increase in the value of the MPI. 
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include in our regression: (1) the Ratio of Domestic Bank Assets to Nominal GDP. 
In Change and Velasco (1998) 's illiquidity model, the liquidity crunch experi-
enced by the East Asian economies once the currency regimes collapse, is believed 
to be another cause of the crises. Thus, (2) the Ratio of Bank ｌｯ｡ｾ＠ to Bank Total 
Deposit is also considered in our model. 
The declining export competitiveness in East Asian countries are widely blamed 
as a deeper cause for the 1997/98 turmoil, and the relevant variables are commonly 
selected as a leading indicator in empirical studies. Here, we also include (3) the 
Growth Rate of Export (% of previous year) in our regression. 
5.4.2 The Data Set 
Most of our data is extracted from the on-line IMF's International Financial Statis-
tics (IFS) and the Global Development Finance (GDF) 2004 CD. We also acquire 
data from the working papers published at the World Bank's website. 
The data set consists of monthly observations from July 1991 to December 1998 
for Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and South Korea. We do not adopt 
a longer sample period, because possible structural changes can happen in markets 
over a long period which invalidates our test for contagion. The end point of Decem-
ber 1998 is chosen as J\!Ialaysia started to re-adopt a pegged exchange rate regime 
and imposed strict controls on capital flows at the beginning of 1999. 
5.5 Contagion Analysis using MS-VAR model 
As discussed in Chapter 2 Literature Review, the regime switching models have been 
increasingly applied to the currency crises over the past few years. It is shown that 
over a long period, many macroeconmnic and financial variables, including the MPI 
we construct, sometimes undergo episodes when the behaviours of the series change 
dramatically. Such events include wars, currency crises, and significant changes in 
government policies. The regime switching models can allow us to assume that 
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observed data is drawn from the different distributions conditional on the state-
contingent parameter sets. 
The main advantage of the regime switching framework over the Logit/Probit 
model is that it allows for a continuous dependent variable and avoids the arbitrary 
choice of the threshold value for a crisis. Moreover, the non-linear nature of the 
regime switching models is also appealing as the economy switches endogenously 
amongst different regimes. 
5.5.1 The MS-VAR model 
We adopt Hamilton's Markov-switching 2 Vector Autoregressive model (MS-VAR) 
to examine the experiences of East Asian countries during the 1990's, while Thailand 
is selected as the origin country where the crisis spreads to other countries in the 
region. It is presumed in Hamilton's model that we cannot observe the shifts in 
:regimes directly, but instead must draw probabilistic inferences about whether and 
when changes may occur, based on the observed behaviours of the MPis. 
Here, our Markov-switching model assumes regime shifts in the intercept term 
and also allows for heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term. It is also assumed 
that there are two regimes in our model-the crisis regime and the relatively stable 
regime. A VAR framework is employed in order to control for endogeneity. As 
discussed above, the MPI rather than the simple nominal depreciation rate is used 
so that we can encompass all the periods of both large depreciations and successful 
defences against severe attacks on exchange rates. 
We also include in the model three economic variables based on the crisis theories 
and empirical works: (1) the negative growth rate of exports(% as the same month 
in previous year,); (2) the Domestic Bank Assets (%of Nominal GDP); and (3) the 
ratio of Bank Loan to Bank Total Deposit. The negative of the export growth rate 
ensures that its coefficient has a predicted positive sign, as a slowdown in exports 
2See Appendix A for more details. Also see Hamilton (1994), chapter 22, for a statistical review 
of Markov-switching models and Hamilton (1989) for an application of the MS model to US growth 
trend. 
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increases the vulnerability of the economy to speculative attacks. 
The MS-VAR model can be formally expressed as 
Xt = v(st) + ¢(L)xt + 'l/l(L)It + TJt 
Xt = ｻｸＺＬｾｽＧ＠
It = { exp;, exz4, lend;, lend{, lndp;, lndz4 }' 
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(5.7) 
(5.8) 
(5.9) 
where x: is the MPI of the crisis source country; ｸｾ＠ is the MPI of another East Asian 
country j; so Xt is a transposed vector of MPI of both countries. ¢(£) is a vector 
of associated polynomials in the lag operator. expf and exp{ are export growth 
rate for the crisis source country and country j respectively; lendZ and lend{ are 
domestic bank assets (%of nominal GDP) for two countries; and lndpi and lndz4 
are the ratio of bank loan to total deposit for the crisis source country and country 
j respectively; therefore, It is a transposed vector of all exogenous variables for 
two countries, while 'ljJ ( L) is a vector of associated polynmnials in the lag operator. 
Finally, the conditional constant term (intercept) v( St) is assumed to switch between 
two states: 
v(st) = ' { 
v1 if St = 1( 'tranquil' ) 
v2, if St = 2( 'crisis' ) 
(5.10) 
dd TJt f"'J NID(O, E(st)), where E(st) is also presun1ed to be different in different 
regimes. Equation (5.7)-(5.9) form the measurement equation for Hrunilton's state 
space model. 
The state St is assu1ned to follow a first-order Markov process so that we can 
write the transition equation as 
Pr(st = ilc;t-1) = Pr(st = ilst-1 = j) = Pij (5.11) 
where c;t-l is a vector representing all the information available at time t -1, includ-
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ing the lagged values of Xt and It. The essence of this method is the presumption 
that the future will in some sense be like the past. The measurement equation and 
the transition equation make up Hamilton's Markov-switching space model. The 
value Pii is known as the transition probability of switching from state j to state i, 
and is assumed to be independent of time: 
fort E {1, +oo }. 
{ 
P12 = Pr( tranquil in tlcrisis in t- 1) 
P21 = Pr( crisis in tltranquil in t - 1) 
(5.12) 
As shown in Appendix A, the Hamilton filter provides a nonlinear algorithm 
for generating inferences about a discrete-valued unobserved state vector. As a by-
product of that algorithm, the log likelihood function for the observed data evaluated 
at the estimated parameters can be calculated. Then, the EM method is adopted to 
obtain maximum likelihood estimators for all the parameters in the MS-VAR model. 
In general, the EM method (developed by Dempster et al. (1977)) maximizes 
the incomplete-data log likelihood via the iterative maximization of the expected 
complete-data log likelihood, conditional upon the observable data. Given the ob-
served data and some initial estimators of the parameters in the model, the EM algo-
rithm begins by calculating the smoothed state probabilities (i.e. the unconditional 
probability of a particular state). With the estimated smoothed state and transi-
tion probabilities, the expected cmnplete-data log likelihood function is constructed. 
This is the (E', expectation part of the algorithm. The expected complete-data log 
likelihood function is then maximized to obtain updated parameter estimators. This 
is the 'M', maximization part of the algorithm. Using this updated estimators, the 
smoothed probabilities are calculated again and substituted into the expected likeli-
hood function, which is n1aximized again. This iterative procedure is repeated until 
convergence (in the parameter estimators or the likelihood function) is achieved. 
Then we can obtain the 1naximum likelihood estimators of the MS model parame-
ters. 
------------------------------- ---- - -- --
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It is also possible to derive smoothed estimators of the state probabilities based 
on all the sample information. These smoothed probabilities represent the best es-
timation of the probabilities for a state in period t (st). Since the Markov-switching 
model includes the possibility that the threshold depends on the last regime, the 
smoothed probabilities are different from the filter probabilities. Kim (1994) devel-
ops a backward recursion algorithm to calculate this smoothed inference. 
We will test for contagion from Thailand to other East Asian countries-Malaysia, 
Philippines, Indonesia and South Korea-during the 1997/98 crises separately. For 
each pair of countries, we estimate the MS-VAR model specified in equations (5. 7) 
through (5.12). Using the variance-covariance estimators from the regression, we 
calculate the cross-market correlation coefficients during both the more stable pe-
riods and periods of turmoil. We then see whether there is a significant increase 
in the correlation coefficients (not adjusted for heteroscedasticity yet) during crises, 
and hence evidence for contagion. 
However, these test results may not be accurate, as the correlation coefficients 
are biased due to heteroscedasticity. In other words, the increases in the estimated 
correlation coefficient might not reflect increases in real cross-market linkages but 
rather increases in market volatility. Therefore, we modify our tests for contagion 
to be based on the unconditional cross-market correlation coefficients which are 
calculated using equation (5.5). Finally, we see the impact of the adjustment on the 
test results for contagion in the 1997/98 East Asia crises. 
5.5.2 Results 
It is shown in the estimated results (Table 5.1 and Table 5.2) that the relatively 
stable states are characterized by low variances, while most periods of turmoil are 
depicted by much higher volatilities, except for Malaysia. In other words, the periods 
of stability are the times of little fluctuation in foreign exchange markets, but crises 
are the periods with high market volatility. 
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Table 5.1: MS-VAR Model Estimated Results Table 1 
Thailand-Malaysia Thailand-Philippine 
MPI Tha Mal Tha Phi 
Intercept (Stable) 6.99 -5.97 -1.27 0.06 
(3.35) ( -3.41) (-1.31) (0.04) 
Intercept (Crisis) 8.63 -5.53 -1.34 1.87 
(3.86) ( -3.05) ( -1.22) (1.12) 
AR_Tha(-1) -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.11 
(-0.37) (0.55) (0.09) (1.11) 
AR..Mal/Phi ( -1) 0.43 -0.05 -0.002 -0.16 
(4.08) ( -0.62) ( -0.05) (-1.70) 
EXP_Tha -1.06 1.15 0.80 -0.60 
( -1.55) (1. 70) (1.18) ( -0.55) 
EXP _Tha(-1) -0.85 -0.72 -0.63 -0.87 
( -1.26) ( -1.29) (-0.89) ( -0.73) 
EXP _Mal/Phi 1.24 -1.37 -0.15 1.39 
(1.82) (-2.03) ( -0.24) (1.26) 
EXP ..Mal/Phi(-1) 1.38 2.49 0.69 -0.02 
(2.20) (4.07) (0.95) ( -0.02) 
BKASS_Tha 2.24 3.91 4.56 4.51 
(1.10) (3.22) (2.34) (1.60) 
BKASS_Tha(-1) -4.22 -2.52 -3.63 -0.22 
( -2.22) ( -2.16) (-1.91) ( -0.07) 
BKASS_Mal/Phi 10.42 -1.24 -0.25 15.06 
(3.60) ( -0.60) ( -0.10) (4.34) 
BKASS_Mal/Phi( -1) -5.76 -0.56 0.23 -7.82 
( -2.06) ( -0.26) (0.10) ( -2.14) 
BKLIQ_Tha -1.16 12.16 6.20 27.65 
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Table 5.1: MS-VAR Model Estimated Results Table 1 
MPI 
BKLIQ_Tha(-1) 
BKLIQ__MalfPhi 
BKLIQ..Mal/Phi( -1) 
Std. Dev. (Stable) 
Std. Dev. (Crisis) 
Regime Duration (months) 
Stable Regime 
Crisis Regime 
Transition Pro b. (%) 
(Stable ｾ＠ Stable) 
(<Jrisis ｾ＠ Crisis) 
(Stable -4 Crisis) 
( <Jrisis -4 Stable) 
Classified 
Crisis periods 
SC criterion 
LR Linearity test 
Thailand-Malaysia 
Tha Mal 
(-0.23) (6.13) 
-1.35 -9.82 
(-0.29) ( -5.00) 
-2.13 5.58 
( -1.07) (4.06) 
-0.97 -3.80 
( -0.48) ( -3.03) 
0.45 
1.84 
62.31 
9.52 
0.98 
0.89 
0.02 
0.11 
0.57 
0.25 
1991:8-1991:10 
1997:4-1998:7 
5.11 
76.01 
[0.000] 
Thailand-Philippine 
Tha Phi 
(1.25) (3.84) 
-6.80 -25.81 
( -1.39) ( - 3.69) 
-4.79 -9.59 
( -2.21) (-2.68) 
6.39 
(2.96) 
0.36 
1.60 
17.38 
10.59 
0.94 
0.91 
0.06 
0.09 
5.47 
(1.52) 
0.68 
0.93 
1991:8-1991:11 
1992:4-1992:7 
1993:5-1993:9 
1997:5-1998:12 
6.67 
63.61 
[0.000] 
-- ----'---------------- - - -- - - -- -
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Notes: Estimated Model: Non-linear Markov-switching Vector Autoregressive model (MS-VAR) with the regime-
dependent intercept and heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term. Number of regimes: 2. Order of VAR: chosen 
according to the (lowest) information criteria. Number of exogenous variables: 3. All results are obtained using 
H-M. Krolzig's MSVAR package for Ox. Number in parenthesis below regression coefficient is t-value. Number in 
parenthesis besides variable indicates number of lag(s) of AR term. Number in square bracket below test statistic 
is p-values. 
EXP-Growth Rate of Export (% of previous year). 
BKASS-Ratio of Domestic Bank Assets to Nominal GDP. 
BKLIQ-Ratio of Bank Loan to Bank Total Deposit. 
Table 5.2: MS-VAR Model Estimated Results Table 2 
Thailand-Indonesia Thailand-South Korea 
MPI Tha Ind Tha Kor 
Intercept (Stable) 1.17 -3.90 -8.97 -4.62 
(0.50) ( -1.14) ( -2.39) ( -1.60) 
Intercept (Crisis) 2.71 -2.64 -6.90 -4.28 
(1.11) ( -0.74) ( -1.77) ( -1.39) 
AR_Tha(-1) 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.01 
(0.33) (0.97) (0.57) (0.23) 
ARJ:nd/Kor( -1) -0.10 -0.001 -0.05 0.19 
(-1.60) ( -0.02) ( -0.53) (2.40) 
AR_Tha(-2) -0.01 0.37 -0.17 -0.01 
( -0.13) (3.00) ( -2.24) ( -0.15) 
AR_Ind/Kor( -2) -0.12 -0.05 0.08 -0.02 
( -2.14) ( -0.66) (1.10) ( -0.34) 
AR_Tha(-3) 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.07 
(0.45) (0.18) (0.84) (1.36) 
AR.Jnd/Kor(-3) -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.10 
( -0.95) ( -0.76) (-0.49) ( -1.74) 
--------------------------------------- -- -
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Table 5.2: MS-VAR Model Estimated Results Table 2 
Thailand-Indonesia Thailand-South Korea 
MPI Tha Ind Tha Kor 
EXP_Tha 0.07 1.62 1.26 0.30 
(0.12) (1.72) (1.46) (0.45) 
EXP _Tha(-1) 0.42 -0.17 -0.19 -0.58 
(0.61) ( -0.17) (-0.21) ( -0.88) 
EXP .Jnd/Kor 0.54 0.81 -0.80 1.09 
(1.02) (1.06) (-0.70) (1.22) 
EXP .Jnd/Kor(-1) 0.31 -0.66 -1.30 -2.46 
(0.58) ( -0.86) (-1.56) ( -3.86) 
BKASS_Tha 3.16 2.37 5.08 1.99 
(1.63) (0.84) (2.26) (1.12) 
BKASS_ Tha( -1) -2.44 1.70 -5.93 -2.24 
(-1.25) (0.59) (-2.87) ( -1.42) 
BKASS.Jnd/Kor -5.56 -1.98 -10.58 4.88 
( -2.45) ( -0.59) (-2.63) (1.62) 
BKASS.Jnd/Kor( -1) 3.70 7.37 6.23 6.91 
(1.98) (2.62) (1.55) ( -2.29) 
BKLIQ_Tha 3.06 2.42 7.96 5.88 
(0.73) (0.40) (1.72) (1.63) 
BKLIQ_Tha(-1) -2.24 -2.13 -5.22 -5.05 
(-0.54) ( -0.35) (-1.09) ( -1.34) 
BKLIQ.Jnd/Kor 6.65 -0.76 4.84 3.33 
(2.55) ( -0.20) (1.75) (1.62) 
BKLIQ.Jnd/Kor( -1) -8.64 2.64 -1.36 -0.95 
( -3.15) (0.66) ( -0.56) ( -0.51) 
Std. Dev. (Stable) 0.45 0.65 0.47 0.36 
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Table 5.2: MS-VAR Model Estimated Results Table 2 
MPI 
Std. Dev. (Crisis) 
Regime Duration (months) 
Stable Regime 
Crisis Regime 
Transition Pro b. (%) 
(Stable ｾ＠ Stable) 
(Crisis ｾ＠ Crisis) 
(Stable ｾ＠ Crisis) 
(Crisis ｾ＠ Stable) 
Classified 
Crisis periods 
SC criterion 
LR Linearity test 
Thailand-Indonesia Thailand-South Korea 
Tha 
2.09 
23.50 
4.44 
0.96 
0.77 
0.04 
0.23 
Ind 
3.17 
1996:2-1996:2 
1997:7-1998:1 
1998:5-1998:10 
7.11 
72.94 
[0.000] 
Tha Kor 
1.56 2.20 
13.71 
2.15 
0.93 
0.54 
0.07 
0.46 
1992:7-1992:7 
1996:7-1996:7 
1997:7-1997:8 
1997:11-1998:1 
1998:4-1998:7 
5.97 
104.75 
[0.000] 
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Notes: Estimated Model: Non-linear Markov-switching Vector Autoregressive model (MS-VAR) with the regime-
dependent intercept and heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term. Number of regimes: 2. Order of VAR: chosen 
according to the (lowest) information criteria. Number of exogenous variables: 3. All results are obtained using 
H-M. Krolzig's MSVAR package for Ox. Number in parenthesis below regression coefficient is t-value. Number in 
parenthesis besides variable indicates number of lag(s) of AR term. Number in square bracket below test statistic 
is p-values. 
EXP-Growth Rate of Export(% of previous year). 
BKASS-Ratio of Domestic Bank Assets to Nominal GDP. 
BKLIQ-Ratio of Bank Loan to Bank Total Deposit. 
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The adoption of formula (5.5) to adjust for heteroscedasticity is justified in that 
the three criteria mentioned above are satisfied. The variances of the MPI in all East 
Asian economies increase significantly in the 1997/98 East Asia Crises, compared 
with the tranquil periods. The country where the crisis originally breaks out is 
Thailand-the devaluation of Thai Bhat in September 1997 is widely regarded as 
the start point of the financial/ currency turn1oil for the region. Finally, we only test 
for contagion from Thailand to one of its neighboring countries each time in our 
MS-VAR model. 
It is seen that duration of a relatively stable state is much longer than a period 
of crisis. The chances that the East Asian countries remain in the same state-
no matter 'it is a regime of turmoil or stability-are also much higher than when 
countries switch between different states. In other words, the economies in East 
Asia that enjoy a relatively stable state would stay in 'calm' for the next period, 
while the countries that find themselves struggling in crises could be dragged even 
deeper into crises in the following month. 
Our results show that the hypotheses of linear specification are rejected at even 
the 1% significant level in all cases. This confirms our assumption that time series 
variables such as the MPI undergo regime changes when facing dramatic events 
like currency crises, and hence justifies our usage of the Markov-switching model 
to depict crisis transmission mechanisms. The three exogenous variables that we 
include in our estimation to help explain movements in exchange markets based on 
crisis theories and previous works have frequent statistically significant coefficients, 
which reduces the risk of having omitted variables in our models. 
As discussed above, the unconditional smoothed probability is the inferred prob-
ability of a particular state in a period which is estimated based on all the sample 
information. A month is then classified as a month of tunnoil if the smoothed prob-
ability of being in crisis is greater than 50% and vice versa. It is noted that 50% is 
not necessarily the only choice of threshold, as the inferred smoothed probabilities 
are all close to either zero or one. 
--------------------------------------- ------
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Table 5.3: Conditional Cross-market Correlation Coefficientsa 
Thailand-Malaysia Thailand-Philippines Thailand-Indonesia Thailand-South Korea 
Stable periods 6 0.35 0.04 0.09 0.05 
Turmoil periods 0.80 0.12 0.29 0.04 
Contagion c C C C N 
a This table reports conditional (unadjusted) cross-market correlation coefficients for Thailand and each of other 
countries in the sample. 
b Both stable and crisis periods are defined by the Markov-switching Vector Autoregressive model (MS-VAR). 
c 'C' indicates that contagion occurs, while 'N' shows no crisis contagion effect. 
Table 5.4: Unconditional Cross-market Correlation Coefficientsa 
Stable periods 6 · 
Turmoil periods 
Contagion c 
Thailand-Malaysia 
0.35 
0.31 
N 
Thailand-Philippines 
0.04 
0.03 
N 
Thailand-Indonesia 
0.09 
0.06 
N 
Thailand-South Korea 
0.05 
0.01 
N 
a This table reports unconditional (after adjusted for heteroscedasticity) cross-market correlation coefficients for 
Thailand and each of other countries in the sample. 
b Both stable and crisis periods are defined by the Markov-switching Vector Autoregressive model (MS-VAR). 
c 'C' indicates that contagion occurs, while 'N' shows no crisis contagion effect. 
Therefore, we can identify 1991:8-1991:10 and 1997:4-1998:7 as periods of tur-
moil for Thailand and Malaysia. 1991:8-1991:11, 1992:4-1992:7, 1993:5-1993:9 and 
1997:5-1998:12 are times when Thailand and Philippines struggle in crises. For Thai-
land and Indonesia, the crisis periods are defined as 1996:2-1996:2, 1997:7-1998:1 and 
1998:5-1998:10. Finally, 1992:7- 1992:7 , 1996:7- 1996:7 , 1997:7- 1997:8 , 1997:11 
- 1998:1 and 1998:4- 1998:7 are identified by MS-VAR model as periods of turmoil 
for Thailand and Korea. Figure 5.1-Figure 5.3 show both the filtered and smoothed 
regime probabilities for four pairs of countries respectively. 
The estimated conditional and unconditional cross-market correlation coefficients 
for each pair of countries during both the stable and crisis periods are shown in Table 
2 and 3 respectively 3 . 
3We here report the absolute value of the estimated correlation coefficients. 
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Thailand and Malaysia 
Several patterns are immediately apparent in the test results for a contagion effect 
between Thailand and Malaysia. Firstly, the cross-market correlation coefficient 
between the two countries during the relatively stable periods is unsurprisingly high, 
given that they are both key members of ASEAN and share a similaF economic 
structure and development. In other words, the Thai foreign exchange market is 
highly correlated with the Malaysian market during the periods of stability (0.35). 
Secondly, the correlation coefficient increases dramatically to 0.80 during the 
periods of turmoil-more than double what it is in a relatively stable state. This 
shows an even higher level of comovement between the two markets during crises 
and thus clear evidence of contagion. Therefore, based on the conditional cross-
.market correlation coefficient (not adjusted for heteroscedasticity), our test finds 
that contagion spreads from the crash of Thai exchange market to Malaysia. 
However, it is shown that the adjustment for the bias due to heteroscedasticity 
has a significant impact on the estimated correlation coefficient and the resulting 
test for contagion. The unconditional cross-market correlation coefficient is now 0.31 
during the periods of turmoil, and smaller than the correlation coefficient during the 
periods of stability (0.35). Thus, there is no significant increase in the unconditional 
correlation coefficient after the shock to Thailand. In other words, the evidence of 
contagion from the primary test disappears after we adjust for heteroscedasticity. 
This is exactly what Forbes and Rigobon (2002) find in their research in stock market 
returns after the 1997/98 East Asia Crises. 
Furthermore, the results also highlight the way by which we define contagion. 
The continued high level of comovement between the Thai foreign market and the 
Malaysian market in periods of turmoil is not considered as evidence of contagion. 
Instead, the two econmnies are regarded as highly interdependent upon each other 
in all states of the world. 
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Thailand and Philippines 
The test results for contagion between Thailand and Philippines shows similar pat-
terns as in the previous case. The low cross-market correlation coefficient (0.04) 
between the two countries during relatively stable periods could be attributed to 
their different economic structure and development-the Thai economy is consid-
ered more developed than that of the Philippines. 
It is also shown that the correlation coefficient increases significantly to 0.12 for 
the two economies during the periods of turmoil. This is the evidence of contagion 
from Thai crash to Philippines, if we base our test on the conditional cross-market 
correlation coefficient (not adjusted for the bias). 
But the adjustment for heteroscedasticity has a significant impact on the test 
for contagion. Once again, we find that the higher level of market comovement 
between the two countries during crises could result from higher market volatilities 
(heteroscedasticity) instead of an increase in real cross-market linkages. After we 
adjust for bias and base our test for contagion on the unconditional correlation coeffi-
cient, there is no significant changes (increases) in the magnitude of the propagation 
mechanism between the Thai exchange market and- the Philippines market-in other 
words, no contagion. The unconditional cross-market correlation coefficient is now 
0.03, smaller than the correlation coefficient in the periods of stability (0.04). 
Thailand and Indonesia 
The same story repeats itself in the case of Thailand and Indonesia. During relatively 
stable periods, the Thai exchange market is correlated with the market in Indonesia 
at a low level (0.09), also because of different economic structure and development 
in two countries. But the cross-market correlation coefficient increases dramatically 
to 0.29 after a shock to the Thai market, more than three times as high as in periods 
of stability. Therefore, the test based on the conditional correlation coefficient finds 
the evidence that contagion occurs from the collapse of Thai exchange rate regime 
to Indonesia. 
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However, it is shown that the test results are entirely different after we adopt the 
proposed formula to adjust for heteroscedasticity. The unconditional cross-market 
correlation coefficient during periods of turmoil is now 0.06, smaller than 0.09 during 
times of stability. In other words, there is no more evidence of contagion between 
Thailand and Indonesia after we adjust our test for the bias due to heteroscedasticity. 
Thailand and South Korea 
South Korea is the third largest economy in East Asia and thus has a much more 
advanced economy than Thailand. This fact is reflected by the low cross-market 
correlation coefficient (0.05) during the stable periods. 
In contrast to the previous cases, we do not find any evidence of contagion 
between Thailand and South Korea. The conditional (unadjusted) correlation coef-
ficient decreases rather than increases to 0.04 during periods of crises. Furthermqre, 
after adjusting for different market volatilities in crises, the correlation coefficient 
becomes even smaller (0.01) during the periods of turmoil. Therefore, there is no 
contagion occurring frmn the crash in Thai exchange market to South Korean mar-
ket. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the significant impact that the adjustment for the bias due 
to heteroscedasticity may have on the test for contagion. 
The rapid spread of the crisis from Thailand to other countries in East Asia 
during 1997/98 crises raises an interesting 9-uestion: do these highly correlated co-
movements provide any evidence of contagion? Here, we adopt the definition of 
contagion that is widely used in the mainstream literature: a significant increase in 
cross-1narket linkages after a shock to one country (or group of countries). Therefore, 
contagion occurs if the cross-market correlation coefficient increases significantly 
during the periods of turmoil, compared with in periods of stability. However, as 
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Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue, the traditional method of testing for contagion 
does not adjust for the bias due to increased market volatility during crisis periods, 
and thus gives inaccurate results. 
Using the proposed formula to adjust for heteroscedasticity, we base our test 
for contagion on the unconditional cross-market correlation coefficient. For the first 
time, we employ the non-linear Markov-switching Vector Autoregressive (MS-VAR) 
model to depict the crisis transmission mechanism. Compared with conventional 
techniques, the MS-VAR model can allow us to avoid an arbitrary choice of threshold 
level, and its non-linear feature is also appealing. It is shown in the estimated results 
that the hypotheses of linear specification are rejected even at the 1% significant 
level in all cases, which justifies our usage of the MS-VAR model. 
Not surprisingly, the tests based on the conditional cross-market correlation co-
efficient find evidence for contagion effects. In three of four cases, the correlation 
coefficients increase significantly during the turmoil periods, compared with periods 
of stability. However, as in Forbes and Rigobon (2002), all evidence for contagion 
soon disappears after we adjust our tests for the bias due to heteroscedasticity. The 
unconditional cross-market correlation coefficients are much smaller than their con-
ditional counterparts during periods of turmoil, and even smaller than the correlation 
coefficients in periods of stability. Instead, the high level of market co-movements 
that exist in all states of the world shows real economic linkages-interdependence-
between Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia. 
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MSVAR: Regime probabilities 
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Figure 5.1: The Filtered and Smoothed Regime Probabilities for Thailand 
and Malaysia during 1991.10-1998.9 
MSVAR: Regime probabilities 
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Figure 5.2: The Filtered and Smoothed Regime Probabilities for Thailand 
and Philippines during 1991.10-1998.9 
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MSVAR: Regime probabilities 
MSIH(2)-VARX(3), 1992 (1)- 1998 (9) 
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Figure 5.3: The Filtered and Smoothed Regime Probabilities for Thailand 
and Indonesia during 1991.10-1998.9 
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Figure 5.4: The Filtered and Smoothed Regime Probabilities for Thailand 
and South Korea during 1991.10-1998.9 
CHAPTER 6 
Concluding Remarks 
The last 30 years saw frequent and severe speculative attacks on the exchange rate 
regimes in both developed and developing countries, such as the collapse of the Eu-
ropean Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992/93, the 1994 Mexican Peso de-
valuation, the East Asia Financial/Currency crises in 1997/98, and the more recent 
Argentina turmoil (2001). The scale and impact of these episodes have prompted 
a huge amount of research interest ｾ＠ scholars are trying to provide different ex-
planations for these ever-changing phenomena. The mainstream crisis literature 
includes the so-called three generation crisis models that we have discussed in detail 
in Chapter 2 Literature Review. 
The initial approach of 'bad' fundament.als (e.g., Krugman (1979), Flood and 
Garber (1984)), indicating that crises can be created by expansionary fiscal and/or 
monetary policies, seems promising when tested to fit the crisis episodes in Latin 
American countries in the late 1970's and 1980's. This is followed by game-theoretical 
1nodels with multiple equilibria ( e.g., Obstfeld (1994), Obstfeld (1996)) that were 
initiated by the 1992/93 ERM crises. The second generation crisis models show 
that as a combination of the conflicting goals of govermnent 's policies with private 
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sector's perfect foresight can create multiple equilibria-the economy can be driven 
from an equilibrium where the fixed exchange rate regime is feasible to another one 
where it is not, even when the fundamentals are sound. The 1997/98 East Asia 
Crises prompted the third generation models, including models attempting to ex-
plain crises in terms of moral hazard (Krugman (1998)) and illiquidity (Change and 
Velasco (1998)), and models exploring the crisis transmission mechanism (Conta-
gion, e.g., Baig and Goldfajn (1998), Glick and Rose (1999) ). It is therefore natural 
to assume that the different generation crisis models ·are at best explaining the 
causes (and other aspects) of different currency crises by which they were originally 
inspired--crises occurring in Latin American countries seem mostly resulting from 
the governments' irresponsibly expansionary policies and the unsustainable credit 
expansion; conflicting goals of government's policies when combined with private 
sector's perfect foresight in Europe cause the ERM crashes; and an unhealthy bank-
ing system with problems of both moral hazard and liquidity crunch is at the center 
of East Asian turmoil. 
In Chapter 3, we have searched for the stylized facts associated with currency 
crises in the three regions: Latin America, Europe and East Asia in order to see how 
good the three generation crisis models are in addressing them respectively. We use 
the country-specific Market Pressure Index (MPI) rather than the simple nominal 
depreciation rate to capture not only the actual devaluations but also 'failed' attacks, 
which are fended off by raising interest rates and/ or selling reserves. The pioneering 
approach we adopt here to define currency crises is a combination of two non-linear 
state models-the SETAR (Self Exciting Threshold Autoregression) model and the 
Markov-switching model. Both models allow us to avoid an arbitrary choice of 
threshold level (i.e., 10% or a one standard deviation move), by allowing the data 
itself to reveal what 1nove represents abnormal behaviour and thus signal a crisis. 
The estimated results from our Logit model that link the binary crisis variable 
to an extensive range of economic variables selected on the basis of the three gen-
eration crisis models, are limitedly promising. On the one hand, we do find that 
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to some extent, the three generation models address the different perspectives of 
currency crises occurring in the three regions respectively. It is shown that a rapidly 
expanding stock of credit and large deficits in current account are important indi-
cators for Latin American crises, consistent with the first generation models that 
emphasize 'bad fundamentals'. We also find that the turmoil episodes in Europe are 
highly associated with its real economic cycle, i.e., the pressure in foreign exchange 
markets piles up when the economy slides into recession. This is the time when 
the discretionary governments are tempted to relax their policies to boost output 
according to the second generation models. As for East Asia, the (international) 
over-borrowing and lack of export competitiveness are shown to play an important 
role, which corresponds the predictions made by the third generation models. Our 
approach is also an example where the theories are neatly linked with empirical 
evidence. 
However, the picture is far from perfect. It is seen that some variables appear 
not to have the predicted signs in the regressions, and others that are suggested by 
the theories are not statistically significant at the conventional level (10%). Due 
to the rigidity of our econometric model, it is unfair to simply conclude that the 
three generation crisis models are ineffective or inefficient at explaining the various 
currency crises across the world. But at the least, our analysis has shown that there 
is some room for improvement, which is the task laid in the chapters which follow. 
It is known that currency crises are so complicated and ever-changing phenomena 
that it is not possible for the three generation crisis models to address all issues 
surrounding the crises. In fact, we look at the issue of credibility of the exchange 
rate regime in currency crises in the following chapter. 
Chapter 4 sheds some light on the two ambivalent impacts that public debt, 
especially debt maturity, has on currency crises: the 'debt-burden' effect and the 
'signalling' effect. When discussing monetary policy, traditional economic theories 
focus on the monetary authority's reputation, and insist that resisting a crisis can 
enhance the authority's anti-inflation reputation, and hence the probability that the 
- ----- ---------- ----
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exchange rate will be maintained in the future. I:Iowever, as Benigno and Missale 
(2001) argue, tight monetary policies aiming to defend the parity can, at the same 
time, increase the actual debt burden and thus impair the ability to withstand future 
crises. Thus, whether the exchange rate regime can gain credibility from a current 
devaluation may depend on the importance of the debt-burden effect relative to the 
signalling effect. 
We adopt a three-period stochastic version of the Barro and Gordon (1983) 
model, and derive solutions by solving the optimal problem facing the monetary au-
thority. We extend Benigno and Missale (2001) 's analysis to introduce non-deflatable 
debt, and also include a new scenario where the monetary authority can commit it-
self to a two-period rule-which is set up in period 0 and known to the public. The 
latter provides us with the socially optimal solution regarded as a benchmark. An-
other two scenarios have also been examined-where the authority cannot commit 
and its preference is publicly lrnown, and where it also adopts discretionary policies 
but its type is not known to private sector. It is shown that a current devaluation 
may improve the prospects that the future exchange rate regime could be maintained 
by reducing the real value of public debt, as long as the debt-burden effect prevails 
over the signalling effect. However, if there is great uncertainty about the authority's 
preferences, a current depreciation may instead give a signal of a weak authority, 
and thus lead to higher expectations of a further devaluation. All these findings 
confirm the results of Benigno and Missale (2001), but in a more comprehensive 
manner. The key conclusions are also demonstrated by the numerical simulations 
using Matlab. 
Our theoretical model also produces two testable predictions about the effect of 
debt maturity on interest rates. In countries where the debt-burden effect dominates, 
a larger proportion of short-term debt strengthens the incentive to roll it over at a 
lower-than-expected interest rate, and thus leads to a higher probability of a current 
devaluation (higher short-term interest rate). As the forward rate is independent 
of debt maturity, we have a flatter yield curve for debt-burden countries. But in 
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countries where there is substantial uncertainty about the authority's preferences, 
the incentive to send a strong signal of the authority's toughness implies that a higher 
ratio of short-term debt lowers the current interest rate, and leads to a steeper yield 
curve. 
But there exist some obstacles for us to test the predictions in empirical work, in 
particular how to differentiate countries where the debt-burden effect prevails from 
countries where signalling dominates. As in Chapter 3, we construct the continu-
ous Market Pressure Index (MPI) that incorporates changes in the exchange rate, 
reserves and interest rates, to gauge the vulnerability of exchange rate regime. we 
then employ both the SETAR (Self Exciting Threshold Autoregression) model and 
the Markov-switching model to identify the periods when foreign exchange markets 
are under severe speculative attacks. The actual devaluation episodes are defined 
by the regime changes in the Reinhart-Rogoff index. Then, the periods of successful 
defences of the parity are periods when the high pressure on domestic currency does 
not lead to an actual devaluation. Finally, we can draw the line between the debt-
burden countries aud the signalling countries, according to different patterns shown 
by their interest rates facing currency crises and/ or successful defences. In this way, 
we distinguish between the two types of countries for our 11 emerging economies 
between 1993Q3-2001Q4. 
Based on the two different country groups, we can conduct our tests for the two 
predictions by using GMM (General Method of Moments) for the dynamic panel 
data model. The estimated results show supportive evidence for our predictions. 
Overall, our main contributions here have been laying down a brand-new method 
to distinguish between the actual devaluations and the successful defences, and 
for the first time, providing empirical evidence for the ambivalent impacts of a 
current devaluation on the credibility of future exchange rate regime. In an earlier 
paper, Drazen and l\tlasson (1994) suggest that the persistent effect ofune1nployment 
could provide another channel whereby current actions affect future policy. The 
direction of future research is, therefore, looking for other factors that can act as 
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an intermediate between the current and future, which are discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
Another area where our research project has made some progress is with regard to 
the crisis transmission mechanism. We follow the mainstream literature to adopt a 
narrow definition of contagion: a significant increase in cross-market linkages after 
a shock to one country (or group of countries). It is argued that the traditional 
approach to test for contagion is inaccurate because it is based on the conditional 
cross-market correlation coefficient that has not been adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
During periods of crisis when markets are more volatile, the correlation coefficient 
intends to increase and be biased upward and thus tests based on it traditionally 
find evidence of contagion. In this chapter, we adopt a formula proposed by Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) to adjust for the bias. In other words, we have based our tests 
for contagion on the unconditional cross-market correlation coefficient. 
The main contribution we have made to the existing literature is, for the first 
time, to employ a non-linear Markov-switching VAR (MS-VAR) model to depict 
the crisis transmission mechanism. The advantage of the MS-VAR model over the 
linear models is that it allows us to assume observations are drawn from the differ-
ent distributions conditional on the state-contingent paratneter sets, which is more 
appropriate for time series variables (i.e. the MPI) especially when there happen 
special events like currency crises during the period. Instead of imposing an arbi-
trary threshold, i.e. 10% or a one standard deviation move, the MS-VAR model 
allows the data itself to reveal what move represents abnormal behaviour and there-
fore signal a crisis. The estimated results have justified our usage of the MS-VAR 
model, as the linear hypotheses are rejected even at 1% significant level in all cases. 
Our research focuses on the experience of a rapid spread of crises from Thailand 
to other countries in East Asia in 1997/98. Our initial tests find evidence of conta-
gion between Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia, since the conditional 
(unadjusted) cross-market correlation coefficients increase significantly during the 
periods of turn1oil in comparison to more stable periods. However, the adjustment 
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for heteroscedasticity has a significant impact on the correlation coefficients and the 
resulting tests for contagion. As in Forbes and Rigobon (2002), we have found that 
all evidence of contagion disappears after we base our tests on the unconditional 
correlation coefficients for the 1997/98 East Asia crises. The high level of market 
co-movements between Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia, on the other 
hand, indicate the close economic linkages-interdependence-amongst them, which 
exist in all states of the world. 
At this point, we think it would be useful to remind ourselves of the purpose of 
our research that is set up at the beginning of the project. After we discover that 
the so-called three generation crisis models are not so good at explaining currency 
crises across the world as they should be, two areas were singled out for this project 
to make some progress. One is the issue of credibility. It is shown that through 
the channel of public debt, a current devaluation may have two ambivalent effects 
on the credibility of a future exchange rate regime. The original theoretical model 
has been extended, and empirical proof is ｰｲｯｶｩ､ｾ､＠ for its two predictions for the 
first time. The other area is contagion where we adjust our tests for bias due 
to heteroscedasticity, and also for the first time, employ the non-linear Markov-
switching VAR model to analyze the crisis transmission mechanism. Therefore, it 
is our belief that the goal of the research project has been achieved. 
The stock of knowledge that we hope we can contribute to (summarized in Chap-
ter 2 Literature Review and re-discussed later in relevant chapters) has provided us 
with the necessary background for this study, and has also offered an invaluable 
reference during our research. The collection of data that has been used in the 
project has not been a painless process, but the clarity of some of the results has 
been extremely rewarding. In addition, we have ensured that the methodology we 
follow in each chapter is appropriate for the problem at hand. 
In writing up this thesis, a big value has been placed on transparency. Every 
effort has been made to provide the reader with sufficient information on the con-
struction of variables and, in general, on every aspect of the work, including any 
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limitations (which follow in this chapter). Additionally, we have tried to base our 
claims on facts. Where necessary, we incorporated graphs and tables to support 
an argument. Appendices as well as footnotes are used to provide further details 
supplementary to the material in the main text. 
Of course, this project is not immune to limitations. Generally, the unavailability 
of data in some cases forms a natural restriction to our econometric exercises in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5. This restriction applies to the majority of empirical studies, 
the quality of which is judged against the relevancy and adequacy of the data for 
the question at hand. As mentioned earlier, we have made every effort to obtain 
reliable and extensive data-sets, which, we believe, contain sufficient information for 
our research purposes. Furthermore, we aim to constantly update our data-base to 
include more countries and longer time series, in order to check for possible new 
trends and test the robustness of our results. 
Some specific criticisms also apply to some aspects of our work. In what follows, 
and before outlining our future research agenda, we briefly present two limitations 
of this project. In Chapter 3, the main criticism is the rigid specification of our 
macro econometric model, and the choice of variables is limited by the relevant 
crisis theories. The reason we have chosen to take this approach is that it is a 
neat way to link the crisis theories to the empirical works. The implication of this 
strategy is that there is a cost in terms of accuracy and completeness, since capturing 
economic reality exactly and fully in an econometric model (i.e., a prediction model) 
is an extremely demanding task including a much more sophisticated form and more 
explanatory variables. We have not undertaken this task here, as we aim to ·see 
the capabilities of the three generation crisis models in interpreting the causes of 
different crises across the world-by which they were originally inspired. Therefore, 
our model is rich enough for our purpose and our approach is suitable and robust 
for extraction of information relevant to the research. 
Another limitation lies in Chapter 5, concerning the assumption of no endogene-
ity or omitted variables in our model. In other words, the formula that we adopt to 
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adjust for heterosceda.sticity would not be valid if there are exogenous shocks and/ or 
feedback from infected countries to origin country. However, it has been shown in 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) that without this assumption, the adjusted correlation 
coefficient is still a relatively good approximation of the unconditional correlation 
coefficient if changes in the variances are large and it is possible to identify the 
country where the shock originates. The ｾｮｴｵｩｴｩｯｮ＠ is what the simultaneous equa-
tion literature calls near identification. It is shown that the variances of the Market 
Pressure Index (MPI) in nearly all East Asian economies increase by more than 5 
times during the 1997/98 Financial/Currency Crises, and the source of the shock is 
clear-the devaluation of Thai Bhat in early September 1997 is widely regarded as 
the beginning of the turmoil. Moveover, we only test for contagion from Thailand 
to other countries in the region in our VAR framework. 
We finally turn to the issue of future research. This will develop in two directions. 
Firstly, we would like to further develop our theoretical model on how current actions 
affect future policy in Chapter 4. As mentioned before, Drazen and Masson (1994) 
suggest that the persistent effect of unemployment could provide a channel, while 
Benigno and Missale (2001) considers the public debt as another factor. Regarding 
the 1997/98 East Asia Financial/Currency Crise .. s, one would recommend that the 
domestic credit provided by banking system can also be a bridge to link current 
actions to the future. An outline of our initial thinking follows. 
A similar theoretical model could be set up to show that successful defence of the 
exchange rate would worsen the fundamentals, by sending a wrong signal to already 
booming markets to encourage more aggressive lending and thus lead to an increase 
in the Non-Performing Debts (NPD) in banking system. We would still consider a 
three-period open economy version of the Barro and Gordon (1983) model, where an 
inflation surprise, due to an unexpected devaluation, increases output both through 
the standard price-output effect and through the reduction of repayn1ent of foreign 
debts. In the model, the dmnestic bank finances its both one-period (short-term) 
loans and two-period (long-term) loans to domestic clients by borrowing only short-
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term loans from abroad at the beginning of each period. 
Following the same logic as in Chapter 4, the monetary authority finds itself 
facing a dilemma in the first period. On the one hand, resisting a crisis could 
enhance the authority's reputation so that the foreign deposits would not be pulled 
out. In that case, the more profitable long-term investment would not be forced 
to liquidate to compensate the short-term foreign borrowings (Change and Velasco 
(1998)). Therefore, the market would expect that the parity will be maintained 
in the second period as everything goes as planned. However, on the other hand, 
defending the parity would send a wrong signal to the over-booming asset markets, 
encouraging more risky lendings by moral hazard, which is transformed into an 
excessive capital accumulation. The excessive investment would inevitably lead to 
a sharp decrease in returns to capital and thus piling up of non-performing debts in 
the banking system. Eventually, the bubbles in asset markets would burst and the 
domestic currency would be forced to devalue. 
The recent experience of the emerging economies in East Asia could provide 
us with some evidence for the two ambivalent effects-a tough policy in a current 
period may improve the credibility of the exchange rate regime by avoiding the 
liquidation of long-term investments, or may send a wrong signal to encourage an 
excessive accumulation of capital in asset markets. But the methodology will have 
to be left for future discussion. 
The second direction we are willing to take is to go deeper to look at our analysis 
of currency crises in the context of real business cycles. The business cycle is the 
fluctuation between periods of relatively rapid economic growth alternating with 
periods of relative stagnation or decline. The periods of rapid growth are associated 
with increases in productivity, and in consumer confidence. These growth periods 
usually end with the failure of speculative investments built on a bubble of confidence 
that bursts or deflates at the end. Some economists argue that the currency crises 
are rather a symptom of this underlying real (in both senses of the word) malady. 
We believe that further study of the relationship between the real business cycle and 
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currency crises in a highly integrated global environment will prove to be a fruitful 
area of research. 
APPENDIX A 
Markov-Switching Model Briefing 
Many macroeconomic or financial variables undergo episodes for a long period in 
which the behavior of the series seems to change quite dramatically. Such apparent 
changes in the time series process can result from events such as wars, financial 
panics, or significant changes in government policies. 
But in econometrics, we usually assume that observed data has been drawn from 
the same distribution conditional on some constant parameter set. As indicated 
above, it is very unlikely that economic time series can be characterized in such a 
way. 
The standard econometric way to solve that problem is trying to detect the 
existence of these changes in regime using different types of parameter constancy 
tests, and then impost dummy variables to account for these changes. But this 
procedure might be very rigid and may lead to the use of models with too many 
dummy variables. 
As a result, state space models have been launched to tackle this problem .. The 
general state space model consists of two equations: the rneasurement equation 
and the transition equation. The Kalman filter of Kalman (1960) and Kalman and 
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Bucy (1961) is an algorithm for generating minimum mean square error forecasts in a 
state space model. But whereas the Kalman filter is a linear algorithm for generating 
estimates of a continues unobserved state vector, Hamilton (1989) presented another 
approach to provide nonlinear inference about a discrete-valued unobserved state 
vector. 
It is presumed in Hamilton model that econometricians can not observe the shifts 
in regime directly, but instead must draw probabilistic inference about whether and 
when changes may have occurred based on the observed behavior of the series. 
A variable Yt is assumed to be a linear function of a vector of variables Xt with 
coefficients that depend on the state or regime · in period t. There are a discrete 
number of states, n. Formally 
Yt = ｸｾｦＳｳｴ＠ + Et (A.1) 
where St is the state in period t which can take one of n possible values, 1, ... , n. 
Defining at as the n x 1 vector with ith element equal to one when St = i and all 
other elements equal to zero, we can rewrite the measurement equation ( A.1) as 
(A.2) 
where B = [fJI : · · ·: f3n] and var(Et) = a 2. 
The state St is assumed to follow a first order Markov process so that we can 
write the transition equation as 
Pr(st = ｩｬｾｴＭｉＩ＠ = Pr(st = ilst-1 = j) = Pii (A.3) 
where ｾｴＭｉ＠ is a vector representing all the information available at time t- 1 
which includes lagged values of Yt and Xt. The reason for the assumption of Markov 
chain is that over a deterministic specification for a process with permanent regime 
changes, one could generate meaningful forecast prior to the change that take into 
account the possibility of the regime change. The essence of this scientific method 
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is the presumption that the future will in some sense be like the past. The value 
PiJ is known as the transition probability of moving to state i from state j and is 
independent of time. If 
[ 
Pn 
II . = . 
Pn1 
then we can rewrite (A.3) as 
(A.4) 
where 1Jt is uncorrelated with at-1 or ｾｴＭｬ＠ and is not normally distributed. 
The Hamilton filter is an iterative algorithm for calculating the distribution of 
the discrete state variable at. 
Let at be E( ｡ｴｬｾｴＩ＠ with ith element given by 
and atlt-1 be ｅＨ｡ｴｬｾｴＭＱＩ＠ with ith element given by 
Then the Hamilton filter comprises two recursive equations: obtaining an optimal 
inference about the current state given the past values of the variable that is to be 
forecast, the updating equation, at = h(atlt-1); the prediction equation, using the 
outcome of the filter to generate future forecasts of this variable, atlt-l = g(at-d· 
The Hamilton filter prediction equation follows from (A.4) and is simply 
(A.5) 
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Through the filter introduced by Hamilton (1989), the optimal inference of at on 
the basis of the information set· in t consisting of the observed values of Yt, could 
be calculated as the following (nonlinear) updating equation. 
Vt 0 O!tlt-1 
O!t = I 
VtO!tlt-1 
(A.6) 
where Vt is then x 1 vector with ith element given by f(YtiSt = i, Xt, €t-d· The 
five-step filter weights for each regime the conditional density of the observation 
Yt, given the population parameters of regime m, with the predicted probability of 
being in regime mat timet given the information set Yt_1 . 
The optimal inference and forecast for each date t in the sample can be found 
by iterating on the above pair of equations. 
Moreover, a starting value ao is needed to calculate O!t through the iterative 
algorithm. Several options are available for initializing the filter. 
If the Markov process is stationary and ergodic, then E(at) = E(at-1) and from 
the transition equation(12) 
This can be used to define the vector of unconditional probabilities a by solving 
a=ITa 
Then one approach is to set a0 equal to a. 
Another option is to set 
ao = p 
where pis a fixed (N x 1) vector of nonnegative constants summing to unity, 
such as p = N-1 · 1. 
The population parameters that describe the time series government by (A.2) 
and (A.4) consist of B, a 2 and the various transition probabilities II. Collect these 
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parameters in a vector (). 
The log likelihood function L( 0) for the observed data YT evaluated at the value 
of() that was used to perform the iterations can also be calculated as a by-product 
of this algorithm from 
T 
L( 8) = L log f(YtlXt, Yt-1; 0) (A.7) 
t=l 
Then the value of () that maximizes the log likelihood can be found numerically 
using the EM method, developed by Dempster et al. (1977). Given the observed 
data and an arbitrary initial guess for the value of (), ()(O), the EM algorithm begins 
by calculating the smoothed state probabilities (i.e. the unconditional probability 
of a particular state, discussed· later in this section). With the estimated smoothed 
state and transition probabilities, the expected complete-data log likelihood function 
is constructed, which is the "E" , expectation part of the algorithm. The log like-
lihood function is then maximized to obtain an updated parameter estimate. This 
is the "M", maximization part of the algorithm. The iterative procedure continues 
until the change between e<m+l) and ()(m) is smaller than some specified convergence 
criterion. Then the maximum likelihood estimate B is equal to ()(m) = ()Cm+l}. 
Once the unknown parameters of the model B, IT, and o-2 have been estimated, it 
is possible to derive estimates of the state vector based on all the sample information. 
These smoothed estimators, given by atiT = E(atl(T), represent the best estimate 
of the probability that the model was in state si in period t. since Markov-Switching 
Model includes the possibility that the threshold depends on the last regime, the 
smoothed probabilities are different from the transition probabilities we discussed 
above. 
Developed by Kim (1994), the backward recursion algorithm used to calculate 
smoothed inferences, can be written as 
atlT = at!t 0 {II'(at+liT 0 at+llt)} (A.8) 
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where 0 is the element-by-element multiplication operator and 0 denotes the 
element-by-element division. This algorithm is started with aTIT, iterating on back-
ward fort= T- 1, T- 2, ... , 1. 
In practice, the Markov-Switching Vector Autoregressive (MS-VAR) models are 
mostly used for its flexibility. There are two major types of MS-VAR: 
• shift in the mean (MSM-VAR): once and for-all jump in the time ｾ･ｲｩ･ｳ＠
• shift in the intercept (MSI-VAR): smooth adjustment of the times series 
However, some economists have pointed about that the numerical optimization of 
a very complicated non-linear function in Hamilton's filter could suffer from several 
specific types of failures. In particular, the parameter vector may change direction 
at ever increasing speed toward absurd values, while still increasing log likelihood 
at each step. 
APPENDIX B 
Discretion under Asymmetric Information 
We must up-date the probability qt at t=1 based on the history h = [D or F, u1]. 
Using Bayes Law 
P ·(AlB ) = Pr(BJA n u1 ) Pr(A n u1) 
I nul Pr(BJul) 
we have that 
q1(F n u1) = Pr(TJF n u1) 
= 
= 
Pr(FJT n u1) Pr(T n ui) 
Pr(F n ui) 
(1- pf)qo 
Pr(F!T n u1) Pr(T n u1) + Pr(FJW n u1) Pr(W n u1) 
(1- pf)qo 
(1 - pf)qo + (1 - pf) (1 - qo) 
(.1) 
Discretion under Asymmetric Information 
and 
(4.34) now becomes 
- Pr(T!Dnu1) 
Pr(DIT n u1) Pr(T n u1) 
Pr(D n u1) 
pfqo 
pfqo + pf(1- qo) 
i 1 1 Oid dm P2(h) =- - -(-+-+IT( h)] 2 2v 2m 2 
with II(h) still given by (4.18). Hence combining (.2) and (4.47) we arrive at 
If q0 = ｾ＠ (uniform probability), then 
= 
pf (1- pf) 
pf + pf 2 - pf - pf 
pf (2- pf- pf) - (1 - pf)(pf + pf) 
(pf + pf)(2- pf- pf) 
pf -pf 
(pf + Pr')(2- pf- pf) 
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(.2) 
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Hence 
Note that (.4) agrees with (7) of Drazen and Masson (1994). If we focus on an 
equilibrium in which a tough authority never devalues then q1(D n u1) = 0 and (.3) 
implies 
Then using ( 4.35) and ( 4.36), we have 
(.6) 
APPENDIX ( 
Dynamic Panel Model Estimation (GMM) Briefing 
The methodology we use to estimate the dynamic panel model is the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) (Arellano and Bond (1991)). The general model that 
can be estimated by the GMM is a single equation with individual effects of the 
form: 
p 
Yit = L a.kYi(t-k) + f3'(L)xit +At+ TJi + vit, t = q + 1, ... , 71; i = 1, ... , N, (.1) 
k=l 
where 'f/i and At are respectively individual and time specific effects, xit is a 
vector of explanatory variables, {J'(L) is a vector of associated polynomials in the 
lag operator and p is the maximum lag length in the model. The number of time 
periods available on the ith individual is 7i and the number of individuals is N. 
Identification of the n1odel requires restrictions on the serial correlation proper-
ties of the error term Vit and/ or on the properties of the explanatory variables X it. 
Only serially uncorrelated or moving average errors are explicitly allowed for the va-
lidity of the GMNI estimators. The vit are assumed to be independently distributed 
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across individuals with zero mean, but arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity across 
units and time are possible. This provides the justification of our empirical analysis 
where both the interest differential relative to USA and the yield curve have different 
volatilities across the different countries and time periods. 
The levels Xit are initially supposed to be correlated with T/i but predetermined 
even not strictly exogenous, in the sense that E(xitvis) i= 0 for s < t and zero 
otherwise. Then only xil, Xi2, . .. , xi(s- 1) m·e valid instruments in the differenced 
equation for periods. 
The GZi - q) equations for individual i can be written conveniently in the form: 
(.2) 
where J is a parameter vector including the ak's, the {3's and the lambda's, and 
Wi is a data matrix containing the time series of the lagged vm·iables, the x's and 
the time dummies. Lastly, Li is a (Ti- q) x 1 vector of ones. The GMM estimator 
of 8 has the form: 
J= ｛Ｈｾｗ［ＧｚｩＩａｎＨｾｚｾｗＺＩ｝Ｍｬ＠ ＨｾｗｩＧｚ［ＩａｎＨ｟ｲＺｺ［ｹｴＩ＠ (.3) 
t 't t 'L 
where 
and Wi and Yi denote the first difference transformation of Wi and Yi 1 . Zi is 
a matrix of instrumental variables and Hi is a possibly individual specific weighting 
matrix. 
Here we only focus on the one-step estimators which use some known matrix as 
the choice for Hi. For a first-difference procedure, the one-step estimators use 
1 Here Wj and yj could be other kinds of transformation of Wi and Yi, e.g. levels, orthogonal 
deviations, combinations of first differences (or orthogonal deviations) and ｬ･ｶ･ｬｾＬ＠ deviations from 
individual means. DPD can be used to compute a range of linear GMM estimators of different 
types of transformations. 
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D 1 H.- =H. =-
. ｾ＠ 2 
while a two-step estimators use 
2 -1 
-1 2 
0 
0 
-1 
0 0 ... -1 2 
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(.4) 
(.5) 
where vi are one-step residuals. It is worth noting that, when the Vit are het-
eroscedastic, simulations suggest that the asymptotic standard errors for the two-
step estimators can be a poor guide for hypothesis testing in typical sample sizes. 
That is the case in our empirical work where both the interest rate differential and 
yield curve are more volatile during currency crises. Therefore, we only produce 
the one-step GMM estimators, with the asymptotic heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors, based on which the inference tests are more reliable 2 • 
The assumption of no serial correlation (or just moving average) in the Vit is 
essential for the consistency of the one-step GMM first-difference estimators, which 
instrument the lagged dependent variable with further lags of the same variable. 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is adopted here to test for the serial 
correlation in the error term. That is, if AN is chosen optimally for any given Zi, 
the statistic 
is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with as many degrees of freedom as 
over-identifying restrictions, under the null hypothesis of the validity of the instru-
ments. The Sargan test based on the two-step GMM estimators is reported because 
2see §3.4, Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond (1998) for further discussions. 
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only that is heteroscedasticity-consistent 3 . 
3 Again, Arellano and Bond (1991) provides a comprehensive discussion of the several test 
procedures. 
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